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3Abstract
Noncooperative game theory enjoys a vast canon of solution concepts.
The predominant solution concept is Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950a; Nash,
1951). Other solution concepts include generalizations and refinements of
Nash equilibrium as well as alternatives to it.
Despite their successes, the established solution concepts are in some
ways unsatisfactory. In particular, for many games, such as the Centipede
Game (Rosenthal, 1981), the p-Beauty Contest (Moulin, 1986; Simonsen, 1988),
and the notorious Traveler’s Dilemma (Basu, 1994; Basu, 2007), many of the
solution concepts yield solutions that are both unreasonable in theory and
refuted by the experimental evidence. And when a solution concept manages
to yield the expected or reasonable solutions for such games, it often suffers
from other difficulties such as unwieldy complexity or reliance on ad hoc or
game-specific constructions that may fail to be generalizable.
We propose a new solution concept, which we call least-squares regret,
that yields the expected or reasonable solutions for games that have thus
far proved to be problematic, such as the Traveler’s Dilemma; that is sim-
ple; that involves no ad hoc or game-specific constructions and can thus be
applied immediately and consistently to any arbitrary game; that exhibits
nice properties; and that is grounded in human psychology. Intuitively, we
suppose that a player chooses a strategy so as to minimize the divergence
from perfect play overall. In particular, we suppose that a player is partially
strategic and chooses a strategy so as to minimize the sum, across all partial
profiles of strategies of the other players, of the squares of the regrets, where
the regret of a strategy with respect to a partial profile is the difference of the
best-response payoff with respect to the partial profile and the payoff from
choosing the strategy with respect to the partial profile.
The aim of this work is to develop the solution concept of least-squares
regret; explore its properties; assess its performance with respect to various
games of interest; determine its merits and demerits, especially in relation
to other solution concepts; review its weaknesses; introduce a refinement,
which we call mutual weighted least-squares regret, that addresses some of the
weaknesses; and propose some questions for further research.
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1Introduction
Noncooperative game theory enjoys a vast canon of solution concepts. The pre-
dominant solution concept is Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950a; Nash, 1951). Other
solution concepts include generalizations and refinements of Nash equilibrium as
well as alternatives to it.
Despite their successes, the established solution concepts are in some ways un-
satisfactory. In particular, for many games, such as the Centipede Game (Rosenthal,
1981), the p-Beauty Contest (Moulin, 1986; Simonsen, 1988), and the notorious
Traveler’s Dilemma (Basu, 1994; Basu, 2007), the last of which we address in detail
in Chapter 4, many of the solution concepts yield solutions that are both unrea-
sonable in theory and refuted by the experimental evidence. And when a solution
concept manages to yield the expected or reasonable solutions for such games, it
often suffers from other difficulties such as unwieldy complexity or reliance on ad
hoc or game-specific constructions that may fail to be generalizable.
Thus, we are led naturally to ask: is it possible to develop a solution concept
that yields the expected or reasonable solutions for games that have thus far proved
to be problematic if not also for other games of interest; that is sufficiently simple
so as to be both trivial to apply and also a plausible characterization of typical
reasoning and behavior; that involves no ad hoc or game-specific constructions
and can thus be applied immediately and consistently to any arbitrary game; that
exhibits nice mathematical and conceptual properties; and that is grounded in
human psychology? This dissertation seeks to develop such a solution concept.
While there may be reasons to act in accordance with one or another of the
established solution concepts, we propose that there is an alternative way to reason
about a game. This alternative way to reason is best understood by considering
how a player might envisage his decision problem. We consider a brief informal
characterization here and an illustrative example in Section 1.2.
In playing a game, a player must choose a single strategy in ignorance of the
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strategies chosen by the other players. But whether or not a strategy is a best
response may depend on the strategies that the other players choose. Thus, a
strategy may not be perfect with respect to every course of play: while it may
constitute perfect play with respect to some strategies of the other players, it may
diverge from perfect play with respect to other strategies. Furthermore, a strategy
may diverge more or less from perfect play depending on the extent to which it
falls short.
We suppose that a player chooses a strategy so as to minimize the divergence
from perfect play overall. In particular, we suppose that a player chooses a strategy
so as to minimize the sum, across all partial profiles of strategies of the other
players, of the squares of the regrets, where the regret of a strategy with respect
to a partial profile is the difference of the best-response payoff with respect to
the partial profile and the payoff from choosing the strategy with respect to the
partial profile. This idea is the basis of our solution concept, which we call least-
squares regret. This dissertation is concerned with defining, developing, defending,
assessing, and refining least-squares regret.
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with explaining the need to develop
an alternative solution concept and discussing informally the essential ideas
behind least-squares regret. Section 1.1 considers some of the established solution
concepts and their inadequacies. Section 1.2 motivates least-squares regret by
considering a simple decision problem. Section 1.3 discusses the concept of
regret, its origin in decision theory, its use in game theory, and evidence from
experimental economics suggesting its role in human psychology. Section 1.4
considers the various degrees to which a player might be strategic. Section 1.5
outlines the contributions of this dissertation.
1.1 Solution Concepts for Noncooperative Games
We noted earlier that the established solution concepts are in some ways unsat-
isfactory, suggesting the need to develop an alternative solution concept such as
least-squares regret. In this section, we consider briefly some of the established
solution concepts and the issues surrounding them.
One of the oldest and most developed solution concepts is maximin (von
Neumann, 1928; Wald, 1939; Wald, 1945; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947;
Wald, 1950). While maximin is the standard solution concept for two-person zero-
sum games, its significance when it comes to other classes of games is less certain.
In particular, focusing exclusively on the minimum payoffmay be too restrictive,
and for many games of interest, maximin yields unsatisfactory solutions. We
examine maximin in more detail, especially in relation to least-squares regret, in
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Sections 3.1 and 7.2.
That Nash equilibrium is the predominant solution concept and has enjoyed
considerable success is undeniable. For perspectives on Nash equilibrium and its
influence, see Myerson (1999) and Holt and Roth (2004).
But as is well known, it is not without its problems. Many solution concepts
have been developed in order to address these problems and others.
In one sense, Nash equilibrium is too weak: it may yield a multiplicity of
solutions and fail to exclude unreasonable ones. Selection criteria and refinements
of Nash equilibrium—such as the focal-point effect (Schelling, 1960); perfect equi-
librium (Selten, 1975); proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978); sequential equilibrium
(Kreps and Wilson, 1982); persistent equilibrium (Kalai and Samet, 1984); stable
equilibrium (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986); and payoff dominance and risk domi-
nance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988)—introduce additional constraints in order to
exclude unreasonable equilibria and to guide equilibrium selection in games with
multiple equilibria.
In another sense, Nash equilibrium is too strong: it may exclude reasonable
outcomes, sometimes on the basis of implausible assumptions. For example, it
assumes very strong conditions on the players such as the condition that each
player have no mistaken beliefs about the strategies of the other players, even
when such expectations may be untenable. Generalizations of Nash equilibrium,
such as rationalizability (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984), weaken the conditions as-
sumed in order to include more reasonable outcomes and to obtain more accurate
characterizations of rationality.
As characterizations of human behavior, however, these solution concepts
have mixed records. For many games, such as those noted earlier, these solution
concepts fail to capture the observed behavior. A salient example is the finitely
repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, in which cooperation is ruled out by the solution
concepts while being routinely confirmed by experiments (Smale, 1980; Axelrod,
1981).
One common approach to explain observed or so-called “anomalous” behavior
in a problematic game is to modify the game in a slight, but instrumental, way and
then to proceed as usual with some standard solution concept or another. Such
an approach minimizes the departure from standard game theory. For example,
Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) explain cooperation in the finitely
repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma by modeling the game as a Bayesian game that
includes an irrational or “cooperative” type.
Some more recent solution concepts are readier to depart from standard game
theory for the sake of better explanations of observed behavior. Many of these
solution concepts—such as quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey,
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1995; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998), level-k thinking (Stahl and Wilson, 1994;
Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2004; Crawford,
Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri, 2013), and noisy introspection (Goeree and Holt, 1999;
Goeree and Holt, 2004)—can capture the observed behavior exceedingly well.
Their successes can be explained in part by their appeals to noise or bounded
reasoning capacity.
Other recent solution concepts employ sophisticated constructions and pro-
cedures in order to model how people reason and to explain observed behavior.
According to minimax weighted expected regret (Halpern and Leung, 2014), the
beliefs of a player about uncertain events are modeled by specifying a set of
weighted probability distributions, and a player chooses a strategy so as to mini-
mize the maximum weighted expected regret. According to common belief in utility
proportional beliefs (Bach and Perea, 2014), each player holds utility proportional
beliefs, according to which the differences of the probabilities of the strategies of
the other players are proportional to the differences of the utilities of the strategies,
believes that each player holds such utility proportional beliefs, and so on.
The solution concepts described above have their advantages and may be
appropriate for many games or situations. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, there
are reasons to be dissatisfied with certain aspects of these solution concepts and
thus reasons to seek an alternative solution concept.
As noted earlier, for many games of interest, many of the established solution
concepts yield solutions that are both unreasonable in theory and refuted by the
experimental evidence. The failure of the solution concepts to capture or explain
the expected or reasonable behavior in these games renders the solution concepts
inappropriate and less useful for characterizing reasoning and behavior. This
problem is particularly pointed when, as in the case of the Traveler’s Dilemma
discussed in Chapter 4, the discrepancies are striking and perplexing.
The trouble with the common approach of modifying a game to capture the
observed behavior is that the modifications are generally ad hoc or game-specific.
For example, the method of Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) to explain
cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma turns on the pat definition
of an irrational or “cooperative” type, which is specific to the game. But the ad hoc
or game-specific nature of such modifications means that the common approach
of modifying a game cannot be applied to a game without some preparatory work,
for example, defining an irrational or “cooperative” type and what is entailed.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a certain modification, being specific to the
game for which it was developed, can be generalized to other games. For example,
for many games, it is not clear what an irrational or “cooperative” type would be
or whether such a type would have any sensible meaning. Thus, while modifying
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a game may yield the desired effect, such a method may not be appropriate in
general.
A solution concept may be game-specific in other unsatisfactory ways, such as
depending on particular specifications of a game that are decision-theoretically
negligible. For example, it is well known that quantal response equilibrium is not
scale invariant and thus depends on the particular utility functions specified in a
game (Wright and Leyton-Brown, 2010). But the dependence of a solution concept
on the particular specifications of a game that are decision-theoretically negligible,
such as the dependence of quantal response equilibrium on the particular utility
functions specified in a game, may render the solution concept inconsistent,
yielding different solutions for games that are considered decision-theoretically
equivalent.
Many of the more recent solution concepts involve specifying structures in
advance, for example, an error structure, as in quantal response equilibrium or
noisy introspection, or a typology of players, as in level-k thinking, and then
estimating free parameters, for example, a precision parameter or a population
distribution parameter. Such an approach can be problematic. The need to make
preliminary specifications, for example, the behavior of a level-0 type in level-k
thinking, and the ad hoc or game-specific nature of such specifications threaten
ease of application and generalizability. Furthermore, the flexibility allowed in
specifying a model, the focus on in-sample parameter estimation, and the freedom
to choose the best parameter estimates mean that, without suitable restrictions, a
model can often be adjusted to fit virtually any set of data, may be susceptible to
overfitting, and may fail to generalize to other games. For more on these issues,
see, for example, Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2005); Haile, Hortaçsu, and Kosenok
(2008); Wright and Leyton-Brown (2010); Burchardi and Penczynski (2012); and
Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri (2013).
Finally, many of the established solution concepts are sufficiently complex so
as to be both nontrivial to apply and also dubious characterizations of typical
reasoning and behavior. For example, Nash equilibrium and related solution
concepts involve complex computations of fixed points and assume of the players
unbounded reasoning capacity. Even weaker solution concepts, such as rationaliz-
ability, may involve reasoning of the infinitely iterated or complex sort that is not
likely to be plausible. Furthermore, a solution concept that is simple in the one
sense may be complex in the other sense. For example, while level-k thinking in-
volves the simple and fairly plausible assumption of bounded reasoning capacity,
solving a game using level-k thinking involves nontrivial parameter estimations
and extensive testing.
Much more can be said, of course, about these solution concepts and others.
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For further discussions on various solution concepts and related issues, see, for
example, Kreps (1990); Myerson (1991); Fudenberg and Tirole (1991); van Damme
(1991); Osborne and Rubinstein (1994); Aumann (1997); Rubinstein (1998); Go-
eree and Holt (1999); Goeree and Holt (2001); van Damme (2002); Hillas and
Kohlberg (2002); Govindan and Wilson (2008); Halpern (2008); Wright and
Leyton-Brown (2010); Fudenberg (2010); Shubik (2012); Crawford, Costa-Gomes,
and Iriberri (2013); Crawford (2013); and Camerer and Ho (2015).
Whatever might be said about the various solution concepts that have been
developed, it is clear that interest in alternative solution concepts persists, and
new solution concepts continue to be proposed and discussed.
For our part, it is our dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the established
solution concepts that inspired our search for an alternative solution concept.
What we are after is simply a solution concept that is less susceptible to the
problems described above, that is, a solution concept that yields the expected or
reasonable solutions for the games of interest; that involves no ad hoc or game-
specific constructions and can be applied immediately and consistently to any
arbitrary game; that involves no exogenous structures or free parameters; that
is simple; that has nice properties; and that has some basis in actual human
reasoning.
It is worth emphasizing that what we are after is neither a refinement nor
a generalization of Nash equilibrium. And that is because, for many games of
interest, the set of solutions that seem reasonable and the set of equilibria may be
disjoint. The Traveler’s Dilemma, discussed in Chapter 4, is a notable example of
this point. Thus, what we are after is an alternative to Nash equilibrium.
1.2 Motivation
In this section, we explore the motivation behind least-squares regret as a way
to reason about an uncertain situation, such as a game, and thus as a solution
concept for noncooperative games.
Suppose that a player is faced with the following decision problem. Let
Θ = {θ1,θ2,θ3,θ4,θ5,θ6} be the set of states of the world, let X = {x,y} be the set of
strategies available to the player, and let the function u : Θ ×X→ R be the payoff
function for the player with the payoffs as shown in Table 1.1. Only one state
will obtain. The trouble is that the player does not know which state will obtain.
Suppose that the uniform distribution is applied to the set Θ of states of the world.
The question is how to reason about such a problem.
According to the traditional approach, the aim is to maximize the expected
payoff (Borel, 1921; von Neumann, 1928; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947;
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Table 1.1 Payoffs in a decision problem
@
@@
X
Θ
x
y
θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6
1 2 3 4 5 5
2 3 4 5 6 0
Savage, 1954). Given the uniform distribution over the setΘ of states of the world,
the expected payoff from choosing x and the expected payoff from choosing y are
identical and equal to 10/3. Thus, neither strategy is better than the other provided
that the aim is to maximize the expected payoff.
Nevertheless, we propose that, despite the equality of the expected payoff from
choosing x and the expected payoff from choosing y, there is a sense in which x is
more reasonable than y. In every state apart from θ6, choosing x yields a payoff
that is only slightly less than the best-response payoff that is achieved by choosing
y, and in state θ6, choosing x yields the best-response payoff, which is significantly
greater than the payoff from choosing y. In every state apart from θ6, choosing
y yields the best-response payoff, which is only slightly greater than the payoff
from choosing x, and in state θ6, choosing y yields a payoff that is significantly
less than the best-response payoff that is achieved by choosing x.
Clearly, neither strategy is perfect with respect to every state. Each strategy
constitutes perfect play with respect to some state and diverges from perfect play
with respect to some other state. But by choosing x, the player minimizes the
divergence from perfect play overall: whatever state ultimately obtains, choosing x
ends up being, if not perfect play, then very close to it. By contrast, while choosing
y yields the best-response payoff in every state apart from θ6, if θ6 obtains, then
choosing y falls far short of perfect play.
We can make this reasoning explicit as follows. We suppose that the player
computes the sum
∑
θ∈Θ
max
z∈X
u(θ, z)−u(θ,x)
2 = 5,
which can be thought of as a measure of the extent to which x diverges from
perfect play overall, and the sum
∑
θ∈Θ
max
z∈X
u(θ, z)−u(θ, y)
2 = 25,
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which can be thought of as a measure of the extent to which y diverges from
perfect play overall. Furthermore, we suppose that the player chooses a strategy
so as to minimize the divergence from perfect play overall and thus chooses x.
More generally, we suppose that a player chooses a strategy so as to minimize
the sum, across all states of the world, of the squares of the regrets, where the
regret of a strategy with respect to a state is the difference of the best-response
payoff with respect to the state and the payoff from choosing the strategy with
respect to the state.
We extend this idea to noncooperative games in the natural way. In particular,
we suppose that a player views the strategies of the other players as uncertain
events, with each partial profile of strategies constituting a state of the world.
Furthermore, we suppose that a player chooses a strategy so as to minimize the
sum, across all partial profiles of strategies of the other players, of the squares of
the regrets, where the regret of a strategy with respect to a partial profile is the
difference of the best-response payoff with respect to the partial profile and the
payoff from choosing the strategy with respect to the partial profile—hence the
name least-squares regret.
Thus, least-squares regret can be seen as an extension of the decision-theoretic
approach to game theory advocated by Kadane and Larkey (1982) and Raiffa
(1982) and explored further by Roth and Schoumaker (1983). The decision-
theoretic approach to game theory involves viewing a game from the perspective
of each player considered individually, assessing a probability distribution to
characterize the beliefs of the player about the strategies of the other players, and
then identifying the strategies of the player that maximize his expected payoff
with respect to the assessed probability distribution. This approach to game
theory contrasts sharply with the standard approach, championed by Harsanyi
(1982) and others. The standard approach to game theory involves solving the
decision problems of the players considered altogether, as if the decision problems
constituted a system of equations in several unknowns.
Least-squares regret differs from the decision-theoretic approach to game the-
ory in two ways. Least-squares regret involves assigning the uniform distribution,
formalized in terms of unweighted summation, while the decision-theoretic ap-
proach involves assessing a probability distribution that need not be uniform.
Furthermore, least-squares regret supposes that a player chooses a strategy so as
to minimize the sum of the squares of the regrets while the decision-theoretic
approach supposes that a player chooses a strategy so as to maximize the expected
payoff with respect to the assessed probability distribution.
We recognize that assuming the uniform distribution may be too restrictive.
We discuss this assumption in Sections 1.4, 2.2, 2.5, and 7.4. In Chapter 8, we
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introduce a refinement of least-squares regret that involves assessing probabil-
ity distributions induced by the strategies of the other players and replacing
unweighted summation with weighted summation, where the weights are the
assessed probabilities. Refining least-squares regret in this way brings it even
closer to the decision-theoretic approach to game theory.
1.3 The Concept of Regret
Central to least-squares regret, as the name suggests and as discussed in Section
1.2, is the concept of regret. Intuitively, the regret of a strategy is a measure of the
extent to which the strategy falls short of perfect play.
The concept of regret has a long history, originating in decision theory with
Niehans (1948) and Savage (1951). Notably, Savage (1951) introduces the concept
of regret, explicitly distinguishing it from the concept of negative income, partly
in order to highlight the failure of Wald (1950) and others to distinguish the
two concepts and argues that the minimax principle is less pessimistic and more
reasonable when applied to regret than when applied to negative income.
Despite advocating the minimax principle as applied to regret, Savage (1951)
professes that no absolute justification for the minimax principle can be given
and concedes that an argument might well exist for preferring to minimize the
average regret or some other aggregate measure. One such alternative is precisely
least-squares regret, which can be thought of as involving the minimization of
the average of the squares of the regrets. In Section 3.2, we show that focusing
exclusively on the maximum regret, as the minimax principle specifies, may be
too restrictive and that it may be better to minimize the sum of the squares of the
regrets, as least-squares regret specifies.
While the concept of regret had since its introduction gained considerable
currency in decision theory, it is only recently that an interest has grown in
employing it in game theory. Many solution concepts and models now incorporate
the concept of regret, largely to obtain more accurate characterizations of observed
behavior. Linhart and Radner (1989) apply the concept of regret to the problem
of sealed-bid bargaining with multiple variables and show that an analysis based
on bidding so as to minimize the maximum regret has a number of advantages
over equilibrium analysis. The approach to learning known as learning direction
theory (Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Selten and Buchta, 1999; Selten, Abbink, and
Cox, 2005) considers learning via adjustments made on the basis of regrets and
not on the basis of experienced payoffs, as in standard reinforcement learning
theories. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) explain overbidding in first-price auctions
in terms of anticipation of loser regret. Renou and Schlag (2010) introduce a new
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solution concept called minimax regret equilibrium according to which each player
in a game chooses a belief about the behavior of the other players according to
a minimax regret criterion and then chooses a best response. Halpern and Pass
(2012) introduce a new solution concept called iterated regret minimization, which
we examine in Sections 3.2 and 6.8, that involves iteratively eliminating all of the
strategies that fail to minimize the maximum regret.
Furthermore, as studies in experimental economics show, regret appears to
play a significant role in human psychology. Ritov (1996) shows that preferences
can change depending on the extent to which uncertainty can be expected to be
resolved and that a principal component of this effect is the anticipated experience
of regret. Grosskopf, Erev, and Yechiam (2006) show that people tend to be
extremely sensitive to foregone payoffs and that foregone payoff information can
have significant effects on choice behavior depending on the environment.
Thus, there seems to be good reason to incorporate the concept of regret into
the analysis of noncooperative games. We propose least-squares regret as one
particular way to do so.
1.4 Nonstrategic, Partially Strategic, and Fully
Strategic Reasoning
As discussed in Section 1.1, solution concepts can differ in the degree of sophis-
tication assumed of a player, with some solution concepts supposing a more
sophisticated player and other solution concepts supposing a less sophisticated
player.
A player might be nonstrategic. In particular, a player might reason about the
other players to no appreciable degree, form no assumptions about them, and then,
without thinking and without any particular aim, choose a strategy randomly
according to some probability distribution, say, the uniform distribution.
Alternatively, a player might be partially strategic. In particular, a player
might reason about the other players to a limited degree, form only rudimentary
assumptions about them, and then, in some principled way, choose a strategy
accordingly.
Finally, a player might be fully strategic. In particular, a player might reason
about the other players to an unlimited degree, form very sophisticated assump-
tions about them, including assumptions about how they might reason about one
another, and then, in some principled way, choose a strategy accordingly.
This typology is fairly standard and fruitfully used. For example, it is central
to level-k thinking (Stahl and Wilson, 1994; Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995;
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Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2004; Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri, 2013). In
level-k thinking, a level-0 type is assumed to be nonstrategic, forming no beliefs
about the other players and choosing a strategy randomly according to some
probability distribution, typically the uniform distribution, and, for any level k
such that k ≥ 1, a level-k type is assumed to be partially strategic, believing the
other players to constitute a population of types from levels 0 to k−1 and choosing
a strategy accordingly.
Most solution concepts suppose that a player is fully strategic. But as seen
in Section 1.1, such an assumption may be a dubious characterization of typical
reasoning and behavior and yield a solution concept that is nontrivial to apply
and fails to capture the expected or reasonable behavior, especially in games in
which a player is less likely to be fully strategic. As noted earlier, many solution
concepts, addressing these inadequacies, suppose instead that a player is partially
strategic.
In defining least-squares regret, we likewise suppose that a player is partially
strategic in order to address the inadequacies just noted. In particular, as discussed
in Section 1.2, we suppose that a player treats uniformly the partial profiles of
strategies of the other players and chooses a strategy so as to minimize the sum of
the squares of the regrets. Equivalently, to use the language of level-k thinking, we
suppose that a player is a level-1 type who believes that each of the other players
is a level-0 type randomizing according to the uniform distribution and chooses a
strategy accordingly.
Supposing complete ignorance as to which one of a set of mutually exclusive
events will obtain, it is not unjustifiable to regard them as all on a par.
One familiar justification of this position invokes the principle of maximum
entropy (Jaynes, 1957a; Jaynes, 1957b). This principle asserts that when inferences
are to be made on the basis of partial information, the proper distribution to use
is the one with the maximum entropy subject to whatever is known since such
a distribution yields the most unbiased representation of the knowledge of the
state of the system under consideration. Notably, where nothing is known, the
maximum-entropy distribution is the uniform distribution.
Another familiar justification invokes the principle of insufficient reason,
which goes back to Bernoulli (1713) and Laplace (1825). This principle asserts
that if there is no reason to judge any one of a set of mutually exclusive events to be
likelier than any other, then the distribution to assign is the uniform distribution.
Chernoff (1954) and Milnor (1954) provide formal justifications of the principle.
Sinn (1980) shows that two of the axioms necessary for expected utility theory,
the axiom of ordering and the axiom of independence, imply the principle.
Such a position seems particularly apt when it comes to characterizing a player
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who is partially strategic to a very limited degree. We suppose, as is standard, that
a player is completely ignorant of the strategy choices of the other players, has no
past experience with the other players, and thus has no special information about
which strategies the other players are choosing. Furthermore, we suppose that a
player is partially strategic to a very limited degree and thus makes no inferences
about how the other players might behave. Thus, it is natural to suppose that
a player treats uniformly the partial profiles of strategies of the other players.
Indeed, to suppose otherwise would be to ascribe to him strategic reasoning
capacity or information about the strategy choices of the other players that he
might not have.
Supposing a player to be partially strategic in this way has a number of ad-
vantages. Such an assumption may be a plausible characterization of typical
reasoning and behavior, especially since people are in general neither nonstrategic
nor fully strategic, but strategic to a very limited degree. Furthermore, as shown
in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, such an assumption makes for a solution concept that
is mathematically and conceptually simple, exhibits nice properties, and yields
the expected or reasonable solutions for a number of games of interest.
Of course, such an assumption is also an obvious point of criticism. The
trouble is that a player characterized as above, while partially strategic, seems to
be insufficiently strategic. In particular, even under complete ignorance, a player
who is partially strategic, even to a limited degree, might be capable of reasoning
fairly competently about how the other players might behave and thus judge some
partial profiles of strategies of the other players to be likelier than other ones.
We review these concerns in Section 2.5, and in Section 7.4, we discuss some of
the problems that can arise from supposing that a player is partially strategic as
characterized above. In Chapter 8, we introduce a refinement of least-squares
regret that considers fully strategic players.
1.5 Contributions of this Dissertation
The primary contribution of this dissertation is a new solution concept for nonco-
operative games, one that yields the expected or reasonable solutions for games
that have so far proved problematic, such as the Traveler’s Dilemma, discussed
in Chapter 4, and for other games of interest, such as those in Chapter 6; that is
simple; that involves no ad hoc or game-specific constructions and can thus be
applied immediately and consistently to any arbitrary game; that exhibits nice
properties, such as those established in Chapter 5; and that is grounded in human
psychology. The greater part of this dissertation is concerned with defining and
developing least-squares regret; exploring its properties; assessing its performance
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with respect to various games of interest; determining its merits and demerits,
including the weaknesses discussed in Chapter 7; and introducing a refinement of
least-squares regret in Chapter 8 that addresses some of the weaknesses.
Early in this chapter and in Sections 1.2 and 1.4, we presented an informal
characterization of least-squares regret in order to motivate it and to fix ideas. As
noted earlier, the idea behind least-squares regret is to choose a strategy so as to
minimize the divergence from perfect play overall. But in order to proceed with
the development and assessment of least-squares regret, it is necessary first to
present a formal characterization of it. In Chapter 2, we formally define least-
squares regret, study an illustrative example to show how least-squares regret is
applied, consider briefly and set aside an alternative definition of least-squares
regret with respect to randomized strategies, and then discuss the assumptions
underlying least-squares regret and make some preliminary observations.
In certain ways, least-squares regret is not unlike some other solution concepts.
Two solution concepts in particular to which least-squares regret bears a resem-
blance are maximin, mentioned in Section 1.1, and iterated regret minimization,
mentioned in Section 1.3. Given the similarities, it is instructive to study least-
squares regret in relation to each of these solution concepts and to see what sets
least-squares regret apart. In Chapter 3, we compare least-squares regret with
each of these solution concepts and give some reasons for preferring least-squares
regret.
Early in this chapter and in Section 1.1, we mentioned as an illustration of some
of the inadequacies of the standard solution concepts the notorious Traveler’s
Dilemma. Given its status as a puzzle with no universally accepted resolution, it
is worthwhile to understand its recalcitrance. In Chapter 4, we describe and study
the Traveler’s Dilemma in detail. We consider the failure of the standard solution
concepts to yield the reasonable solution that is supported by both intuition and
the experimental evidence. After describing some alternative analyses, we show
how least-squares regret resolves the puzzle.
Part of evaluating a solution concept involves determining the properties that
it exhibits and the criteria that it satisfies. Ideally, a solution concept should
exhibit nice and desirable properties and satisfy the relevant criteria. In Chapter
5, we establish some notable mathematical and conceptual properties of least-
squares regret, including existence; invariance with respect to full equivalence; the
relationship between least-squares regret and dominated strategies; the differences
between least-squares regret and iterative elimination of dominated strategies;
the relationship between least-squares regret and uniformly dominant strategies;
invariance with respect to certain well-known transformations of the payoffs in
a game that leave unchanged the best-response correspondences of the players;
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the equivalence of least-squares regret and risk dominance when it comes to the
equilibria in pure strategies of a 2× 2 game; convexity of the set of solutions of a
game; and uniqueness of a solution under specific conditions.
Another part of evaluating a solution concept involves determining whether it
yields the expected or reasonable solutions for the games of interest. A solution
concept that failed to yield the expected or reasonable solutions would not be con-
sidered successful no matter how superior it might be in other respects. In Chapter
6, we apply least-squares regret to a number of well-known games, in particular,
the Dollar Auction; Bertrand competition; inspection games; Matching Pennies;
Chicken; coordination games; Battle of the Sexes; and the two-person bargaining
problem. We show how, with respect to many of these games, least-squares regret
yields reasonable solutions in line with intuition and the experimental evidence
and outperforms standard solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium and how,
with respect to some of these games, least-squares regret yields unsatisfactory
solutions.
All solution concepts have their weaknesses, and least-squares regret is no
different. As shown in Chapter 6, for some games, least-squares regret yields
unsatisfactory solutions. Furthermore, least-squares regret has some other weak-
nesses not unlike those aﬄicting the solution concepts discussed in Sections 1.1
and 1.3. In Chapter 7, we consider some of the weaknesses of least-squares re-
gret, including its failure to satisfy the principle of Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives, its divergence from maximin and Nash equilibrium with respect to
two-person zero-sum games, its susceptibility to framing effects, and the problems
that arise from supposing that a player is partially strategic in the sense discussed
in Sections 1.2, 1.4, 2.2, and 2.5.
As noted throughout this dissertation, least-squares regret considers partially
strategic players. Supposing a player to be partially strategic has many advantages,
as the greater part of this dissertation illustrates. But as discussed in Sections 1.2,
1.4, 2.2, 2.5, and 7.4, such an assumption has its limitations. In particular, such
an assumption can yield unsatisfactory solutions and, being oversimple, may be
an implausible characterization of typical reasoning and behavior, which may be
more sophisticated. Recognizing the importance of relaxing this assumption and
addressing its limitations, we introduce in Chapter 8 a refinement of least-squares
regret, which we call mutual weighted least-squares regret, that considers fully
strategic players. This refinement may be a fruitful alternative to least-squares
regret, especially for games in which a player is likely to be significantly, if not
fully, strategic. Much of Chapter 8 is devoted to developing mutual weighted least-
squares regret, studying an illustrative example to show how mutual weighted
least-squares regret is applied, proving a general existence theorem, comparing
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mutual weighted least-squares regret with Nash equilibrium, and understanding
whether computation of a solution can be reduced to a recursive process.
We view this dissertation essentially as an exploration of least-squares regret
and its significance. But we recognize that room remains for further development.
In Chapter 9, we conclude the dissertation by proposing some questions for
further research. The proposed topics include a deeper defense of least-squares
regret; a refinement of least-squares regret that considers highly strategic, but not
fully strategic, players; extensions of least-squares regret to other classes of games,
such as games with infinite strategy sets, Bayesian games, and games in extensive
form; and applications of least-squares regret to applied areas such as mechanism
design.
2Least-Squares Regret
In this chapter, we present a formal characterization of least-squares regret. Sec-
tion 2.1 presents the notation and basic concepts used throughout this dissertation.
Section 2.2 formally defines least-squares regret. Section 2.3 studies an illustrative
example. Section 2.4 considers briefly and sets aside an alternative definition of
least-squares regret with respect to randomized strategies. Section 2.5 discusses
the assumptions underlying least-squares regret and makes some preliminary
observations.
2.1 Notation and Basic Concepts
In this section, we present standard notation and the basic concepts of noncooper-
ative game theory. We follow for the most part the presentation of Myerson (1991)
and deviate where appropriate.
A game in strategic form is any Γ of the form
Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ),
where N is the nonempty set of players and, for any player i in N , the nonempty
set Ci is the pure-strategy set for player i, a pure strategy for player i is any ci in Ci ,
and the function ui :

j∈N Cj → R is the utility function for player i.
A pure-strategy profile is any vector c = (cj)j∈N in

j∈N Cj .
For any game Γ in strategic form, the game Γ is finite if and only if the set N of
players is finite and, for every player i in N , the pure-strategy set Ci is finite. In
the interest of tractability, we restrict attention to finite games in strategic form.
For any player i in N , let N − i be the set such that
N − i = N \ {i},
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and let C−i be the set of partial profiles of pure strategies of the other players, that
is,
C−i =

j∈N−i
Cj .
For any player i in N , any partial profile c−i = (cj)j∈N−i in C−i , and any pure
strategy ci in Ci , let (c−i , ci) be the pure-strategy profile in

j∈N Cj such that the
i-component is ci and all other components are as in c−i .
For any finite set Z, let ∆(Z) be the set of probability distributions over the set
Z, that is,
∆(Z) = {q : Z→ R |
∑
y∈Z
q(y) = 1 and q(z) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ Z}.
For any player i in N , the set ∆(Ci) is the randomized-strategy set for player i,
and a randomized strategy for player i is any σi = (σi(ci))ci∈Ci in ∆(Ci).
A randomized-strategy profile is any vector σ = (σj)j∈N in

j∈N ∆(Cj).
For any player i in N , any partial profile σ−i = (σj)j∈N−i in

j∈N−i∆(Cj), and
any randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci), let (σ−i ,σi) be the randomized-strategy profile
such that the i-component is σi and all other components are as in σ−i .
As is standard, we suppose that the players choose their pure strategies inde-
pendently. For any randomized-strategy profile σ = (σj)j∈N in

j∈N ∆(Cj) and any
pure-strategy profile c = (cj)j∈N in

j∈N Cj , the probability that c obtains in play
is just∏
j∈N
σj(cj).
For any player i in N , the utility function ui :

j∈N Cj → R is extended to the
domain

j∈N ∆(Cj) to yield the function ui :

j∈N ∆(Cj)→ R such that
ui(σ) =
∑
c∈j∈N Cj
∏
j∈N
σj(cj)
ui(c).
For any player i in N and any pure strategy ci in Ci , let ci be also the ran-
domized strategy in ∆(Ci) such that the pure strategy ci is assigned probability
1.
Using standard linear algebra notation, for any player i in N and any random-
ized strategy σi in ∆(Ci), let
σi =
∑
ci∈Ci
σi(ci)ci .
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2.2 Formal Definition
When it comes to playing a game, the essential question is which strategy to
choose. One natural way to evaluate a strategy is to determine how grave an error
it would be to choose it. Intuitively, the less of an error it would be to play a
strategy, the better the strategy is. Thus, the idea is to choose a strategy with the
minimum degree of error. What follows is essentially a characterization of the
error associated with choosing a strategy.
In playing a game, a player faces other players, each of whom is likewise
choosing a strategy. How well a strategy ends up performing depends on the
strategies that the other players choose and, in particular, on the outcome that
obtains in play. Thus, we suppose that a player is concerned with the partial
profiles of strategies of the other players that can ultimately obtain in play.
Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form. Consider any
player i in N . The set
C−i =

j∈N−i
Cj
is the set of partial profiles of pure strategies of the other players. In the end, after
the other players have settled on their pure strategies, exactly one partial profile
will obtain in play. The trouble for player i is that he does not know the strategy
choices of the other players.
The set C−i is the set of partial profiles that can ultimately obtain in play. Thus,
we suppose that player i is concerned with the partial profiles in C−i and chooses
a pure strategy accordingly.
Now, consider any pure strategy ci in Ci and any partial profile c−i in C−i . If
the other players play as in c−i , then the payoff to player i from choosing ci is
ui(c−i , ci).
But ci may or may not be a best response to c−i . Thus, ui(c−i , ci) may or may not
be the best-response payoffmaxdi∈Ci ui(c−i ,di) that could be achieved with respect
to c−i .
The best-response payoff maxdi∈Ci ui(c−i ,di) is notable. Since it is impossible
to achieve a payoff greater than the best-response payoff, there is no use in being
concerned with payoffs beyond it. It is the maximum payoff that could be achieved
with perfect play with respect to c−i . Thus, it represents the ideal or target or
benchmark payoff with respect to c−i .
If ci is not a best response to c−i , then player i errs in choosing ci in the very
trivial sense that he is not playing as well as he possibly could have with respect
to c−i . By the informal notion of error here, we mean simply a divergence from
perfect play.
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We can quantify the extent to which a pure strategy diverges from perfect play
with respect to a partial profile. For any player i in N , any partial profile c−i in
C−i , and any pure strategy ci in Ci , the regret of the pure strategy ci with respect
to the partial profile c−i is
max
di∈Ci
ui(c−i ,di)−ui(c−i , ci).
Intuitively, this payoff difference is a measure of the extent to which ci falls short
of a best response with respect to c−i . It can be interpreted as the regret from
choosing ci with respect to c−i .
Just as the payoff of a pure strategy with respect to a partial profile can vary
depending on the partial profile, so can the regret of a pure strategy with respect
to a partial profile. Thus, it is necessary to compute the regret of a pure strategy
with respect to each partial profile.
What is of interest ultimately is a measure of the regret of a pure strategy
overall. But since the regret of a pure strategy with respect to a partial profile can
vary depending on the partial profile and since it is impossible to know which
partial profile will obtain in play, it is necessary to evaluate a pure strategy with
respect to all of the partial profiles considered at once.
We suppose the squaring of regret for technical reasons and for mathematical
convenience. But it is worth noting that the squaring of regret amounts to sup-
posing that a larger regret is far more significant in an economic or psychological
sense. We discuss the squaring of regret in Sections 2.5 and 3.2.
We suppose also that a player is partially strategic in the sense described in
Sections 1.2 and 1.4. In particular, we suppose that a player treats uniformly
the partial profiles of pure strategies of the other players. This assumption is an
obvious point of criticism. We discuss it in Sections 2.5 and 7.4, and in Chapter
8, we introduce a refinement of least-squares regret that considers fully strategic
players.
Furthermore, we suppose that a player computes the regret of a pure strategy
by taking the sum, across all partial profiles of pure strategies of the other players,
of the squares of the regrets.
For any player i in N , let ρi : Ci → R be the regret function in pure strategies for
player i such that
ρi(ci) =
∑
c−i∈C−i
max
di∈Ci
ui(c−i ,di)−ui(c−i , ci)

2
.
Intuitively, for any pure strategy ci inCi , the value ρi(ci) is the regret from choosing
ci .
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It is straightforward to extend the definitions above to incorporate randomized
strategies. We proceed in the natural way.
Consider any player i in N . The set

j∈N−i∆(Cj) is the set of partial profiles
of randomized strategies of the other players. In the end, after the other players
have settled on their randomized strategies, exactly one partial profile will obtain
in play. The trouble for player i is that he does not know the strategy choices of
the other players.
But in a sense, the partial profiles in

j∈N−i∆(Cj) are not really the ones
that can ultimately obtain in play. While each of the other players may choose
a randomized strategy, each player will randomize and end up choosing a pure
strategy. Thus, the outcome that obtains after everything is settled will be some
partial profile in C−i .
The set C−i is the set of partial profiles that can ultimately obtain in play. Thus,
we suppose that player i is concerned with the partial profiles in C−i and chooses
a randomized strategy accordingly.
Now, consider any randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci) and any partial profile c−i
in C−i . If the other players play as in c−i , then the payoff to player i from choosing
σi is ui(c−i ,σi). (Recall the definition from earlier: for any player i in N and any
pure strategy ci in Ci , let ci be also the randomized strategy in ∆(Ci) such that the
pure strategy ci is assigned probability 1.) Clearly,
ui(c−i ,σi) =
∑
ci∈Ci
σi(ci)ui(c−i , ci), ∀i ∈N, ∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci), ∀c−i ∈ C−i .
Intuitively, for any randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci) and any partial profile c−i in
C−i , the payoff ui(c−i ,σi) is the expected payoff to player i from choosing σi with
respect to c−i .
But σi may or may not be a best response to c−i . Thus, ui(c−i ,σi) may or may
not be the best-response payoffmaxτi∈∆(Ci )ui(c−i ,τi) that could be achieved with
respect to c−i .
We note in passing that, clearly,
max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi) = max
di∈Ci
ui(c−i ,di), ∀i ∈N, ∀c−i ∈ C−i .
Still, we prefer in this context to specify randomized strategies as opposed to pure
strategies for the sake of symmetry and clarity and to make explicit, especially in
what follows, that randomized strategies are being considered.
The best-response payoffmaxτi∈∆(Ci )ui(c−i ,τi) is notable. Since it is impossible
to achieve a payoff greater than the best-response payoff, there is no use in being
concerned with payoffs beyond it. It is the maximum payoff that could be achieved
with perfect play with respect to c−i . Thus, it represents the ideal or target or
benchmark payoff with respect to c−i .
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If σi is not a best response to c−i , then player i errs in choosing σi in the very
trivial sense that he is not playing as well as he possibly could have with respect
to c−i . Again, by the informal notion of error here, we mean simply a divergence
from perfect play.
We can quantify the extent to which a randomized strategy diverges from
perfect play with respect to a partial profile. For any player i in N , any partial
profile c−i in C−i , and any randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci), the regret of the
randomized strategy σi with respect to the partial profile c−i is
max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i ,σi).
Intuitively, this payoff difference is a measure of the extent to which σi falls short
of a best response with respect to c−i . It can be interpreted as the regret from
choosing σi with respect to c−i .
Just as the payoff of a randomized strategy with respect to a partial profile can
vary depending on the partial profile, so can the regret of a randomized strategy
with respect to a partial profile. Thus, it is necessary to compute the regret of a
randomized strategy with respect to each partial profile.
What is of interest ultimately is a measure of the regret of a randomized
strategy overall. But since the regret of a randomized strategy with respect to a
partial profile can vary depending on the partial profile and since it is impossible
to know which partial profile will obtain in play, it is necessary to evaluate a
randomized strategy with respect to all of the partial profiles considered at once.
We appeal to the assumptions and constructions given in the case of pure
strategies and make adjustments as needed. In particular, we suppose the squaring
of regret; that a player is partially strategic in the sense described in Sections 1.2
and 1.4; that a player treats uniformly the partial profiles of pure strategies of the
other players; and that a player computes the regret of a randomized strategy by
taking the sum, across all partial profiles of pure strategies of the other players,
of the squares of the regrets. As noted earlier, we discuss these assumptions
in Sections 2.5, 3.2, and 7.4, and in Chapter 8, we introduce a refinement of
least-squares regret that considers fully strategic players.
For any player i in N , let ρi : ∆(Ci)→ R be the regret function in randomized
strategies for player i such that
ρi(σi) =
∑
c−i∈C−i
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i ,σi)

2
.
Intuitively, for any randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci), the value ρi(σi) is the regret
from choosing σi .
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The regret of a strategy is a measure of the divergence from the best-response
payoffs of the payoffs that the strategy could yield and is thus a measure of the
extent to which the strategy diverges from perfect play overall. By choosing a
strategy with the minimum regret, a player minimizes the divergence and gets
as close as possible to perfect play overall and thus to securing the best-response
payoff whatever the other players might do.
As discussed in Sections 1.2 and 1.4, we suppose that a player is partially
strategic in the sense that, given his rudimentary assumptions about the other
players, he responds accordingly. In particular, we suppose that a player chooses
a strategy so as to minimize the divergence from the best-response payoffs.
If pure strategies are considered, then a player chooses a pure strategy so as
to minimize the regret function in pure strategies. For any player i in N and any
pure strategy ci in Ci , the pure strategy ci is a pure least-squares regret strategy for
player i if and only if
ρi(ci) ≤ ρi(di), ∀di ∈ Ci .
For any pure-strategy profile c = (cj)j∈N in

j∈N Cj , the pure-strategy profile c is
a least-squares regret profile in pure strategies of Γ if and only if
ρi(ci) ≤ ρi(di), ∀i ∈N, ∀di ∈ Ci .
Thus, in a least-squares regret profile in pure strategies, each player chooses a
pure least-squares regret strategy.
If randomized strategies are considered, then a player chooses a randomized
strategy so as to minimize the regret function in randomized strategies. For any
player i in N and any randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci), the randomized strategy σi
is a randomized least-squares regret strategy for player i if and only if
ρi(σi) ≤ ρi(τi), ∀τi ∈ ∆(Ci).
For any randomized-strategy profile σ = (σj)j∈N in

j∈N ∆(Cj), the randomized-
strategy profile σ is a least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies of Γ if and
only if
ρi(σi) ≤ ρi(τi), ∀i ∈N, ∀τi ∈ ∆(Ci).
Thus, in a least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies, each player chooses
a randomized least-squares regret strategy.
2.3 An Example
For an illustration of least-squares regret, consider the finite two-person game
Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form shown in Table 2.1.
Chapter 2. Least-Squares Regret 30
Table 2.1 A game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
3 0
0 2
0 1
1 0
Consider first least-squares regret with respect to pure strategies. As discussed
in Section 2.2, each player chooses a pure least-squares regret strategy.
Consider player 1. Notice that x1 is a best response if player 2 chooses x2 and
falls short if player 2 chooses y2 and that y1 falls short if player 2 chooses x2 and is
a best response if player 2 chooses y2. Whatever player 1 chooses, he risks playing
imperfectly depending on what player 2 chooses. Thus, player 1 chooses a pure
strategy so as to minimize the regret function ρ1 in pure strategies.
Consider x1. If player 2 chooses x2, then the payoff to player 1 is 3 while the
best-response payoff is 3, and so, the regret is 3−3 = 0. If player 2 chooses y2, then
the payoff to player 1 is 0 while the best-response payoff is 1, and so, the regret is
1− 0 = 1. The regret of x1 is
ρ1(x1) =
max
d1∈C1
u1(d1,x2)−u1(x1,x2)

2
+
max
d1∈C1
u1(d1, y2)−u1(x1, y2)

2
= (3− 3)2 + (1− 0)2
= 1.
Consider y1. If player 2 chooses x2, then the payoff to player 1 is 0 while the
best-response payoff is 3, and so, the regret is 3−0 = 3. If player 2 chooses y2, then
the payoff to player 1 is 1 while the best-response payoff is 1, and so, the regret is
1− 1 = 0. The regret of y1 is
ρ1(y1) =
max
d1∈C1
u1(d1,x2)−u1(y1,x2)

2
+
max
d1∈C1
u1(d1, y2)−u1(y1, y2)

2
= (3− 0)2 + (1− 1)2
= 9.
The regret of x1 is less than the regret of y1, and so, the unique pure least-
squares regret strategy for player 1 is x1.
Consider player 2. Notice that x2 falls short if player 1 chooses x1 and is a best
response if player 1 chooses y1 and that y2 is a best response if player 1 chooses x1
and falls short if player 1 chooses y1. Whatever player 2 chooses, he risks playing
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imperfectly depending on what player 1 chooses. Thus, player 2 chooses a pure
strategy so as to minimize the regret function ρ2 in pure strategies.
Consider x2. If player 1 chooses x1, then the payoff to player 2 is 0 while the
best-response payoff is 2, and so, the regret is 2−0 = 2. If player 1 chooses y1, then
the payoff to player 2 is 1 while the best-response payoff is 1, and so, the regret is
1− 1 = 0. The regret of x2 is
ρ2(x2) =
max
d2∈C2
u2(x1,d2)−u2(x1,x2)

2
+
max
d2∈C2
u2(y1,d2)−u2(y1,x2)

2
= (2− 0)2 + (1− 1)2
= 4.
Consider y2. If player 1 chooses x1, then the payoff to player 2 is 2 while the
best-response payoff is 2, and so, the regret is 2−2 = 0. If player 1 chooses y1, then
the payoff to player 2 is 0 while the best-response payoff is 1, and so, the regret is
1− 0 = 1. The regret of y2 is
ρ2(y2) =
max
d2∈C2
u2(x1,d2)−u2(x1, y2)

2
+
max
d2∈C2
u2(y1,d2)−u2(y1, y2)

2
= (2− 2)2 + (1− 0)2
= 1.
The regret of y2 is less than the regret of x2, and so, the unique pure least-
squares regret strategy for player 2 is y2.
Thus, the unique least-squares regret profile in pure strategies is (x1, y2), which
gives the payoff allocation (0,2).
Now, consider least-squares regret with respect to randomized strategies. As
discussed in Section 2.2, each player chooses a randomized least-squares regret
strategy.
Consider player 1. Notice that whatever player 1 chooses, he risks playing
imperfectly depending on what player 2 chooses. Thus, player 1 chooses a random-
ized strategy so as to minimize the regret function ρ1 in randomized strategies.
Consider any randomized strategy σ1 in ∆(C1). If player 2 chooses x2, then
the payoff to player 1 is 3σ1(x1) while the best-response payoff is 3, and so, the
regret is 3− 3σ1(x1). If player 2 chooses y2, then the payoff to player 1 is 1− σ1(x1)
while the best-response payoff is 1, and so, the regret is 1− (1− σ1(x1)). The regret
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function ρ1 : ∆(C1)→ R is
ρ1(σ1) =
 max
τ1∈∆(C1)
u1(τ1,x2)−u1(σ1,x2)

2
+
 max
τ1∈∆(C1)
u1(τ1, y2)−u1(σ1, y2)

2
= (3− 3σ1(x1))2 + (1− (1− σ1(x1)))2
= 10(σ1(x1))
2 − 18σ1(x1) + 9,
and so,
d(ρ1(σ1))
dσ1(x1)
= 20σ1(x1)− 18.
The regret function ρ1 is minimized at the point σ1(x1) = 0.9, and so, the unique
randomized least-squares regret strategy for player 1 is 0.9x1 + 0.1y1.
Consider player 2. Notice that whatever player 2 chooses, he risks playing
imperfectly depending on what player 1 chooses. Thus, player 2 chooses a random-
ized strategy so as to minimize the regret function ρ2 in randomized strategies.
Consider any randomized strategy σ2 in ∆(C2). If player 1 chooses x1, then
the payoff to player 2 is 2(1− σ2(x2)) while the best-response payoff is 2, and so,
the regret is 2− 2(1− σ2(x2)). If player 1 chooses y1, then the payoff to player 2
is σ2(x2) while the best-response payoff is 1, and so, the regret is 1− σ2(x2). The
regret function ρ2 : ∆(C2)→ R is
ρ2(σ2) =
 max
τ2∈∆(C2)
u2(x1,τ2)−u2(x1,σ2)

2
+
 max
τ2∈∆(C2)
u2(y1,τ2)−u2(y1,σ2)

2
= (2− 2(1− σ2(x2)))2 + (1− σ2(x2))2
= 5(σ2(x2))
2 − 2σ2(x2) + 1,
and so,
d(ρ2(σ2))
dσ2(x2)
= 10σ2(x2)− 2.
The regret function ρ2 is minimized at the point σ2(x2) = 0.2, and so, the unique
randomized least-squares regret strategy for player 2 is 0.2x2 + 0.8y2.
Thus, the unique least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies is
(0.9x1 + 0.1y1,0.2x2 + 0.8y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (0.62,1.46).
2.4 An Alternative Definition
In this section, in order to clarify and affirm the established definition of the regret
function in randomized strategies given in Section 2.2, we consider briefly and set
aside an alternative definition.
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Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form. Now, recall the
established definition. For any player i in N , the regret function in randomized
strategies for player i is the function ρi : ∆(Ci)→ R such that
ρi(σi) =
∑
c−i∈C−i
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i ,σi)

2
=
∑
c−i∈C−i
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−
∑
ci∈Ci
σi(ci)ui(c−i , ci)

2
.
Intuitively, for any randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci), the value ρi(σi) is the sum,
across all partial profiles of pure strategies of the other players, of the squares of
the regrets, where the regret of σi with respect to a partial profile is the difference
of the best-response payoff with respect to the partial profile and the expected
payoff from choosing σi with respect to the partial profile.
According to the established definition, as discussed in Section 2.2, a player
chooses a randomized strategy so as to minimize the regret function in randomized
strategies.
Now, consider the following alternative definition. For any player i in N ,
let ζi : ∆(Ci)→ R be the alternative regret function in randomized strategies for
player i such that
ζi(σi) =
∑
c−i∈C−i
∑
ci∈Ci
σi(ci)
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i , ci)

2
.
Intuitively, for any randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci), the value ζi(σi) is the sum,
across all partial profiles of pure strategies of the other players, of the expected
values of the squares of the regrets, where the expected value induced by σi with
respect to a partial profile is the probability-weighted average with respect to σi
of the squares of all possible regrets with respect to the partial profile.
According to the alternative definition just described, a player chooses a ran-
domized strategy so as to minimize the alternative regret function in randomized
strategies.
For an illustration of some of the differences between the two definitions,
consider the finite two-person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form
shown in Table 2.2.
Consider first the alternative definition. Consider player 1 and any randomized
strategy σ1 in ∆(C1). Given σ1, player 1 chooses x1 with probability σ1(x1) and y1
with probability σ1(y1) = 1− σ1(x1). If player 2 chooses x2, then the regret from
choosing x1 is 3 − 3 = 0, and the regret from choosing y1 is 3 − 0 = 3. If player
2 chooses y2, then the regret from choosing x1 is 1 − 0 = 1, and the regret from
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Table 2.2 Payoffs of player 1 in a game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
3 0
0 1
choosing y1 is 1− 1 = 0. The alternative regret function ζ1 : ∆(C1)→ R is
ζ1(σ1) =
∑
c2∈C2
∑
c1∈C1
σ1(c1)
 max
τ1∈∆(C1)
u1(τ1, c2)−u1(c1, c2)

2
= σ1(x1)(3− 3)2 + (1− σ1(x1))(3− 0)2 + σ1(x1)(1− 0)2 + (1− σ1(x1))(1− 1)2
= 9− 8σ1(x1).
Thus, the unique randomized strategy that minimizes the alternative regret func-
tion ζ1 is x1, which assigns probability 1 to the pure strategy x1.
Notably, for many games, the alternative definition yields solutions that involve
no randomization at all, even when some randomization, which can be seen as a
method of hedging, might be expected or reasonable.
Now, consider the established definition. The unique randomized least-squares
regret strategy for player 1 is 0.9x1 + 0.1y1. Thus, minimizing the regret function
ρ1 involves randomizing between x1 and y1 and not playing either with probability
1.
Indeed, for many games, the established definition yields solutions that involve
some randomization, especially when randomization, interpreted as a method of
hedging, might be expected or reasonable.
For another illustration of some of the differences between the two definitions,
consider the finite two-person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form
shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 Payoffs of player 1 in a game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
1 0
0 1
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Consider first the alternative definition. Consider player 1 and any randomized
strategy σ1 in ∆(C1). Given σ1, player 1 chooses x1 with probability σ1(x1) and y1
with probability σ1(y1) = 1− σ1(x1). If player 2 chooses x2, then the regret from
choosing x1 is 1 − 1 = 0, and the regret from choosing y1 is 1 − 0 = 1. If player
2 chooses y2, then the regret from choosing x1 is 1 − 0 = 1, and the regret from
choosing y1 is 1− 1 = 0. The alternative regret function ζ1 : ∆(C1)→ R is
ζ1(σ1) =
∑
c2∈C2
∑
c1∈C1
σ1(c1)
 max
τ1∈∆(C1)
u1(τ1, c2)−u1(c1, c2)

2
= σ1(x1)(1− 1)2 + (1− σ1(x1))(1− 0)2 + σ1(x1)(1− 0)2 + (1− σ1(x1))(1− 1)2
= 1.
Thus, any randomization between x1 and y1 minimizes the alternative regret
function ζ1.
Notably, for many games, the alternative definition yields infinitely many
solutions, even when uniqueness might be expected or reasonable.
Now, consider the established definition. The unique randomized least-squares
regret strategy for player 1 is 0.5x1 + 0.5y1. Thus, minimizing the regret function
ρ1 involves randomizing uniformly between x1 and y1.
Indeed, for many games, the established definition yields unique solutions,
especially when uniqueness might be expected or reasonable. For two theorems
that describe sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of a solution yielded by the
established definition, see Section 5.9.
For further illustrations of the established definition reflecting hedging via
randomization and yielding randomized or unique solutions in line with intuition
and the experimental evidence, see the examples in Sections 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, and
6.7.
The alternative definition may well have its merits. Nevertheless, we note
several reasons to prefer the established definition.
Unlike the established definition, which involves convex combinations of the
payoffs in a game, the alternative definition involves convex combinations of the
squares of the regrets. Consequently, in contrast to the established definition, the
alternative definition is conceptually somewhat unnatural; structurally unlike the
definition of the regret function in pure strategies; mathematically inconvenient
in certain ways; deprived of the natural and intuitive interpretations discussed in
Section 2.5 and of certain of the nice properties established in Chapter 5; and, as
the examples illustrate, incapable of yielding the expected or reasonable solutions
for a number of games, such as those discussed in Chapter 6.
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2.5 Discussion
As discussed in Sections 1.2, 1.4, and 2.2, least-squares regret involves a number
of assumptions. In this section, we discuss these assumptions and make some
preliminary observations.
One preliminary observation is that whether or not randomized strategies are
considered can matter greatly. For an illustration of this point, consider again the
finite two-person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form shown in Table
2.1 in Section 2.3 and reproduced in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 A game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
3 0
0 2
0 1
1 0
As noted in Section 2.3, in this game, for player 1, the unique pure least-squares
regret strategy is x1, and the unique randomized least-squares regret strategy is
0.9x1 + 0.1y1, and for player 2, the unique pure least-squares regret strategy is y2,
and the unique randomized least-squares regret strategy is 0.2x2 + 0.8y2. Thus, for
a player, the set of pure least-squares regret strategies and the set of randomized
least-squares regret strategies need not coincide, and so, for a game, the set of
least-squares regret profiles in pure strategies and the set of least-squares regret
profiles in randomized strategies need not coincide.
Furthermore, as the example illustrates, the support of a randomized least-
squares regret strategy may contain pure strategies that are not pure least-squares
regret strategies. As just observed, the unique randomized least-squares regret
strategy for player 1 assigns positive probability to y1, which is not a pure least-
squares regret strategy for player 1, and the unique randomized least-squares
regret strategy for player 2 assigns positive probability to x2, which is not a pure
least-squares regret strategy for player 2.
In general, as will be evident throughout, it is important to be clear about
whether or not randomized strategies are considered.
As noted in Sections 1.2 and 2.2, we suppose the squaring of regret for technical
reasons and for mathematical convenience. Squaring the regret simplifies the
mathematics and yields nice mathematical properties. For example, as shown in
Section 5.8, one agreeable consequence of squaring the regret is that the regret
function in randomized strategies is convex. Convexity of the regret function
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in randomized strategies implies that computation of randomized least-squares
regret strategies is a convex optimization problem, which can be solved efficiently
using standard well-developed techniques. More generally, squaring the regret
allows for computations that are elementary, straightforward, and easily executed
using established techniques.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the squaring of regret amounts to supposing that
a larger regret is far more significant in an economic or psychological sense. In this
way, the squaring of regret can be thought of as formalizing a cognitive pattern
along the lines of, say, loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman and
Tversky, 1984; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). In particular, what the squaring
of regret formalizes is an attitude toward regret. We discuss this attitude and
compare it with an alternative attitude with respect to particular games in Sections
3.2 and 6.8.
Furthermore, squaring the regret and assuming that partial profiles are treated
uniformly allow for a natural and intuitive geometric interpretation of least-
squares regret. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form.
Consider any player i in N . The best-response payoffs form a payoff vector
(maxdi∈Ci ui(c−i ,di))c−i∈C−i = (maxτi∈∆(Ci )ui(c−i ,τi))c−i∈C−i in R
|C−i |. Now, consider
any pure strategy ci in Ci and any randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci). Notice that
ci yields the payoff vector (ui(c−i , ci))c−i∈C−i in R
|C−i | and that σi yields the payoff
vector (ui(c−i ,σi))c−i∈C−i in R
|C−i |. The regret function ρi : Ci → R can be interpreted
as a distance function that specifies, for any pure strategy ci in Ci , the squared
Euclidean distance from the payoff vector yielded by ci to the best-response
payoff vector. The regret function ρi : ∆(Ci)→ R can be interpreted as a distance
function that specifies, for any randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci), the squared
Euclidean distance from the payoff vector yielded by σi to the best-response payoff
vector. Thus, there is a very natural and concrete sense in which minimizing
regret minimizes the divergence from the best-response payoffs.
Squaring the regret and assuming that partial profiles are treated uniformly
allow also for an interpretation of least-squares regret in terms of the standard
ordinary least-squares method of parameter estimation. For a fuller discussion on
this statistical method, see any standard econometrics text, for example, Greene
(2011) or Wooldridge (2013), on which the following discussion is based.
For an illustration, consider simple linear regression. Suppose that y and x are
two variables characterizing a population and that the aim is to determine how y
depends on x. A simple regression model is any equation of the form
y = β0 + β1x+u,
where the constant β0 is the intercept parameter, the constant β1 is the slope param-
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eter, and the variable u is the error term representing all explanatory factors other
than x that affect y.
The aim is to derive an estimate βˆ0 of the intercept parameter β0 and an
estimate βˆ1 of the slope parameter β1 using a sample drawn from the population.
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be the nonempty set of observations, and let
{(xi , yi) ∈ R2 | i ∈N }
be a random sample drawn from the population. Since the sample is drawn from
the population, which is characterized by the simple regression model, it follows
that
yi = β0 + β1xi +ui , ∀i ∈N,
where, for any observation i in N , the variable ui is the error term for observation
i representing all explanatory factors other than xi that affect yi .
For any estimates βˆ0 and βˆ1 and any observation i in N , the fitted value yˆi for
observation i with respect to the estimates βˆ0 and βˆ1 is the number such that
yˆi = βˆ0 + βˆ1xi ,
and the residual uˆi for observation i with respect to the estimates βˆ0 and βˆ1 is the
difference of the actual value yi and the fitted value yˆi , that is,
uˆi = yi − yˆi = yi − βˆ0 − βˆ1xi .
For any estimates βˆ0 and βˆ1, the sum of the squared residuals with respect to the
estimates βˆ0 and βˆ1 is the sum
n∑
i=1
uˆ2i =
n∑
i=1
(yi − βˆ0 − βˆ1xi)2.
The ordinary least-squares method involves choosing the estimates βˆ0 and
βˆ1 so as to minimize the sum of the squared residuals. An ordinary least-squares
regression line is any equation of the form
yˆ = βˆ0 + βˆ1x,
where the estimates βˆ0 and βˆ1 minimize the sum of the squared residuals and
the variable yˆ is the fitted version of y. Intuitively, the ordinary least-squares
regression line is the line that best approximates the sample.
As the name suggests, least-squares regret is essentially an adaptation of
the ordinary least-squares method of parameter estimation. Just as the idea
behind simple linear regression is to choose estimates that define a line that
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best approximates the sample, the idea behind least-squares regret is to choose
a strategy that defines a payoff vector that best approximates the best-response
payoff vector. In the case of simple linear regression, divergence is defined in
terms of the residual, and the aim is to choose estimates so as to minimize the
sum of the squares of the residuals. In the case of least-squares regret, divergence
is defined in terms of regret, and the aim is to choose a strategy so as to minimize
the sum of the squares of the regrets. Thus, least-squares regret can be seen as a
special case of the problem of ordinary least-squares, which, as is well known, is
well studied and has a very complete theory, arises in a number of areas, and can
be solved very efficiently using established techniques.
While we assume the squaring of regret for the reasons just given, we recognize
that there may be other operations that are equally or more reasonable. And while
we consider the question of alternative formulations only briefly in Section 3.2, it
would be interesting and worthwhile to consider further reasons for squaring or
not squaring regret.
As discussed in Sections 1.2, 1.4, and 2.2, we suppose that a player is partially
strategic. In particular, we suppose that a player treats uniformly the partial
profiles of pure strategies of the other players; computes the regret of a strategy
by taking the sum, across all partial profiles of pure strategies of the other players,
of the squares of the regrets; and chooses a strategy so as to minimize the regret
function. These assumptions imply that fully strategic reasoning and information
that might determine how the other players might behave—such as the payoffs of
the other players—are disregarded.
As might be expected, these assumptions confer certain advantages. They
make for a solution concept that is mathematically and conceptually simple and
easy to apply. They imply that players can be considered separately, allowing
a game to be decomposed into independent parts and making the computation
of solutions trivial. They lead to reasonable solutions for a number of games, as
shown in Chapters 4 and 6. And they enable the capture of certain experimentally
robust effects, as shown in Sections 6.3, 6.4, and 6.6.
Of course, we recognize that the proposed assumptions can be problematic.
Such assumptions may be inappropriate or too restrictive, especially if the aim
is to characterize the behavior of fully strategic players capable of reasoning
about one another and responding accordingly. Also, such assumptions can lead
to unsatisfactory solutions for some games, as shown in Sections 6.4 and 6.7.
Furthermore, such assumptions imply that unlike in, say, a Nash equilibrium,
the strategies that the players choose may differ from the ones that the players
expect to be chosen. Finally, as Harsanyi (1982) argues in his criticism of the
decision-theoretic approach to game theory advocated by Kadane and Larkey
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(1982) and Raiffa (1982) and explored further by Roth and Schoumaker (1983),
disregarding fully strategic reasoning and information that might determine how
the other players might behave amounts to throwing away essential information
and deprives game theory of its substance and remit.
These problems merit consideration. We discuss them more fully in Chapter 7,
and in Chapter 8, we introduce a refinement of least-squares regret that addresses
them.
3Alternative Solution Concepts
Two solution concepts to which least-squares regret bears a resemblance are
maximin, mentioned in Section 1.1, and iterated regret minimization, mentioned
in Section 1.3.
In this chapter, we study least-squares regret in relation to each of these solu-
tion concepts. Section 3.1 compares least-squares regret with maximin. Section
3.2 compares least-squares regret with iterated regret minimization.
3.1 Least-Squares Regret and Maximin
One solution concept that rivals least-squares regret is maximin (von Neumann,
1928; Wald, 1939; Wald, 1945; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Wald, 1950),
which involves choosing a strategy so as to maximize the minimum payoff. For an
illustration of some of the differences between least-squares regret and maximin,
consider again the finite two-person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic
form shown in Table 2.1 in Section 2.3 and reproduced in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 A game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
3 0
0 2
0 1
1 0
Consider first maximin with respect to pure strategies. For player 1, the
minimum payoff from choosing x1 is 0, and the minimum payoff from choosing
y1 is 0, and so, both x1 and y1 are pure maximin strategies. For player 2, the
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minimum payoff from choosing x2 is 0, and the minimum payoff from choosing
y2 is 0, and so, both x2 and y2 are pure maximin strategies. Thus, neither player
has a favored strategy, and all outcomes are possible.
Now, consider maximin with respect to randomized strategies. As Figure 3.1
shows, for player 1, the minimum expected payoff is maximized when
3σ1(x1) = 1− σ1(x1),
that is, at the point σ1(x1) = 0.25, and so, the unique randomized maximin strategy
is 0.25x1 +0.75y1. As Figure 3.2 shows, for player 2, the minimum expected payoff
Figure 3.1 Expected payoffs of player 1
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is maximized when
2(1− σ2(x2)) = σ2(x2),
that is, at the point σ2(x2) = 2/3, and so, the unique randomized maximin strategy
is (2/3)x2 + (1/3)y2. Thus, the unique profile of randomized maximin strategies is
Figure 3.2 Expected payoffs of player 2
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(0.25x1 + 0.75y1, (2/3)x2 + (1/3)y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (3/4,2/3). Notably, player 1 favors y1, and player 2
favors x2.
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Now, consider least-squares regret. Recall from Section 2.3 that the unique
least-squares regret profile in pure strategies is (x1, y2), which gives the payoff
allocation (0,2), and that the unique least-squares regret profile in randomized
strategies is
(0.9x1 + 0.1y1,0.2x2 + 0.8y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (0.62,1.46). Notably, player 1 favors x1, and
player 2 favors y2.
That least-squares regret and maximin should yield different solutions is
unsurprising. They represent different ways to reason about a game. Least-squares
regret involves assessing personal payoffs in the form of regrets and choosing a
strategy so as to minimize the divergence from the best-response payoffs. Maximin
involves assessing personal payoffs, but not regrets, and choosing a strategy so as
to maximize the minimum payoff. Notably, the exclusive focus of maximin on the
minimum payoff characterizes an attitude that can be described as pessimistic or
conservative.
The discrepancy between least-squares regret and maximin is particularly
significant when it comes to two-person zero-sum games, for which maximin is
the standard solution concept. We compare least-squares regret with maximin
with respect to two-person zero-sum games in Section 7.2.
3.2 Least-Squares Regret and Iterated Regret
Minimization
Least-squares regret is closely related to the solution concept of iterated regret
minimization (Halpern and Pass, 2012). In this section, we compare the two
solution concepts.
As the name suggests, iterated regret minimization is based on the concept
of regret. Just as with least-squares regret, the regret of a strategy with respect
to a partial profile of strategies of the other players is the difference of the best-
response payoff with respect to the partial profile and the payoff from choosing
the strategy with respect to the partial profile.
The idea behind iterated regret minimization is simple. Given any finite game
in strategic form, fix some initial set of strategy profiles, typically the set of pure-
strategy profiles or the set of randomized-strategy profiles. Given the initial set
of strategy profiles, each player eliminates all of the strategies available to him
that fail to minimize the maximum regret. The process is repeated ad infinitum,
each time on the set of strategy profiles that remain after the previous round of
elimination.
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Iterated regret minimization is defined formally as follows. We use our no-
tation where convenient to facilitate comparison and defer to Halpern and Pass
(2012) for the original formulations. For the sake of economy, we define iter-
ated regret minimization with respect to both pure strategies and randomized
strategies at once.
Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form. For any player
i in N and any set S =

j∈N Sj such that
Si ⊆ Ci , ∀i ∈N
in the case of pure strategies or
Si ⊆ ∆(Ci), ∀i ∈N
in the case of randomized strategies, let regretSi : Si → R be the function such that
regretSi (si) = max
s−i∈S−i
max
ti∈Si
ui(s−i , ti)−ui(s−i , si)
 ,
where S−i =

j∈N−i Sj . Intuitively, for any strategy si in Si and any set S =

j∈N Sj
of strategy profiles, the value regretSi (si) is the maximum regret from choosing si
with respect to S.
For any player i in N , let RMi : P (j∈N Cj) → P (Ci) in the case of pure
strategies orRMi : P (j∈N ∆(Cj))→P (∆(Ci)) in the case of randomized strategies
be the function such that
RMi(S) = argmin
ti∈Si
regretSi (ti).
Intuitively, for any set S =

j∈N Sj of strategy profiles, the value RMi(S) is the
set of strategies in Si that minimize the maximum regret function regret
S
i with
respect to S. Clearly, RMi(S) ⊆ Si .
Now, let RM : P (j∈N Cj) → P (j∈N Cj) in the case of pure strategies or
RM : P (j∈N ∆(Cj))→P (j∈N ∆(Cj)) in the case of randomized strategies be the
function such that
RM(S) =

j∈N
RMj(S).
Clearly, RM(S) ⊆ S.
The process of iterative elimination is defined recursively as follows. For any
player i in N and any set S =

j∈N Sj such that
Si ⊆ Ci , ∀i ∈N
Chapter 3. Alternative Solution Concepts 45
in the case of pure strategies or
Si ⊆ ∆(Ci), ∀i ∈N
in the case of randomized strategies, let
RM1i (S) =RMi(S),
RMk+1i (S) =RMi(RMk(S)), ∀k ∈ {1,2,3, . . .}, and
RM∞i (S) =
∞⋂
k=1
RMki (S).
Intuitively, for any set S =

j∈N Sj of strategy profiles, the value RM∞i (S) is the
set of strategies in Si that survive iterated regret minimization with respect to S.
For any set S =

j∈N Sj such that
Si ⊆ Ci , ∀i ∈N
in the case of pure strategies or
Si ⊆ ∆(Ci), ∀i ∈N
in the case of randomized strategies, let
RM1(S) =RM(S),
RMk+1(S) =RM(RMk(S)), ∀k ∈ {1,2,3, . . .}, and
RM∞(S) =
∞⋂
k=1
RMk(S).
Intuitively, for any set S =

j∈N Sj of strategy profiles, the value RM∞(S) is the
set of strategy profiles in S that survive iterated regret minimization with respect
to S.
Halpern and Pass (2012) describe sufficient conditions for convergence to a
nonempty fixed point.
Theorem 3.2.1 (Halpern and Pass (2012)). Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any
finite game in strategic form. For any set S =

j∈N Sj such that
Si ⊆ Ci , ∀i ∈N
in the case of pure strategies or
Si ⊆ ∆(Ci), ∀i ∈N
in the case of randomized strategies, if the set S is nonempty and closed, then RM∞(S)
is nonempty and
RM(RM∞(S)) =RM∞(S).
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In particular, if S =

j∈N Cj or S =

j∈N ∆(Cj), then, by Theorem 3.2.1, the
set RM∞(S) is nonempty and
RM(RM∞(S)) =RM∞(S).
Thus, for any finite game in strategic form, a solution is guaranteed to exist.
For an illustration of iterated regret minimization, consider the finite two-
person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form shown in Table 3.2. For the
sake of simplicity in what follows, let C be the set such that
C =

j∈N
Cj .
Table 3.2 A game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
2 0
0 2
0 1
1 0
Consider first iterated regret minimization with respect to pure strategies.
For player 1, with respect to C, the maximum regret from choosing x1 is 1,
and the maximum regret from choosing y1 is 2, and so, x1 is the unique pure
strategy that survives iterated regret minimization. For player 2, with respect
to C, the maximum regret from choosing x2 is 2, and the maximum regret from
choosing y2 is 1, and so, y2 is the unique pure strategy that survives iterated regret
minimization. Thus, the unique pure-strategy profile that survives iterated regret
minimization is (x1, y2), which gives the payoff allocation (0,2).
Now, consider iterated regret minimization with respect to randomized strate-
gies. To simplify the computations, we appeal to the following proposition, which
establishes that, at the first step, only pure-strategy partial profiles need be con-
sidered.
Proposition 3.2.1 (Halpern and Pass (2012)). Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any
finite game in strategic form. Let S =

j∈N ∆(Cj). Then
regretSi (σi) = max
c−i∈C−i
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i ,σi)
 , ∀i ∈N, ∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci).
Now, let S =

j∈N ∆(Cj). Consider player 1. Notice that, by Proposition 3.2.1,
regretS1 (σ1) = max{2− 2σ1(x1),1− (1− σ1(x1))}, ∀σ1 ∈ ∆(C1).
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As Figure 3.3 shows, the maximum regret function regretS1 is minimized at the
point σ1(x1) = 2/3, and so, the unique randomized strategy that survives iterated
regret minimization for player 1 is (2/3)x1 + (1/3)y1. Consider player 2. Notice that,
Figure 3.3 Regret of player 1
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by Proposition 3.2.1,
regretS2 (σ2) = max{2− 2(1− σ2(x2)),1− σ2(x2)}, ∀σ2 ∈ ∆(C2).
As Figure 3.4 shows, the maximum regret function regretS2 is minimized at the
point σ2(x2) = 1/3, and so, the unique randomized strategy that survives iterated
regret minimization for player 2 is (1/3)x2 + (2/3)y2. Thus, the unique randomized-
Figure 3.4 Regret of player 2
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strategy profile that survives iterated regret minimization is
((2/3)x1 + (1/3)y1, (1/3)x2 + (2/3)y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (2/3,1).
Both least-squares regret and iterated regret minimization involve minimizing
regret in one way or another. But despite the similarities between the two solution
concepts, there are two differences that deserve mentioning.
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One difference concerns iterative processes. Least-squares regret involves no
iterative process while iterated regret minimization involves iterative elimination.
We exclude iterative elimination to forestall complications. Iterative elimi-
nation is an added complication and may be computationally and cognitively
demanding, especially in more complex games, and introduces other difficulties.
For example, the reason for eliminating a strategy might turn on the maximum
regret potentially induced by some partial profile of strategies of the other players
that is subsequently eliminated and assumed not to occur. Such difficulties recall
those aﬄicting iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (Samuelson,
1992; Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995).
Halpern and Pass (2012) consider as a remedy lexicographic belief systems
reminiscent of the lexicographic probability systems of Blume, Brandenburger,
and Dekel (1991) and Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler (2008). But the
remedy itself is fairly involved.
In any case, whether iterative elimination is included or not is a minor differ-
ence between least-squares regret and iterated regret minimization, and we point
it out mainly for the sake of completeness. Indeed, iterative elimination could
easily be added to least-squares regret or removed from iterated regret minimiza-
tion. But we note that by eschewing iterative elimination, we skirt entirely the
complications noted above.
The more significant difference between least-squares regret and iterated regret
minimization concerns the assessment of regret. Least-squares regret involves
choosing a strategy so as to minimize the sum of the squares of the regrets while
iterated regret minimization involves choosing a strategy so as to minimize the
maximum regret. These different imperatives amount to quite different attitudes
toward regret.
It is easy to see how, ignoring iterative elimination, least-squares regret and
iterated regret minimization are related. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite
game in strategic form. Consider iterated regret minimization (without iterative
elimination) as applied to the initial set S =

j∈N Cj of pure-strategy profiles. For
any number p such that p ≥ 1 and any player i in N , let ρi : Ci → R be the function
such that
ρi(ci) =
∑
c−i∈C−i
max
di∈Ci
ui(c−i ,di)−ui(c−i , ci)

p
.
This function with the parameter p is a natural generalization of the regret func-
tion in pure strategies defined in Section 2.2. Notice that when the function is
raised to the power of 1/p, the result is an application of the p-norm. Intuitively,
the greater is the value of p, the more larger regrets matter.
Chapter 3. Alternative Solution Concepts 49
Now, notice that
lim
p→∞(ρi(ci))
1/p = max
c−i∈C−i
max
di∈Ci
ui(c−i ,di)−ui(c−i , ci)
 , ∀ci ∈ Ci .
In the limit as p→∞, only the maximum regret matters. Thus, the natural gener-
alization of least-squares regret that involves minimizing the function (ρi(ci))
1/p
subsumes iterated regret minimization (without iterative elimination) as an ex-
treme case that is derived by letting p→∞.
Least-squares regret and iterated regret minimization can yield different solu-
tions. For certain games, studied below, least-squares regret yields more agreeable
solutions. The reason is that focusing exclusively on the maximum regret, as
iterated regret minimization requires, may be too restrictive.
For an example in which least-squares regret outperforms iterated regret
minimization, consider the finite two-person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in
strategic form shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Payoffs of player 1 in a game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
u1
v1
w1
x1
y1
z1
v2 w2 x2 y2 z2
1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
Consider first iterated regret minimization. Notice that, for player 1,
regretC1 (c1) = max
c2∈C2
max
d1∈C1
u1(d1, c2)−u1(c1, c2)
 = 1, ∀c1 ∈ C1.
Each pure strategy in C1 yields a maximum regret of 1. Thus,
RM∞1 (C) = C1.
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Each pure strategy in C1 survives iterated regret minimization.
But this solution seems unreasonable. The pure strategies in C1 are not all on
a par. On the contrary: there seems to be a natural and reasonable ordering over
them. Notice that, for player 1, the pure strategy z1 is strongly dominated (for
example, by a randomization between u1 and v1) and weakly dominated by every
other strategy; that y1 is weakly dominated by x1; that x1 is weakly dominated by
w1; that each of w1 and x1 and y1 is weakly dominated by u1 and by v1; and that
neither u1 nor v1 is dominated. Thus, the most attractive strategies are u1 and v1,
followed in turn by w1, and then by x1, and then by y1, and then finally by z1.
Iterated regret minimization is here incapable of recognizing certain strategies
as more reasonable than others, and the reason is the exclusive focus on the
maximum regret. For example, z1 is regarded as just as reasonable as u1—even
though z1 can never yield a positive payoff and u1 yields the best-response payoff
with respect to all but one of the strategies of player 2—simply because z1 and u1
yield the same maximum regret of 1.
As the game shown in Table 3.3 illustrates, the exclusive focus on the maximum
regret can be problematic. In particular, such a focus means that domination
may go unrecognized, with the result that dominated strategies may be equated
with undominated strategies. In general, evaluating a strategy solely in terms of
the maximum regret that it might yield means that the enumeration of partial
profiles of strategies of the other players to which the strategy fails to be a best
response—whether it be just one partial profile or all of them—matters not at all.
By contrast, least-squares regret yields a more reasonable solution. Notice that,
for player 1,
ρ1(u1) = ρ1(v1) = 1,
ρ1(w1) = 2,
ρ1(x1) = 3,
ρ1(y1) = 4, and
ρ1(z1) = 5.
Thus, least-squares regret captures exactly the natural and reasonable ordering
described earlier and yields as the sole solutions precisely the two undominated
pure strategies u1 and v1. In general, least-squares regret rejects dominated strate-
gies; for more on this point, see Theorem 5.6.2 in Section 5.6 and the discussion in
Section 5.3.
For another example in which least-squares regret outperforms iterated regret
minimization, consider the two-person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic
form, where
C1 = C2 = {x ∈ R | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1},
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the utility function for player 1 is
u1(c1, c2) = 0− ε if c1 = c2 = 0,
= 1 if c1 = 0 and c2 > 0,
= 1 if c1 > 0 and c2 = 0,
= 0 if c1 > 0 and c2 > 0,
and ε is any small positive number.
Consider first iterated regret minimization. Notice that, for player 1,
regretC1 (0) = max
c2∈C2
max
d1∈C1
u1(d1, c2)−u1(0, c2)
 = 1 + ε and
regretC1 (c1) = max
c2∈C2
max
d1∈C1
u1(d1, c2)−u1(c1, c2)
 = 1, ∀c1 ∈ {x ∈ R | 0 < x ≤ 1}.
Thus,
RM∞1 (C) = C1 \ {0}.
The pure strategy 0 is eliminated, and every other pure strategy survives iterated
regret minimization.
But this solution seems unreasonable. With respect to almost all—that is,
except for a set of measure zero—of the pure strategies of player 2, the pure
strategy 0 yields the best-response payoff of 1, and every other pure strategy yields
the minimum payoff of 0. Furthermore, choosing the pure strategy 0 fails to be
a best response if and only if c2 = 0, and then the regret is 1 + ε, which is only
marginally greater than 1. Thus, it seems that the sole reasonable solution is the
pure strategy 0.
The trouble, again, is the exclusive focus on the maximum regret. The only
reason that the pure strategy 0 is eliminated and every other pure strategy is
preserved is that the maximum regret from choosing the pure strategy 0 is 1 + ε
while the maximum regret from choosing any other pure strategy is 1. But this is
not an overwhelming reason to eliminate the pure strategy 0 in favor of the other
pure strategies considering that the differences
regretC1 (0)− regretC1 (c1) = ε, ∀c1 ∈ {x ∈ R | 0 < x ≤ 1},
are essentially negligible—and are all the more so the smaller is ε—and that, as
noted earlier, the pure strategy 0 outperforms every other pure strategy with
respect to almost all of the pure strategies of player 2.
The exclusive focus on the maximum regret seems excessively strict and pes-
simistic. It entails favoring one strategy over another as long as the maximum
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regret from choosing the latter is greater than that from choosing the former, no
matter how negligible the difference and no matter how superior the unfavored
strategy might be in other respects.
By contrast, least-squares regret yields a more reasonable solution. Notice that,
for player 1,
ρ1(0) = 0 and
ρ1(c1) = 1, ∀c1 ∈ {x ∈ R | 0 < x ≤ 1}.
Thus, least-squares regret yields as the sole solution precisely the pure strategy 0.
For another example in which least-squares regret yields a more agreeable
solution than does iterated regret minimization, see the extended discussion on
the two-person bargaining problem in Section 6.8. Theorem 6.8.2 establishes
that in the two-person bargaining problem, if each player has a concave utility
function, then the final payoff allocation yielded by least-squares regret is at least
as great as that yielded by iterated regret minimization. Intuitively, the reason
is that the exclusive focus on the maximum regret required by iterated regret
minimization induces one to be more conservative than one would be if one were
instead to act in accordance with least-squares regret.
4The Traveler’s Dilemma
As noted in Chapter 1, the puzzle of the Traveler’s Dilemma (Basu, 1994; Basu,
2007) is notoriously recalcitrant. What is most vexing about the game is that all
of the standard solution concepts converge upon a unique solution that is both
unreasonable in theory and refuted by the experimental evidence. Interest in
the game remains high, and to this date, no generally accepted resolution of the
puzzle exists.
In this chapter, we study the game in detail. Section 4.1 formally defines the
game. Section 4.2 considers the standard solution concepts and shows how all
yield the same unsatisfactory solution. Section 4.3 discusses the experimental
evidence, which refutes the standard analyses. Section 4.4 describes some alter-
native analyses of the game. Section 4.5 shows how least-squares regret resolves
the puzzle and yields solutions in line with both intuition and the experimental
evidence.
4.1 Definition of the Game
The Traveler’s Dilemma game is defined formally as follows. An airline loses
the identical belongings of two travelers and reimburses them according to the
following scheme. Each traveler must submit independently and privately to
the airline a quotation that can be any number between 2 and 100, representing
the value of the belongings. If the numbers match, each traveler is reimbursed
that amount; otherwise, the traveler quoting the lower number is reimbursed
the lower number plus some amount α such that α > 1 while the other traveler
is reimbursed the lower number less α. The number α can be thought of as the
reward for quoting the lower number and the penalty for quoting the higher
number. In this game, the set of players is N = {1,2}. Now, there are two versions
of the game: the discrete version and the continuous version. In the discrete
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version, the pure-strategy sets are
C1 = C2 = {x ∈ Z | 2 ≤ x ≤ 100}.
In the continuous version, the pure-strategy sets are
C1 = C2 = {x ∈ R | 2 ≤ x ≤ 100}.
In both versions, for any player i in N , the utility function is
ui(c1, c2) = min{c1, c2} −α if i < argmin
j∈{1,2}
cj ,
= min{c1, c2}+α if {i} = argmin
j∈{1,2}
cj ,
= ci if c1 = c2,
where α is any real number, specified in advance, such that α > 1.
4.2 Standard Analyses of the Game
There are many different ways to solve the game. In this section, we consider the
standard analyses. For simplicity in what follows, restrict analysis to the standard
discrete version where α = 2.
Consider first maximin. Notice that the minimum payoff from quoting 2 is
2 and that, for any quotation other than 2, the minimum payoff is 0. Thus, the
strategy of quoting 2 is the unique maximin strategy for each player.
Now, consider Nash equilibrium. At first glance, it may seem reasonable
to conclude that each player should quote 100—the maximum number—since
each will then be reimbursed that amount. But observe that there is always the
incentive for one player to undercut the other player by the slimmest margin
whenever possible. Assuming that the other player quotes 100, one would do
better to deviate and quote 99. But, anticipating this, the other player would
then do better to deviate and quote 98. And, anticipating this, one would then do
better to deviate and quote 97. Continuing thus leads to the conclusion that, in
the unique equilibrium of the game, each player quotes 2—the minimum number.
Seen in this light, the Traveler’s Dilemma turns out to be very much like a one-
shot simultaneous-move version of the famous Centipede Game (Rosenthal, 1981),
a game well known for embodying the paradox of rationality posed by backward
induction. This similarity is no accident. Indeed, the Traveler’s Dilemma was
devised to illustrate that the paradox is deeper than had been thought since
it can arise in a one-shot simultaneous-move game and cannot be resolved by
finding fault with structures relating to the extensive form. Thus, the Traveler’s
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Dilemma, involving backward induction at the level of introspection and purged
of supplementary elements such as play over time, can be seen as one of the purest
forms of the paradox of rationality.
Part of what makes the earlier equilibrium analysis so unreasonable is that
it presumes a kind of superrationality on the part of the players. Each player
must engage in a long chain of reasoning involving myriad assumptions of one
another’s extreme sophistication in order to reach the equilibrium solution.
The other standard solution concepts fare no better. Consider iterative elimi-
nation of weakly dominated strategies. Notice that, for each player, the strategy of
quoting 100 is weakly dominated by the strategy of quoting 99 and can thus be
eliminated. But then, for each player, the strategy of quoting 99 becomes weakly
dominated by the strategy of quoting 98 and can thus be eliminated. Continuing
thus leaves each player with the strategy of quoting 2 as the unique iteratively
undominated strategy in the weak sense. But as with equilibrium analysis, this
analysis presumes a kind of superrationality on the part of the players.
Iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies is even more compli-
cated. Notice that, for each player i in N , the strategy of quoting 100 is strongly
dominated by the randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci) such that
σi(100) = 0 and
σi(ci) =
ε100−ci∑98
k=1 ε
k
, ∀ci ∈ {x ∈ Z | 2 ≤ x ≤ 99},
where ε is any small positive number, and the strategy of quoting 100 can thus be
eliminated. But then, for each player i in N , the strategy of quoting 99 becomes
strongly dominated by the randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci \ {100}) such that
σi(99) = 0 and
σi(ci) =
ε99−ci∑97
k=1 ε
k
, ∀ci ∈ {x ∈ Z | 2 ≤ x ≤ 98},
where ε is any small positive number, and the strategy of quoting 99 can thus be
eliminated. Continuing thus leaves each player with the strategy of quoting 2 as
the unique iteratively undominated strategy in the strong sense. Just as before, a
kind of superrationality on the part of the players is presumed.
Rationalizability (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984) is likewise unsatisfactory.
As is well known, in two-person games, the set of rationalizable strategies for a
player is just the set of strategies that survive iterative elimination of strongly
dominated strategies. Thus, given the foregoing analysis, the strategy of quoting
2 is also the unique rationalizable strategy for each player. But determining the
set of rationalizable strategies for a player requires an analysis just as involved as
the foregoing ones.
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It is natural to be dissatisfied with these solution concepts. All of them yield
the strategy of quoting 2 as the unique rational strategy, defying intuition, and,
moreover, all of them, with the exception of maximin, presume a kind of superra-
tionality on the part of the players.
4.3 Experimental Evidence
Notwithstanding the analyses described in Section 4.2, it seems that no reasonable
person would ever choose to quote 2 or to engage in the complicated reasoning
required. In fact, experimental research demonstrates that people consistently
reject the strategy of quoting 2 in favor of quoting a larger number and, moreover,
that those who do so generally win higher payoffs. For detailed results, see, for
example, Capra, Goeree, Gómez, and Holt (1999); Goeree and Holt (2001); Rubin-
stein (2006); Cabrera, Capra, and Gómez (2007); Rubinstein (2007); Chakravarty,
Dechenaux, and Roy (2010); and Basu, Becchetti, and Stanca (2011).
Even professional game theorists fail to play in accordance with standard game
theory. An experiment conducted on members of the Game Theory Society reveals
deviations from standard game theory just as marked as in other experiments
(Becker, Carter, and Naeve, 2005). In the experiment, members were asked to
submit a strategy, pure or randomized, for the one-shot Traveler’s Dilemma. Fifty-
one entries were received. Of the forty-five specifying a pure strategy, ten specified
the maximum quotation of 100; thirty-one specified a quotation of 96 or greater;
thirty-eight specified a quotation of 90 or greater; and only three specified the
prescribed quotation of 2. Just as in the other experiments noted above, there is a
salient concentration at the top of the scale—the very opposite of what standard
game theory suggests. Furthermore, the pure strategy that turns out to do best
against the average strategy is the strategy of quoting 97, with its expected payoff
of 85.09, and worst of all is the prescribed strategy of quoting 2, with its expected
payoff of 3.92. These results thus appear to confirm the suspicion noted earlier:
even knowing all that standard game theory has to say, there is something rational
about quoting a larger number. The confirmation lies in the payoff received.
Another study shows that, in general, the greater is the value of α, the lower is
the number that is quoted, as intuition suggests (Capra, Goeree, Gómez, and Holt,
1999). Importantly, however, none of the standard solution concepts is sensitive
to the value of α.
4.4 Alternative Analyses
Numerous alternative analyses have been proposed. Capra, Goeree, Gómez, and
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Holt (1999) and Anderson, Goree, and Holt (2002) show that logit equilibrium
models can fit the experimental data very well. Becker, Carter, and Naeve (2005)
adapt the approach of Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) used to explain
cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma and model the Traveler’s
Dilemma as a Bayesian game that includes an irrational or “cooperative” type.
Rubinstein (2006) and Rubinstein (2007) analyze response times and suggest
that the distribution of observed strategy choices may be due at least in part to
variations in cognitive effort or sophistication. Cabrera, Capra, and Gómez (2007)
develop a noisy introspection model in which the reasoning process consists in
iteratively computing responses, with some error, until some specified stopping
rule is satisfied. Chakravarty, Dechenaux, and Roy (2010) consider the ability of
pre-play communication to induce coordination and show that while ill-defined
communication does little to foster cooperation, precise communication can lead
to higher numbers being chosen. Basu, Becchetti, and Stanca (2011) extend the
results of Capra, Goeree, Gómez, and Holt (1999) and show the dominance of
one’s own bonus-penalty amount, document heterogeneity of player types, find
evidence of inadequacy in strategic thinking, and show that strategy choice and
treatment effects are largely explained by risk aversion. Bavly (2012) considers the
effect of introducing uncertainty about the range of available strategies. Halpern
and Pass (2012) show how iterated regret minimization yields solutions consistent
with intuition and the experimental evidence. Baghestanian (2014) develops a
level-k model with heterogeneous types to explain the observed data.
4.5 Least-Squares Regret
In this section, we show how least-squares regret yields for the Traveler’s Dilemma
solutions in line with intuition and the experimental evidence, at once resolving
the puzzle and outperforming all of the standard solution concepts.
But before continuing, it is instructive to consider first the question of whether
people, in fact, reason in terms of regret in a game such as the Traveler’s Dilemma.
To answer this question, notice that there is a general intuition that quoting 2, as
standard game theory prescribes, is a poor strategy all things considered and that
one would do better to quote a higher number. Quoting 2 is a best response if and
only if the other player quotes either 2 or 3. But in any other circumstance, one
would do better—and potentially substantially better—to quote a higher number.
Furthermore, by quoting 2, one limits one’s maximum payoff to 4, a meager
amount considering the range of potential payoffs. Notice also that the greater
is the quotation of the other player, the more one loses out by quoting 2. These
observations suggest that regret may be an important strategic consideration,
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especially in a game such as the Traveler’s Dilemma.
Furthermore, as the studies of Ritov (1996) and Grosskopf, Erev, and Yechiam
(2006) described in Section 1.3 illustrate, there is evidence in experimental eco-
nomics that suggests that regret plays a significant role in decision-making. There
is thus reason to think that regret might well play a role also in reasoning about
the Traveler’s Dilemma.
It is easy to see how least-squares regret resolves the Traveler’s Dilemma puzzle.
For concreteness, consider the standard discrete version of the game where the
pure-strategy sets are
C1 = C2 = {x ∈ Z | 2 ≤ x ≤ 100}
and α = 2.
For an illustration, consider the strategy of quoting 2. Notice that, for any
player i in N , the regret from quoting 2 is
ρi(2) =
100∑
c−i=2
max
di∈Ci
ui(c−i ,di)−ui(c−i ,2)

2
= (2− 2)2 + (4− 4)2 + . . .+ (101− 4)2
= 308945.
The regret from quoting 2 is high. And the reasons are precisely those given
earlier. As the computation indicates, quoting 2 is a best response if and only if
the other player quotes either 2 or 3, but in any other circumstance, one would do
better to quote a higher number, and, moreover, the greater is the quotation of the
other player, the more one loses out by quoting 2.
For another illustration, consider the strategy of quoting 100. Notice that, for
any player i in N , the regret from quoting 100 is
ρi(100) =
100∑
c−i=2
max
di∈Ci
ui(c−i ,di)−ui(c−i ,100)

2
= (2− 0)2 + (4− 1)2 + . . .+ (101− 100)2
= 878.
The regret from quoting 100 is low. And the reason is what intuition suggests.
Notably, while in no circumstance would it be a best response to quote 100,
doing so guarantees in every conceivable circumstance a payoff very close to the
best-response payoff.
In general, quoting a low number is associated with high regret while quoting
a high number is associated with low regret, as intuition suggests and as Figure
4.1 shows.
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Figure 4.1 Regret of player i in the Traveler’s Dilemma
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In fact, for any player i in N , the pure strategies that minimize the regret
function ρi are the strategy of quoting 96 and the strategy of quoting 97, as Figure
4.2 shows.
Figure 4.2 Regret of player i in the Traveler’s Dilemma
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Thus, unlike the standard solution concepts, least-squares regret yields solu-
tions in line with the experimental evidence and with the intuition that quoting a
high number is a better strategy all things considered than quoting a low num-
ber. Notably, the solutions yielded by least-squares regret are consistent with the
experimental result discussed earlier that the strategy of quoting 97 is the pure
strategy that does best against the average strategy (Becker, Carter, and Naeve,
2005).
Furthermore, it is easy to see that least-squares regret captures the expected
sensitivity to the value of α. To see this, consider the continuous version of the
game where the pure-strategy sets are
C1 = C2 = {x ∈ R | 2 ≤ x ≤ 100}.
Consider any player i in N and any pure strategy ci in Ci . If the other player
chooses some pure strategy c−i in C−i that is less than ci , then the payoff to player
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i from choosing ci is c−i −α while the best-response payoff is c−i +α (since the best
response is to undercut the other player by the slimmest margin). If the other
player chooses some pure strategy c−i in C−i that is greater than ci , then the payoff
to player i from choosing ci is ci +α while the best-response payoff is again c−i +α.
Thus, for any player i in N ,
ρi(ci) =
∫ ci
2
((c−i +α)− (c−i −α))2dc−i +
∫ 100
ci
((c−i +α)− (ci +α))2dc−i
=
∫ ci
2
4α2dc−i +
∫ 100
ci
(c−i − ci)2dc−i
= (100− ci)3/3 + 4α2ci − 8α2,
and so,
d(ρi(ci))
dci
= 4α2 − (100− ci)2.
Setting the derivative equal to 0 and solving for ci yields
ci =
200±√(−200)2 − 4(1002 − 4α2)
2
= 100± 2α.
The regret function ρi is minimized at the smaller critical point, which is also the
only critical point in the domain
Ci = {x ∈ R | 2 ≤ x ≤ 100}.
Thus, the unique pure least-squares regret strategy for player i is ci = 100− 2α.
This strategy is a strictly decreasing function of α, and so, the greater is the value
of α, the lower is the number that is yielded by least-squares regret.
Thus, again, unlike the standard solution concepts, least-squares regret yields
solutions in line with the experimental evidence and with the intuition that
strategy choice is sensitive to the value of α. Notably, the sensitivity captured by
least-squares regret is consistent with the experimental result discussed earlier
that the greater is the value of α, the lower is the number that is quoted (Capra,
Goeree, Gómez, and Holt, 1999).
5Properties
In appraising a solution concept and assessing its performance, numerous ques-
tions arise, such as whether the solution concept satisfies a general existence
theorem; whether, for any game, the solution concept yields as solutions all in-
tuitively reasonable outcomes and rules out all intuitively unreasonable ones;
whether, for any game, the set of solutions yielded by the solution concept is
invariant when the game is transformed in a way that is considered irrelevant;
whether the fundamental logic of the solution concept is intuitive, credible, and
compelling as a characterization of typical reasoning and behavior.
In this chapter, we establish some notable mathematical and conceptual prop-
erties of least-squares regret. Section 5.1 presents a general existence theorem.
Section 5.2 presents a theorem that establishes that least-squares regret is in-
variant with respect to full equivalence. Section 5.3 examines the relationship
between least-squares regret and dominated strategies. Section 5.4 shows that
least-squares regret and iterative elimination of dominated strategies can yield
different solutions. Section 5.5 examines the relationship between least-squares
regret and uniformly dominant strategies. Section 5.6 presents two theorems that
establish that least-squares regret is invariant with respect to certain well-known
transformations of the payoffs in a game that leave unchanged the best-response
correspondences of the players. Section 5.7 presents a theorem that establishes
that when it comes to the equilibria in pure strategies of a 2× 2 game in strategic
form, least-squares regret is equivalent to risk dominance. Section 5.8 presents a
theorem that establishes that, for any finite game in strategic form, least-squares
regret yields a convex set of solutions. Section 5.9 presents two theorems that
describe sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of a solution yielded by least-
squares regret.
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5.1 Existence
The following general existence theorem establishes that every finite game in
strategic form has at least one least-squares regret profile in pure strategies and at
least one least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies. Thus, for any finite
game in strategic form, a solution is guaranteed to exist.
Theorem 5.1.1. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form. Then
there exist some least-squares regret profile in pure strategies and some least-squares
regret profile in randomized strategies.
Proof. Consider any player i in N . Consider first pure strategies. Since the set Ci
is finite, the regret function ρi : Ci → R has a minimum. And so, the set
argmin
di∈Ci
ρi(di)
is nonempty.
Thus, the set
i∈N
argmin
di∈Ci
ρi(di)
is nonempty since it is the Cartesian product of nonempty sets.
Now, consider randomized strategies. Since the set ∆(Ci) is a nonempty com-
pact set and since the regret function ρi : ∆(Ci)→ R is continuous, ρi has a mini-
mum. And so, the set
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi)
is nonempty.
Thus, the set
i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi)
is nonempty since it is the Cartesian product of nonempty sets. 
5.2 Full Equivalence
A utility function is simply a mathematical representation of the preferences of
an individual and is unique up to strictly increasing affine transformation. Thus,
replacing any number of the utility functions in a game with decision-theoretically
equivalent ones leaves unchanged the underlying preference structure of the
game. Since the original game and the transformed game represent the same
fundamental situation, they must be considered decision-theoretically equivalent.
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Myerson (1991) introduces the concept of full equivalence of finite games in
strategic form to characterize the equivalence just described. Full equivalence
might more illuminatingly be called cardinal equivalence.
Full equivalence of finite games in strategic form is defined formally as follows.
For any finite games Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) and Γˆ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (uˆi)i∈N ) in strate-
gic form, the games Γ and Γˆ are fully equivalent if and only if, for every player i in
N , there exist real numbers Ai and Bi such that Ai > 0 and
uˆi(c−i , ci) = Aiui(c−i , ci) +Bi , ∀c−i ∈ C−i , ∀ci ∈ Ci .
As a matter of consistency, a solution concept should not yield different so-
lutions for fully equivalent games. Any solution concept that fails on this score
must be seen as being faulty in a significant way. For example, as noted in Section
1.1, quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1998) is not scale invariant and can thus be inconsistent, yielding different
solutions for fully equivalent games (Wright and Leyton-Brown, 2010).
The following theorem establishes that least-squares regret is invariant with
respect to full equivalence in the sense that fully equivalent games have the same
solutions.
Theorem 5.2.1. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) and Γˆ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (uˆi)i∈N ) be any
finite games in strategic form such that Γ and Γˆ are fully equivalent. For any player
i in N , let ρi : ∆(Ci)→ R be the regret function in randomized strategies for player
i in Γ , let ρˆi : ∆(Ci)→ R be the regret function in randomized strategies for player i
in Γˆ , let ρi : Ci → R be the regret function in pure strategies for player i in Γ , and let
ρˆi : Ci → R be the regret function in pure strategies for player i in Γˆ . Then
i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi) =

i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρˆi(τi)
and 
i∈N
argmin
di∈Ci
ρi(di) =

i∈N
argmin
di∈Ci
ρˆi(di).
Proof. Consider any player i in N . By assumption, the games Γ and Γˆ are fully
equivalent, and so, there exist real numbers Ai and Bi such that Ai > 0 and
uˆi(c−i , ci) = Aiui(c−i , ci) +Bi , ∀c−i ∈ C−i , ∀ci ∈ Ci .
Clearly, it follows that
uˆi(c−i ,σi) = Aiui(c−i ,σi) +Bi , ∀c−i ∈ C−i , ∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci).
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Thus,
ρˆi(σi)
=
∑
c−i∈C−i
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
uˆi(c−i ,τi)− uˆi(c−i ,σi)

2
, ∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci)
=
∑
c−i∈C−i
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
(Aiui(c−i ,τi) +Bi)− (Aiui(c−i ,σi) +Bi)

2
, ∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci)
= A2i
∑
c−i∈C−i
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i ,σi)

2
, ∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci)
= A2i ρi(σi), ∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci).
Since Ai > 0, the regret functions ρi and ρˆi differ by a strictly increasing linear
transformation. And so,
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi) = argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρˆi(τi).
Thus,
i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi) =

i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρˆi(τi).
From the above, it follows that
ρˆi(ci) = A
2
i ρi(ci), ∀ci ∈ Ci .
Since Ai > 0, the regret functions ρi and ρˆi differ by a strictly increasing linear
transformation. And so,
argmin
di∈Ci
ρi(di) = argmin
di∈Ci
ρˆi(di).
Thus,
i∈N
argmin
di∈Ci
ρi(di) =

i∈N
argmin
di∈Ci
ρˆi(di). 
5.3 Dominated Strategies
It is instructive to examine the relationship between least-squares regret and dom-
inated strategies. Intuitively, if a pure strategy is weakly or strongly dominated for
a player, then, for any partial profile of strategies of the other players, the regret
of the dominated strategy with respect to the partial profile is at least as great as
the regret of the dominating strategy with respect to the partial profile, and there
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exists some partial profile such that the regret of the dominated strategy with
respect to the partial profile is strictly greater than the regret of the dominating
strategy with respect to the partial profile.
This intuition leads immediately to two conclusions. To begin, a pure strategy
that is weakly or strongly dominated for a player by some randomized strategy
cannot, when assigned probability 1, minimize the regret function in randomized
strategies. Furthermore, a pure strategy that is weakly or strongly dominated for
a player by some other pure strategy cannot minimize the regret function in pure
strategies. The following proposition establishes these facts.
Proposition 5.3.1. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form.
For any player i in N , any pure strategies ci and cˆi in Ci , and any randomized strategy
σi in ∆(Ci), if ci is weakly or strongly dominated for player i by σi , then
ρi(σi) < ρi(ci),
and if ci is weakly or strongly dominated for player i by cˆi , then
ρi(cˆi) < ρi(ci).
Proof. Consider any player i in N . Let ci be any pure strategy in Ci , and let σi be
any randomized strategy in ∆(Ci). Suppose that ci is weakly or strongly dominated
for player i by σi . Then
max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i ,σi) ≤ max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i , ci), ∀c−i ∈ C−i ,
and there exists some partial profile cˆ−i in C−i such that
max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(cˆ−i ,τi)−ui(cˆ−i ,σi) < max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(cˆ−i ,τi)−ui(cˆ−i , ci).
Thus,
ρi(σi) < ρi(ci).
Let ci and cˆi be any pure strategies in Ci . Suppose that ci is weakly or strongly
dominated for player i by cˆi . From the above, it follows that
ρi(cˆi) < ρi(ci). 
Whether or not randomized strategies are considered can matter substan-
tially. For an illustration of this point, consider the finite two-person game
Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form shown in Table 5.1.
Consider the pure strategy z1. Notice that it is for player 1 weakly dominated,
for example, by the randomized strategy (2/3)x1 + (1/3)y1, and strongly dominated,
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Table 5.1 Payoffs of player 1 in a game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
z1
x2 y2
0 3
3 0
1 1
for example, by the randomized strategy 0.5x1 + 0.5y1. Thus, by Proposition
5.3.1, the pure strategy z1 cannot, when assigned probability 1, be a randomized
least-squares regret strategy for player 1. But notice that if only pure strategies
are considered, then z1 is neither weakly nor strongly dominated for player 1 and,
moreover, since
ρ1(z1) = 8 < 9 = ρ1(x1) = ρ1(y1),
it is, in fact, the unique pure least-squares regret strategy for player 1.
It is clear that the support of a randomized least-squares regret strategy cannot
contain a weakly or strongly dominated strategy. The following proposition
establishes this fact.
Proposition 5.3.2. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form.
For any player i in N , any randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci), and any pure strategy ci in
Ci , if σi is a randomized least-squares regret strategy for player i and ci is weakly or
strongly dominated for player i, then σi(ci) = 0.
Proof. Consider any player i in N . Let σi be any randomized strategy in ∆(Ci),
and let ci be any pure strategy in Ci . Suppose that σi is a randomized least-squares
regret strategy for player i and that ci is weakly or strongly dominated for player
i and that σi(ci) > 0. Since ci is weakly or strongly dominated for player i, there
exists some randomized strategy ξi in ∆(Ci) such that
ui(c−i ,ξi) ≥ ui(c−i , ci), ∀c−i ∈ C−i ,
and there exists some partial profile cˆ−i in C−i such that
ui(cˆ−i ,ξi) > ui(cˆ−i , ci).
Now, consider the randomized strategy σˆi in ∆(Ci) that is exactly like σi except
that ci is assigned probability 0 and ξi is assigned probability σi(ci). That is, σˆi is
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the randomized strategy in ∆(Ci) such that
σˆi(ci) = 0 and
σˆi(di) = σi(di) + σi(ci)ξi(di), ∀di ∈ Ci \ {ci}.
Clearly,
max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i , σˆi) ≤ max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i ,σi), ∀c−i ∈ C−i ,
and there exists some partial profile c¯−i in C−i such that
max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c¯−i ,τi)−ui(c¯−i , σˆi) < max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c¯−i ,τi)−ui(c¯−i ,σi).
Thus,
ρi(σˆi) < ρi(σi).
But this is a contradiction. Thus, σi(ci) = 0. 
Finally, it is instructive to consider the question of iterative elimination of
dominated strategies. Consider again the Traveler’s Dilemma discussed in Chapter
4. Recall from Section 4.2 that, for each player, the strategy of quoting 96 and
the strategy of quoting 97 each end up being eliminated following both iterative
elimination of weakly dominated strategies and iterative elimination of strongly
dominated strategies. Furthermore, recall from Section 4.5 that, for each player,
the pure least-squares regret strategies are the strategy of quoting 96 and the
strategy of quoting 97.
This discrepancy does not contradict Proposition 5.3.1, which ignores iterative
elimination of dominated strategies. Notice that the strategy of quoting 96 and
the strategy of quoting 97 become weakly or strongly dominated for a player
only after several rounds of elimination. Neither strategy is weakly or strongly
dominated prior to any elimination, and so, it is not contradictory that each is
a pure least-squares regret strategy. By contrast, the strategy of quoting 100 is
weakly and strongly dominated prior to any elimination and is also not a pure
least-squares regret strategy, precisely as Proposition 5.3.1 establishes.
The point is that whether or not iterative elimination of dominated strategies
is considered can matter greatly. In general, as discussed in Section 5.4, least-
squares regret and iterative elimination of dominated strategies can yield different
solutions.
5.4 Iterative Elimination of Dominated Strategies
Least-squares regret and iterative elimination of dominated strategies can yield
different solutions. For an illustration of this point, consider the finite two-person
game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form shown in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2 A game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
3 1
0 1
1 2
0 1
This game is dominance solvable. Notice that x2 is strongly dominated for
player 2 by y2 and can thus be eliminated. But once x2 is eliminated, x1 becomes
strongly dominated for player 1 by y1 and can thus be eliminated. Thus, the
unique solution yielded by iterative elimination of dominated strategies is (y1, y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (2,1).
Least-squares regret yields a different solution. The unique least-squares regret
profile in pure strategies is (x1, y2), which gives the payoff allocation (1,1).
The discrepancy observed in this example is a consequence of supposing that
a player is partially strategic in the sense discussed in Sections 1.2, 1.4, 2.2, and
2.5. In Section 7.4, we consider more fully the problems, such as the discrepancy
above, that can arise from making such an assumption.
5.5 Uniformly Dominant Strategies
Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form. For any player i
in N and any pure strategy ci in Ci , the pure strategy ci is uniformly dominant for
player i if and only if
ui(c−i , ci) ≥ ui(c−i ,di), ∀di ∈ Ci , ∀c−i ∈ C−i .
Intuitively, a uniformly dominant strategy for a player is at least as good as every
other pure strategy with respect to each partial profile of strategies of the other
players. Such a strategy is an obvious choice for playing the game. Notice that a
player may have more than one uniformly dominant strategy.
We note in passing that while the term weakly dominant is sometimes used to
mean what we call uniformly dominant, we prefer our term since the idea of a pure
strategy being weakly dominant for a player typically involves at least one strict
inequality with respect to some or another partial profile of strategies of the other
players. With the term uniformly dominant, there is no such ambiguity and thus
no risk of confusion.
The following proposition establishes that if a player has at least one uniformly
dominant strategy, then every uniformly dominant strategy is a pure least-squares
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regret strategy and, when assigned probability 1, is a randomized least-squares re-
gret strategy, and every pure least-squares regret strategy is a uniformly dominant
strategy. Thus, the following proposition formalizes the intuition that a uniformly
dominant strategy is an obvious choice for playing a game.
Proposition 5.5.1. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form.
For any player i in N , if there exists some pure strategy c¯i in Ci such that c¯i is uniformly
dominant for player i, then, for any pure strategy ci in Ci , if ci is uniformly dominant
for player i, then ci is a pure least-squares regret strategy for player i and, when assigned
probability 1, is a randomized least-squares regret strategy for player i, and if ci is a
pure least-squares regret strategy for player i, then ci is uniformly dominant for player
i.
Proof. Consider any player i in N . Suppose that there exists some pure strategy c¯i
in Ci such that c¯i is uniformly dominant for player i. Then ρi(c¯i) = 0.
Consider any pure strategy ci in Ci . If ci is uniformly dominant for player i,
then ρi(ci) = 0, and so, ci is a pure least-squares regret strategy for player i and,
when assigned probability 1, is a randomized least-squares regret strategy for
player i. If ci is not uniformly dominant for player i, then ρi(ci) > 0, and so, it is
not a pure least-squares regret strategy for player i. 
The following proposition concerns randomized strategies and establishes that
if a player has at least one uniformly dominant strategy, then the support of any
randomized least-squares regret strategy can contain only uniformly dominant
strategies. Intuitively, this proposition establishes that if one has at least one
uniformly dominant strategy, then one can randomize however one pleases as
long as one randomizes exclusively over uniformly dominant strategies.
Proposition 5.5.2. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form.
For any player i in N , if there exists some pure strategy c¯i in Ci such that c¯i is uniformly
dominant for player i, then, for any randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci) and any pure
strategy ci in Ci , if σi is a randomized least-squares regret strategy for player i and
σi(ci) > 0, then ci is uniformly dominant for player i.
Proof. Consider any player i in N . Suppose that there exists some pure strategy c¯i
in Ci such that c¯i is uniformly dominant for player i. Then ρi(c¯i) = 0.
Consider any randomized strategy σi in ∆(Ci) and any pure strategy ci in Ci .
Suppose that σi is a randomized least-squares regret strategy for player i and that
σi(ci) > 0 and that ci is not uniformly dominant for player i. Then ρi(σi) > 0. But
then
σi < argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi).
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But this is a contradiction. Thus, ci is uniformly dominant for player i. 
For an illustration of these two propositions, consider the finite two-person
game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form known as the Prisoners’ Dilemma
shown in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 Prisoners’ Dilemma game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
2 0
2 3
3 1
0 1
It is easy to see that Proposition 5.5.1 holds. Consider any player i in N .
Clearly, yi is for player i both the unique uniformly dominant strategy and the
unique pure least-squares regret strategy. Thus, for any player i in N , the set of
uniformly dominant strategies for player i and the set of pure least-squares regret
strategies for player i are identical. Furthermore, since ρi(yi) = 0, it follows that yi ,
when assigned probability 1, is also a randomized least-squares regret strategy for
player i.
It is likewise easy to see that Proposition 5.5.2 holds. Consider any player i in
N . The regret function ρi : ∆(Ci)→ R is
ρi(σi) =
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(x−i ,τi)−ui(x−i ,σi)

2
+
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(y−i ,τi)−ui(y−i ,σi)

2
= (3− (2σi(xi) + 3(1− σi(xi))))2 + (1− (1− σi(xi)))2
= 2(σi(xi))
2.
The regret function ρi is minimized at the point σi(xi) = 0, and so, the unique ran-
domized least-squares regret strategy for player i is yi , which assigns probability
1 to the pure strategy yi , the unique uniformly dominant strategy for player i.
In the absence of uniformly dominant strategies, randomizing over several
pure strategies may be better than playing any particular pure strategy with
probability 1. For an illustration of this point, consider the finite two-person game
Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form shown in Table 5.4.
In this game, the unique randomized least-squares regret strategy for player 1
is 0.5x1 + 0.5y1. Thus, minimizing the regret function ρ1 involves randomizing
between x1 and y1 and not playing either with probability 1.
But this is not to say that in the absence of uniformly dominant strategies, ran-
domizing over several pure strategies need be better than playing any particular
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Table 5.4 Payoffs of player 1 in a game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
3 0
1 2
pure strategy with probability 1. Indeed, in the absence of uniformly dominant
strategies, it may be best to play some particular pure strategy for sure. For an illus-
tration of this point, consider the finite two-person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2)
in strategic form shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 Payoffs of player 1 in a game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
z1
x2 y2
2 −9
1 0
0 1
Consider player 1. The regret function ρ1 : ∆(C1)→ R is
ρ1(σ1) =
 max
τ1∈∆(C1)
u1(τ1,x2)−u1(σ1,x2)

2
+
 max
τ1∈∆(C1)
u1(τ1, y2)−u1(σ1, y2)

2
= (2− (2σ1(x1) + σ1(y1)))2 + (1− (1− 10σ1(x1)− σ1(y1)))2
= 104(σ1(x1))
2 + 2(σ1(y1))
2 + 24σ1(x1)σ1(y1)− 8σ1(x1)− 4σ1(y1) + 4.
It is straightforward to verify that the regret function ρ1 is minimized when
σ1(x1) = 0 and σ1(y1) = 1.
Thus, the unique randomized least-squares regret strategy for player 1 is y1, which
assigns probability 1 to the pure strategy y1.
5.6 Strategic Equivalence
In Section 5.2, we considered the concept of full equivalence of finite games in
strategic form (Myerson, 1991). But other concepts of equivalence have been
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proposed. Of particular significance are certain well-known transformations of
the payoffs in a game—most notably, those transformations that characterize
the concept of strategic equivalence of finite games in strategic form—that leave
unchanged the best-response correspondences of the players. In this section, we
show that least-squares regret is invariant with respect to such transformations.
Strategic equivalence of finite games in strategic form is defined formally as
follows. For any finite games Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) and Γˆ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (uˆi)i∈N )
in strategic form, the games Γ and Γˆ are strategically equivalent if and only if,
for every player i in N , there exist some real number Ai and some function
Bi :

j∈N−iCj → R such that Ai > 0 and
uˆi(c−i , ci) = Aiui(c−i , ci) +Bi(c−i), ∀c−i ∈ C−i , ∀ci ∈ Ci .
Such transformations are particularly notable. For example, Moulin and Vial
(1978) show that, for any two-person game, such transformations are the only
transformations that leave unchanged the best-response correspondences of the
players (setting aside the latitude to make a dominated strategy arbitrarily better
or worse as long as it remains dominated). Furthermore, Moulin and Vial (1978)
introduce the concept of a two-person strategically zero-sum game, which is defined
as any game that is strategically equivalent to some two-person zero-sum game,
and show that, with respect to a number of correlation schemes, including the
scheme characterized by the concept of a correlated strategy (Aumann, 1974;
Aumann, 1987), strategically zero-sum games are precisely those two-person
games whose completely randomized equilibria cannot be improved upon.
As a matter of consistency, a solution concept should not yield different solu-
tions for strategically equivalent games. Any solution concept that fails on this
score must be seen as being faulty in a significant way. For example, as noted
in Sections 1.1 and 5.2, quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey,
1995; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998) is not scale invariant and can thus be inconsis-
tent, yielding different solutions for strategically equivalent games (Wright and
Leyton-Brown, 2010).
The following theorem establishes that least-squares regret is invariant with
respect to strategic equivalence in the sense that strategically equivalent games
have the same solutions.
Theorem 5.6.1. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) and Γˆ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (uˆi)i∈N ) be any
finite games in strategic form such that Γ and Γˆ are strategically equivalent. For any
player i in N , let ρi : ∆(Ci)→ R be the regret function in randomized strategies for
player i in Γ , let ρˆi : ∆(Ci)→ R be the regret function in randomized strategies for
player i in Γˆ , let ρi : Ci → R be the regret function in pure strategies for player i in Γ ,
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and let ρˆi : Ci → R be the regret function in pure strategies for player i in Γˆ . Then
i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi) =

i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρˆi(τi)
and 
i∈N
argmin
di∈Ci
ρi(di) =

i∈N
argmin
di∈Ci
ρˆi(di).
Proof. Consider any player i in N . By assumption, the games Γ and Γˆ are strate-
gically equivalent, and so, there exist some real number Ai and some function
Bi :

j∈N−iCj → R such that Ai > 0 and
uˆi(c−i , ci) = Aiui(c−i , ci) +Bi(c−i), ∀c−i ∈ C−i , ∀ci ∈ Ci .
Clearly, it follows that
uˆi(c−i ,σi) = Aiui(c−i ,σi) +Bi(c−i), ∀c−i ∈ C−i , ∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci).
Thus,
ρˆi(σi)
=
∑
c−i∈C−i
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
uˆi(c−i ,τi)− uˆi(c−i ,σi)

2
, ∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci)
=
∑
c−i∈C−i
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
(Aiui(c−i ,τi) +Bi(c−i))− (Aiui(c−i ,σi) +Bi(c−i))

2
, ∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci)
= A2i
∑
c−i∈C−i
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i ,σi)

2
, ∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci)
= A2i ρi(σi), ∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci).
Since Ai > 0, the regret functions ρi and ρˆi differ by a strictly increasing linear
transformation. And so,
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi) = argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρˆi(τi).
Thus,
i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi) =

i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρˆi(τi).
From the above, it follows that
ρˆi(ci) = A
2
i ρi(ci), ∀ci ∈ Ci .
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Since Ai > 0, the regret functions ρi and ρˆi differ by a strictly increasing linear
transformation. And so,
argmin
di∈Ci
ρi(di) = argmin
di∈Ci
ρˆi(di).
Thus,
i∈N
argmin
di∈Ci
ρi(di) =

i∈N
argmin
di∈Ci
ρˆi(di). 
In some ways, a weakly or strongly dominated strategy for a player is strate-
gically irrelevant and negligible. Thus, it seems reasonable to suppose that, as
long as a weakly or strongly dominated strategy remains so, it can be made arbi-
trarily better or worse without affecting the behavior of the player. The following
theorem establishes that least-squares regret is invariant with respect to such
transformations of weakly or strongly dominated strategies.
Theorem 5.6.2. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) and Γˆ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (uˆi)i∈N ) be any
finite games in strategic form. For any player i in N , let Di be the set of weakly or
strongly dominated strategies for player i in Γ , let Dˆi be the set of weakly or strongly
dominated strategies for player i in Γˆ , let ρi : ∆(Ci) → R be the regret function in
randomized strategies for player i in Γ , let ρˆi : ∆(Ci)→ R be the regret function in
randomized strategies for player i in Γˆ , let ρi : Ci → R be the regret function in pure
strategies for player i in Γ , and let ρˆi : Ci → R be the regret function in pure strategies
for player i in Γˆ . If, for every player i in N ,
Di = Dˆi
and
uˆi(c−i , ci) = ui(c−i , ci), ∀c−i ∈ C−i , ∀ci ∈ Ci \Di ,
then 
i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi) =

i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρˆi(τi)
and 
i∈N
argmin
di∈Ci
ρi(di) =

i∈N
argmin
di∈Ci
ρˆi(di).
Proof. Consider any player i in N . Consider first randomized strategies. Suppose
that
Di = Dˆi = ∅.
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Since, by assumption,
uˆi(c−i , ci) = ui(c−i , ci), ∀c−i ∈ C−i , ∀ci ∈ Ci \Di ,
it follows that Γ and Γˆ are identical. Thus, it is trivially true that
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi) = argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρˆi(τi).
Now, suppose that
Di = Dˆi , ∅.
By Proposition 5.3.2 in Section 5.3, the support of a randomized least-squares
regret strategy cannot contain a weakly or strongly dominated strategy. Thus, only
the undominated strategies in Ci can be included in the support of a randomized
least-squares regret strategy. But, by assumption,
uˆi(c−i , ci) = ui(c−i , ci), ∀c−i ∈ C−i , ∀ci ∈ Ci \Di .
And so,
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi) = argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρˆi(τi).
Thus,
i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi) =

i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρˆi(τi).
Now, consider pure strategies. Suppose that
Di = Dˆi = ∅.
Since, by assumption,
uˆi(c−i , ci) = ui(c−i , ci), ∀c−i ∈ C−i , ∀ci ∈ Ci \Di ,
it follows that Γ and Γˆ are identical. Thus, it is trivially true that
argmin
di∈Ci
ρi(di) = argmin
di∈Ci
ρˆi(di).
Now, suppose that
Di = Dˆi , ∅.
By Proposition 5.3.1 in Section 5.3, a pure strategy that is weakly or strongly
dominated for a player by some other pure strategy cannot minimize the regret
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function in pure strategies. Thus, only an undominated strategy in Ci can be a
pure least-squares regret strategy. But, by assumption,
uˆi(c−i , ci) = ui(c−i , ci), ∀c−i ∈ C−i , ∀ci ∈ Ci \Di ,
And so,
argmin
di∈Ci
ρi(di) = argmin
di∈Ci
ρˆi(di).
Thus,
i∈N
argmin
di∈Ci
ρi(di) =

i∈N
argmin
di∈Ci
ρˆi(di). 
5.7 Risk Dominance
When it comes to the equilibria in pure strategies of a 2×2 game in strategic form,
there is a strong relationship between least-squares regret and the concept of risk
dominance proposed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). In this section, we examine
this relationship more closely.
Particularly significant here is the well-known fact that when it comes to the
equilibria in pure strategies of a 2× 2 game in strategic form, risk dominance is
equivalent to 1/2-dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988; Morris, Rob, and Shin,
1995; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). This equivalence is defined formally as
follows.
Let Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) be any finite two-person game in strategic form
such that, for each player i in N , it is the case that |Ci | = 2. For any pure-strategy
profile (c1, c2) in C1 ×C2 such that (c1, c2) is an equilibrium of Γ , the pure-strategy
profile (c1, c2) is risk dominant if and only if∑
c−i∈C−i
0.5ui(c−i , ci) ≥
∑
c−i∈C−i
0.5ui(c−i ,di), ∀i ∈N, ∀di ∈ Ci
or, more simply,∑
c−i∈C−i
ui(c−i , ci) ≥
∑
c−i∈C−i
ui(c−i ,di), ∀i ∈N, ∀di ∈ Ci .
Intuitively, for any pure-strategy profile (c1, c2) in C1 × C2 such that (c1, c2) is
an equilibrium, the pure-strategy profile (c1, c2) is risk dominant if and only if,
for each player i in N , the pure strategy ci is a best response to the uniform
randomization between the two pure strategies of the other player.
The following theorem establishes that when it comes to the equilibria in pure
strategies of a 2× 2 game in strategic form, least-squares regret is equivalent to
risk dominance.
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Theorem 5.7.1. Let Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) be any finite two-person game in strate-
gic form such that, for each player i in N , it is the case that |Ci | = 2. Then, for any
pure-strategy profile (c1, c2) in C1 ×C2 such that (c1, c2) is an equilibrium of Γ , the
pure-strategy profile (c1, c2) is risk dominant if and only if (c1, c2) is a least-squares
regret profile in pure strategies.
Proof. For concreteness, for any player i in N , let Ci = {xi , yi}. Consider any player
i in N . The game Γ can be shown as in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6 Payoffs of player i in a game in strategic form
@
@
@
i
−i
xi
yi
x−i y−i
ui(x−i ,xi) ui(y−i ,xi)
ui(x−i , yi) ui(y−i , yi)
Let (x−i ,xi) be an equilibrium of Γ . Notice that there may be more than one
equilibrium. Since (x−i ,xi) is an equilibrium, ui(x−i ,xi) is the best-response payoff
with respect to x−i .
Suppose that the equilibrium (x−i ,xi) is risk dominant. There are two cases to
consider depending on whether ui(y−i ,xi) or ui(y−i , yi) is the best-response payoff
with respect to y−i .
Suppose first that ui(y−i ,xi) is the best-response payoff with respect to y−i .
Clearly,
ui(x−i ,xi) +ui(y−i ,xi) ≥ ui(x−i , yi) +ui(y−i , yi)
and 0 = ρi(xi) ≤ ρi(yi). Indeed, this conclusion follows immediately also from the
fact that xi is uniformly dominant for player i and Proposition 5.5.1 in Section
5.5.
Now, suppose that ui(y−i , yi) is the best-response payoff with respect to y−i .
Then
ρi(xi) = (ui(y−i , yi)−ui(y−i ,xi))2 and
ρi(yi) = (ui(x−i ,xi)−ui(x−i , yi))2.
Since (x−i ,xi) is risk dominant,
ui(x−i ,xi) +ui(y−i ,xi) ≥ ui(x−i , yi) +ui(y−i , yi).
Thus,
ui(x−i ,xi)−ui(x−i , yi) ≥ ui(y−i , yi)−ui(y−i ,xi) ≥ 0,
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and so, ρi(xi) ≤ ρi(yi).
Thus, the equilibrium (x−i ,xi) is a least-squares regret profile in pure strategies.
Now, suppose that the equilibrium (x−i ,xi) is a least-squares regret profile in
pure strategies. There are two cases to consider depending on whether ui(y−i ,xi)
or ui(y−i , yi) is the best-response payoff with respect to y−i .
Suppose first that ui(y−i ,xi) is the best-response payoff with respect to y−i .
Clearly, 0 = ρi(xi) ≤ ρi(yi) and
ui(x−i ,xi) +ui(y−i ,xi) ≥ ui(x−i , yi) +ui(y−i , yi).
Now, suppose that ui(y−i , yi) is the best-response payoff with respect to y−i .
Then
ρi(xi) = (ui(y−i , yi)−ui(y−i ,xi))2 and
ρi(yi) = (ui(x−i ,xi)−ui(x−i , yi))2.
Since (x−i ,xi) is a least-squares regret profile in pure strategies, ρi(xi) ≤ ρi(yi).
Thus,
ui(x−i ,xi)−ui(x−i , yi) ≥ ui(y−i , yi)−ui(y−i ,xi) ≥ 0,
and so,
ui(x−i ,xi) +ui(y−i ,xi) ≥ ui(x−i , yi) +ui(y−i , yi).
Thus, the equilibrium (x−i ,xi) is risk dominant. 
For an illustration of Theorem 5.7.1 and the equivalence that it describes,
consider the 2×2 game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form shown in Table
5.7.
Table 5.7 A game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
3 0
2 1
2 2
0 2
This game has three equilibria: (x1,x2), which gives the payoff allocation (3,2);
(y1, y2), which gives the payoff allocation (2,2); and
((2/3)x1 + (1/3)y1, (2/3)x2 + (1/3)y2),
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which gives the payoff allocation (2,4/3). Notably, the equilibrium (x1,x2) is payoff
dominant, and the equilibrium (y1, y2) is risk dominant.
Now, consider least-squares regret. The unique least-squares regret profile in
pure strategies is precisely the risk-dominant equilibrium (y1, y2).
Least-squares regret with respect to randomized strategies yields a similar
solution. The unique least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies is
(0.2x1 + 0.8y1,0.2x2 + 0.8y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (1.72,1.52).
This solution is quite reasonable. In particular, it comes quite close to being
the risk-dominant equilibrium. Still, this solution is somewhat unsatisfactory
in that it is worse for each player than the risk-dominant equilibrium that is
achieved by considering only pure strategies. But this is to be expected: hedging
via randomization comes at a price.
Of course, how well a least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies
fares relative to a risk-dominant equilibrium in pure strategies depends on the
other payoffs that can be achieved. For an illustration of this point, consider the
2 × 2 game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form shown in Table 5.8, which
differs from the game shown in Table 5.7 only in that u1(x1,x2) is increased from
3 to 10 and u1(y1,x2) is increased from 2 to 9.
Table 5.8 A game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
10 0
2 1
9 2
0 2
In this game, as Theorem 5.7.1 establishes, the unique least-squares regret
profile in pure strategies is again precisely the risk-dominant equilibrium (y1, y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (2,2), and the unique least-squares regret profile
in randomized strategies is
(0.2x1 + 0.8y1,0.2x2 + 0.8y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (3.12,1.52). Notably, this solution in randomized
strategies is better for player 1 than the risk-dominant equilibrium that is achieved
by considering only pure strategies.
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5.8 Convexity
As discussed in Sections 2.2, 2.5, and 3.2, we suppose the squaring of regret for
technical reasons and for mathematical convenience. As noted earlier, one agree-
able consequence of squaring the regret is that the regret function in randomized
strategies is convex. Thus, minimization of the regret function in randomized
strategies defines a convex set of randomized least-squares regret strategies. It
follows that, for any finite game in strategic form, the set of least-squares regret
profiles in randomized strategies is convex. The following theorem establishes
these facts.
Theorem 5.8.1. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form.
Then the set
i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi)
is convex.
Proof. Consider any player i in N . Let σi and σˆi be any randomized strategies in
∆(Ci). Let λ be any real number such that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, and let λσi + (1−λ)σˆi be the
randomized strategy in ∆(Ci) such that
(λσi + (1−λ)σˆi)(ci) = λσi(ci) + (1−λ)σˆi(ci), ∀ci ∈ Ci .
Then
ρi(λσi + (1−λ)σˆi) =
∑
c−i∈C−i
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i ,λσi + (1−λ)σˆi)

2
.
But notice that
ui(c−i ,λσi + (1−λ)σˆi) = λui(c−i ,σi) + (1−λ)ui(c−i , σˆi).
And so,
ρi(λσi + (1−λ)σˆi)
=
∑
c−i∈C−i
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i , σˆi) +λ(ui(c−i , σˆi)−ui(c−i ,σi))

2
.
Now, consider the function fi : [0,1]→ R such that
fi(λ) = ρi(λσi + (1−λ)σˆi).
Notice that
d2(fi(λ))
dλ2
= 2
∑
c−i∈C−i
(ui(c−i , σˆi)−ui(c−i ,σi))2.
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Clearly,
d2(fi(λ))
dλ2
≥ 0, ∀λ ∈ [0,1],
and so, the function fi is convex.
Now, notice that
fi(0) = ρi(0σi + (1− 0)σˆi) = ρi(σˆi)
and
fi(1) = ρi(1σi + (1− 1)σˆi) = ρi(σi).
Observe that the line connecting the points (0,ρi(σˆi)) and (1,ρi(σi)) in R2 is just
the function gi : [0,1]→ R such that
gi(λ) = λρi(σi) + (1−λ)ρi(σˆi).
But since the function fi is convex,
fi(λ) = ρi(λσi + (1−λ)σˆi) ≤ gi(λ) = λρi(σi) + (1−λ)ρi(σˆi), ∀λ ∈ [0,1].
Thus, the regret function ρi is convex. And so, the set
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi)
is convex.
Thus, the set
i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi)
is convex since it is the Cartesian product of convex sets. 
Convexity is appealing for several reasons. Convexity of the regret function
in randomized strategies implies that computation of randomized least-squares
regret strategies is a convex optimization problem, which can be solved efficiently
using standard well-developed techniques. Furthermore, convexity of the regret
function in randomized strategies implies that the player has a convex set of
randomized least-squares regret strategies, each of which is considered reasonable,
and can randomize over such strategies in any manner.
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5.9 Uniqueness
Theorem 5.8.1 in Section 5.8 establishes that, for any finite game in strategic form,
the set of least-squares regret profiles in randomized strategies is convex. But this
means that a finite game in strategic form may have infinitely many solutions.
The following theorem describes a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a
least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies.
Theorem 5.9.1. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form. If,
for every player i in N and for any randomized strategies σi and σˆi in ∆(Ci) such that
σi , σˆi , there exists some partial profile c−i in C−i such that
ui(c−i ,σi) , ui(c−i , σˆi),
then the set
i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi)
is a singleton.
Proof. Consider any player i in N . Let σi and σˆi be any randomized strategies
in ∆(Ci) such that σi , σˆi . Let λ be any real number such that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, and let
λσi + (1−λ)σˆi be the randomized strategy in ∆(Ci) such that
(λσi + (1−λ)σˆi)(ci) = λσi(ci) + (1−λ)σˆi(ci), ∀ci ∈ Ci .
Just as in the proof of Theorem 5.8.1 in Section 5.8, consider the function
fi : [0,1]→ R such that
fi(λ) = ρi(λσi + (1−λ)σˆi).
Recall that
d2(fi(λ))
dλ2
= 2
∑
c−i∈C−i
(ui(c−i , σˆi)−ui(c−i ,σi))2.
By assumption, there exists some partial profile c−i in C−i such that
ui(c−i ,σi) , ui(c−i , σˆi).
Thus,
d2(fi(λ))
dλ2
> 0, ∀λ ∈ [0,1],
and so, the function fi is strictly convex.
Now, notice that
fi(0) = ρi(0σi + (1− 0)σˆi) = ρi(σˆi)
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and
fi(1) = ρi(1σi + (1− 1)σˆi) = ρi(σi).
Observe that the line connecting the points (0,ρi(σˆi)) and (1,ρi(σi)) in R2 is just
the function gi : [0,1]→ R such that
gi(λ) = λρi(σi) + (1−λ)ρi(σˆi).
But since the function fi is strictly convex,
fi(λ) = ρi(λσi + (1−λ)σˆi) < gi(λ) = λρi(σi) + (1−λ)ρi(σˆi), ∀λ ∈ (0,1).
Thus, the regret function ρi is strictly convex. And so, the set
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi)
is a singleton since, by Theorem 5.1.1 in Section 5.1, it is nonempty and since, as
just shown, the regret function ρi is strictly convex.
Thus, the set
i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi)
is a singleton since it is the Cartesian product of singleton sets. 
In the case of a small finite game in strategic form in which each player has at
most two pure strategies, the sufficient condition for uniqueness is far simpler.
Theorem 5.9.2. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form such
that, for every player i in N , it is the case that |Ci | ≤ 2. If, for every player i in N , it is
the case that |Ci | = 1 or, for any pure strategies ci and cˆi in Ci such that ci , cˆi , there
exists some partial profile c−i in C−i such that
ui(c−i , ci) , ui(c−i , cˆi),
then the set
i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi)
is a singleton.
Proof. Consider any player i in N . Suppose that |Ci | = 1. Then, clearly, |∆(Ci)| = 1.
And so, the set
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi)
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is a singleton.
Now, suppose that |Ci | = 2. Let ci and cˆi be any pure strategies in Ci such that
ci , cˆi . By assumption, there exists some partial profile c−i in C−i such that
ui(c−i , ci) , ui(c−i , cˆi).
Let σi and σˆi be any randomized strategies in ∆(Ci) such that σi , σˆi . Then
ui(c−i ,σi) = σi(ci)ui(c−i , ci) + σi(cˆi)ui(c−i , cˆi)
= σi(ci)ui(c−i , ci) + (1− σi(ci))ui(c−i , cˆi)
= σi(ci)(ui(c−i , ci)−ui(c−i , cˆi)) +ui(c−i , cˆi)
and
ui(c−i , σˆi) = σˆi(ci)ui(c−i , ci) + σˆi(cˆi)ui(c−i , cˆi)
= σˆi(ci)ui(c−i , ci) + (1− σˆi(ci))ui(c−i , cˆi)
= σˆi(ci)(ui(c−i , ci)−ui(c−i , cˆi)) +ui(c−i , cˆi).
But
σi(ci) , σˆi(ci)
and
ui(c−i , ci)−ui(c−i , cˆi) , 0.
And so,
σi(ci)(ui(c−i , ci)−ui(c−i , cˆi)) +ui(c−i , cˆi) , σˆi(ci)(ui(c−i , ci)−ui(c−i , cˆi)) +ui(c−i , cˆi).
Thus, there exists some partial profile c−i in C−i such that
ui(c−i ,σi) , ui(c−i , σˆi).
And so, by Theorem 5.9.1, the set
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi)
is a singleton.
Thus, the set
i∈N
argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(τi)
is a singleton since it is the Cartesian product of singleton sets. 
Intuition suggests that, for any generic finite game in strategic form, the set of
least-squares regret profiles in randomized strategies is a singleton. It would be
interesting to verify this conjecture.
6Further Examples
One significant question that arises when appraising a solution concept is whether
or not it yields the expected or reasonable solutions for the games to which it is
applied and, in particular, for games beyond those that inspired its development.
In this chapter, we move beyond the Traveler’s Dilemma and show that least-
squares regret yields reasonable solutions for many other well-known games—and,
for some, solutions that are even more reasonable than those yielded by standard
solution concepts—and unsatisfactory solutions for some. Section 6.1 studies
the Dollar Auction game and shows how least-squares regret yields a reason-
able solution and outperforms Nash equilibrium. Section 6.2 studies Bertrand
competition and shows how least-squares regret yields a reasonable solution in
line with the experimental evidence and outperforms Nash equilibrium. Section
6.3 studies inspection games and shows how least-squares regret, unlike Nash
equilibrium, captures certain intuitive and experimentally robust effects. Section
6.4 studies Matching Pennies games and evaluates the successes and failures of
least-squares regret and Nash equilibrium. Section 6.5 studies the Chicken game
and shows how least-squares regret yields reasonable solutions and outperforms
Nash equilibrium. Section 6.6 studies coordination games, for which least-squares
regret yields reasonable solutions. Section 6.7 studies the Battle of the Sexes game,
for which least-squares regret yields unsatisfactory solutions. Section 6.8 studies
the two-person bargaining problem and presents two new theorems.
6.1 Dollar Auction
Consider the Dollar Auction game (Raiffa, 1982). In this game, a single dollar is
up for auction. There are two risk-neutral players, and each must privately and
independently submit a bid that can be any real number between 0 and 1. The
high bidder wins the auction and pays the amount of his bid. The low bidder loses
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the auction and pays nothing. In the event of a tie, each player has a probability of
0.5 of winning the auction and paying the amount of his bid and a probability of
0.5 of losing the auction and paying nothing. Thus, in this game, the set of players
is N = {1,2}, the pure-strategy sets are
C1 = C2 = {x ∈ R | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1},
and, for any player i in N , the utility function is
ui(c1, c2) = 0 if i < argmax
j∈{1,2}
cj ,
= 1− ci if {i} = argmax
j∈{1,2}
cj ,
= (1− ci)/2 if c1 = c2.
In the unique equilibrium of this game, each player bids 1 for sure and receives
a net payoff of 0. For any other profile of bids, there is always an incentive for
one player to outbid the other player by the slimmest margin. In this way, the
Dollar Auction game models the dynamics of bidding up the price of an item in
an auction.
But this solution seems unreasonable. It seems that no player would ever bid
1. Indeed, for each player, bidding 1 is a weakly dominated strategy—one that is,
in fact, weakly dominated by every other strategy—since it is the only bid that
cannot yield a positive payoff and no bid can yield a negative payoff. Thus, it is
difficult to recommend playing the equilibrium strategy of bidding 1 for sure.
Any other bid would be better. If there is any chance at all of the other player, for
whatever reason, bidding strictly less than 1, it would be rational for one likewise
to bid some amount strictly less than 1. Here, the equilibrium strategy seems
wrongheaded.
By contrast, least-squares regret yields a more reasonable solution. Consider
any player i in N and any bid ci in Ci . If the other player chooses some bid c−i in
C−i that is less than ci , then the payoff to player i from choosing ci is 1− ci while
the best-response payoff is 1− c−i (since the best response is to outbid the other
player by the slimmest margin). If the other player chooses some bid c−i in C−i
that is greater than ci , then the payoff to player i from choosing ci is 0 while the
best-response payoff is again 1− c−i . Thus, for any player i in N ,
ρi(ci) =
∫ ci
0
((1− c−i)− (1− ci))2dc−i +
∫ 1
ci
((1− c−i)− 0)2dc−i
=
∫ ci
0
(ci − c−i)2dc−i +
∫ 1
ci
(1− c−i)2dc−i
= c2i − ci + 1/3,
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and so,
d(ρi(ci))
dci
= 2ci − 1.
Setting the derivative equal to 0 and solving for ci yields the unique pure least-
squares regret strategy ci = 0.5. Such a bid, being strictly less than 1, is more
reasonable than the equilibrium strategy: it always does at least as well as the
equilibrium strategy, and with respect to half of the pure-strategy set of the other
player, it does strictly better. Such a bid makes intuitive sense also: it balances
the need to bid high enough to win the auction and the need to bid low enough to
avoid a costly victory.
Of course, the unique least-squares regret profile in pure strategies (0.5,0.5),
while reasonable, cannot be an equilibrium since each player, should he expect
the other player to choose 0.5, would prefer to outbid the other player by the
slimmest margin. As discussed in Sections 1.2, 1.4, 2.2, and 2.5, least-squares
regret disregards fully strategic reasoning, and this disregard is an obvious point
of criticism. We discuss this issue in Section 7.4 and address it in Chapter 8.
6.2 Bertrand Competition
Consider Bertrand competition, which models the price-setting behaviors of com-
petitors in a market (Bertrand, 1883). In this game, there are two risk-neutral
players competing in a market to sell 100 units of some homogeneous commodity,
and each must privately and independently set a price to publicize that can be
any real number between 0 and 200. Assume that the players have no costs and
that consumers choose on the basis of price alone. The player setting the lower
price wins the entire market and sells all 100 units at his chosen price. The player
setting the higher price loses the entire market and sells nothing. If the two
players set the same price, they split the market evenly. Thus, in this game, the
set of players is N = {1,2}, the pure-strategy sets are
C1 = C2 = {x ∈ R | 0 ≤ x ≤ 200},
and, for any player i in N , the utility function is
ui(c1, c2) = 0 if i < argmin
j∈{1,2}
cj ,
= 100ci if {i} = argmin
j∈{1,2}
cj ,
= 50ci if c1 = c2.
One may notice several striking similarities between Bertrand competition and
the Dollar Auction game in Section 6.1. This is not surprising. The two games are
Chapter 6. Further Examples 88
more or less structurally equivalent. More precisely, Bertrand competition, as it
has been described here, can be seen as a kind of reverse auction.
In the unique equilibrium of this game, each player sets a price of 0 for sure
and receives a net payoff of 0. For any other profile of prices, there is always an
incentive for one player to undercut the other player by the slimmest margin. In
this way, Bertrand competition models the dynamics of price wars or convergence
to a market equilibrium.
But this solution seems unreasonable. It seems that no player would ever set
a price of 0. Indeed, for each player, setting a price of 0 is a weakly dominated
strategy—one that is, in fact, weakly dominated by every other strategy—since
it is the only price that cannot yield a positive payoff and no price can yield a
negative payoff. Thus, it is difficult to recommend playing the equilibrium of
strategy of setting a price of 0 for sure. Any other price would be better. If there is
any chance at all of the other player, for whatever reason, setting a price strictly
greater than 0, it would be rational for one likewise to set a price strictly greater
than 0. Here, the equilibrium strategy seems wrongheaded.
By contrast, least-squares regret yields a more reasonable solution. Consider
any player i in N and any price ci in Ci . If the other player chooses some price c−i
in C−i that is less than ci , then the payoff to player i from choosing ci is 0 while
the best-response payoff is 100c−i (since the best response is to undercut the other
player by the slimmest margin). If the other player chooses some price c−i in C−i
that is greater than ci , then the payoff to player i from choosing ci is 100ci while
the best-response payoff is again 100c−i . Thus, for any player i in N ,
ρi(ci) =
∫ ci
0
(100c−i − 0)2dc−i +
∫ 200
ci
(100c−i − 100ci)2dc−i
= 1002
∫ ci
0
c2−i dc−i + 100
2
∫ 200
ci
(c−i − ci)2dc−i
= 1002(200c2i − 2002ci + 2003/3),
and so,
d(ρi(ci))
dci
= 1002(400ci − 2002).
Setting the derivative equal to 0 and solving for ci yields the unique pure least-
squares regret strategy ci = 100. Such a price, being strictly greater than 0, is more
reasonable than the equilibrium strategy: it always does at least as well as the
equilibrium strategy, and with respect to half of the pure-strategy set of the other
player, it does strictly better. Such a price makes intuitive sense also: it balances
the need to set a price low enough to capture the market and the need to set a
price high enough to avoid costly underpricing. Notably, the solution yielded
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by least-squares regret agrees with the experimental evidence, which shows that
people consistently choose prices well above that specified by the equilibrium
strategy (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000).
Of course, the unique least-squares regret profile in pure strategies (100,100),
while reasonable, cannot be an equilibrium since each player, should he expect
the other player to choose 100, would prefer to undercut the other player by the
slimmest margin. As discussed in Sections 1.2, 1.4, 2.2, and 2.5, least-squares
regret disregards fully strategic reasoning, and this disregard is an obvious point
of criticism. We discuss this issue in Section 7.4 and address it in Chapter 8.
6.3 Inspection Games
Consider the finite two-person inspection game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strate-
gic form shown in Table 6.1 (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; von Stengel, 2011).
Table 6.1 An inspection game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
0 −4
0 4
−1 −2
0 −10
This game models the dynamics of compliance inspection. In this game, player
1 is the inspector, and player 2 is the inspectee. Player 1 has two pure strategies:
the “abstain” strategy x1 and the “inspect” strategy y1. Player 2 has two pure
strategies: the “comply” strategy x2 and the “cheat” strategy y2. The aim of
player 1 is to ensure that player 2 complies with the regulations and to catch
any violations, but inspections are costly. Player 2 has an incentive to cheat, but
getting caught is very costly.
The unique equilibrium of this game is
((5/7)x1 + (2/7)y1, (2/3)x2 + (1/3)y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (−4/3,0). Notably, player 1 favors the “abstain”
strategy x1, and player 2 favors the “comply” strategy x2.
Least-squares regret yields a quite different solution. The unique least-squares
regret profile in randomized strategies is
(0.2x1 + 0.8y1, (25/29)x2 + (4/29)y2),
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which gives the payoff allocation (−148/145,−144/145) or roughly (−1.02,−0.99). No-
tably, player 1 favors the “inspect” strategy y1, and player 2 favors the “comply”
strategy x2.
Now, consider the two-person inspection game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) shown
in Table 6.2, which differs from the game shown in Table 6.1 only in that u2(y1, y2)
is decreased from −10 to −20. This change models an increase in the cost of getting
caught.
Table 6.2 An inspection game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
0 −4
0 4
−1 −2
0 −20
The unique equilibrium of this game is
((5/6)x1 + (1/6)y1, (2/3)x2 + (1/3)y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (−4/3,0).
In equilibrium, each player randomizes so as to render the other player indif-
ferent between his strategies, and so, the behavior of a player depends not on his
own payoffs, but on the payoffs of the other player. Thus, increasing the cost of
getting caught reduces the probability of the “inspect” strategy y1 being chosen
while having no effect on the behavior of player 2.
But this is peculiar. The cost of getting caught is greater in this game than
in the game shown in Table 6.1. Thus, one would expect the probability of the
“cheat” strategy y2 being chosen to be lower in this game than in the game shown
in Table 6.1. More generally, one would expect a player to be sensitive to his own
payoffs in the natural way.
Such expectations are not only reasonable; they are well supported. Indeed,
own-payoff effects—and the failure of Nash equilibrium to capture them—are well
recognized and experimentally robust (Ochs, 1995; McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber,
2000; Goeree and Holt, 2001; Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey, 2003). Furthermore, with
respect to inspection games of the sort considered here, own-payoff effects are
known to play a role in determining behavior (Nosenzo, Offerman, Sefton, and
van der Veen, 2014).
Now, consider least-squares regret. The unique least-squares regret profile in
randomized strategies is
(0.2x1 + 0.8y1, (25/26)x2 + (1/26)y2),
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which gives the payoff allocation (−56/65,−38/65) or roughly (−0.86,−0.58).
According to least-squares regret, the behavior of a player depends on his own
payoffs. Thus, increasing the cost of getting caught reduces the probability of the
“cheat” strategy y2 being chosen, as expected, while also having no effect on the
behavior of player 1.
Thus, least-squares regret is notable here for yielding solutions in line with
intuition and the experimental evidence, outperforming Nash equilibrium, and
capturing the experimentally robust own-payoff effects described earlier.
6.4 Matching Pennies
Consider the finite two-person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form
known as Matching Pennies shown in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 Matching Pennies game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
80 40
40 80
40 80
80 40
The unique equilibrium of this game is
(0.5x1 + 0.5y1,0.5x2 + 0.5y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (60,60).
As might be expected, the experimental evidence confirms this solution (Go-
eree and Holt, 2001).
Least-squares regret agrees with both Nash equilibrium and the experimental
evidence. For each player i in N , the unique randomized least-squares regret
strategy for player i is 0.5xi + 0.5yi .
Now, consider the asymmetric Matching Pennies game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2)
shown in Table 6.4, which differs from the game shown in Table 6.3 only in that
u1(x1,x2) is increased from 80 to 320.
The unique equilibrium of this game is
(0.5x1 + 0.5y1, (1/8)x2 + (7/8)y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (75,60).
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Table 6.4 An asymmetric Matching Pennies game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
320 40
40 80
40 80
80 40
In equilibrium, each player randomizes so as to render the other player indif-
ferent between his strategies, and so, the behavior of a player depends not on his
own payoffs, but on the payoffs of the other player. Thus, increasing u1(x1,x2)
from 80 to 320 reduces the probability of x2 being chosen while having no effect
on the behavior of player 1.
But this is peculiar. The payoff u1(x1,x2) is greater in this game than in the
game shown in Table 6.3. Thus, one would expect the probability of x1 being
chosen to be greater in this game than in the game shown in Table 6.3. More
generally, one would expect a player to be sensitive to his own payoffs in the
natural way. In fact, the experimental evidence confirms these intuitions: in this
game, x1 is chosen with probability 0.96 (Goeree and Holt, 2001).
Now, consider least-squares regret. The unique least-squares regret profile in
randomized strategies is
(0.98x1 + 0.02y1,0.5x2 + 0.5y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (888/5,60) or (177.6,60).
According to least-squares regret, the behavior of a player depends on his
own payoffs. Thus, increasing u1(x1,x2) from 80 to 320 increases the probability
of x1 being chosen, as expected, while also having no effect on the behavior of
player 2. Notably, the unique randomized least-squares regret strategy for player
1 involves choosing x1 with probability 0.98, which very nearly matches the
observed probability of 0.96.
Now, consider the asymmetric Matching Pennies game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2)
shown in Table 6.5, which differs from the game shown in Table 6.3 only in that
u1(x1,x2) is decreased from 80 to 44.
The unique equilibrium of this game is
(0.5x1 + 0.5y1, (10/11)x2 + (1/11)y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (480/11,60) or roughly (43.64,60).
Again, in equilibrium, each player randomizes so as to render the other player
indifferent between his strategies, and so, the behavior of a player depends not on
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Table 6.5 An asymmetric Matching Pennies game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
44 40
40 80
40 80
80 40
his own payoffs, but on the payoffs of the other player. Thus, decreasing u1(x1,x2)
from 80 to 44 increases the probability of x2 being chosen while having no effect
on the behavior of player 1.
But again, this is peculiar. The payoff u1(x1,x2) is lower in this game than in
the game shown in Table 6.3. Thus, one would expect the probability of x1 being
chosen to be lower in this game than in the game shown in Table 6.3. And again,
more generally, one would expect a player to be sensitive to his own payoffs in the
natural way. In fact, the experimental evidence confirms these intuitions: in this
game, x1 is chosen with probability 0.08 (Goeree and Holt, 2001).
Now, consider least-squares regret. The unique least-squares regret profile in
randomized strategies is
((1/101)x1 + (100/101)y1,0.5x2 + 0.5y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (6042/101,60) or roughly (59.82,60).
Again, according to least-squares regret, the behavior of a player depends on
his own payoffs. Thus, decreasing u1(x1,x2) from 80 to 44 decreases the probability
of x1 being chosen, as expected, while also having no effect on the behavior of
player 2. Notably, the unique randomized least-squares regret strategy for player
1 involves choosing x1 with probability 1/101, which matches fairly closely the
observed probability of 0.08.
Thus, least-squares regret is notable here for yielding solutions in line with
intuition and the experimental evidence, outperforming Nash equilibrium, and
capturing the experimentally robust own-payoff effects (Ochs, 1995; McKelvey,
Palfrey, and Weber, 2000; Goeree and Holt, 2001; Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey, 2003).
But this is not to say that least-squares regret yields solutions that are wholly
consistent with the experimental evidence. Notice that in all three games above,
the unique randomized least-squares regret strategy for player 2 is 0.5x2 + 0.5y2.
But the experimental evidence shows y2 being chosen with probability 0.84 in the
game shown in Table 6.4 and x2 being chosen with probability 0.8 in the game
shown in Table 6.5 (Goeree and Holt, 2001). Player 2 thus appears to anticipate
Chapter 6. Further Examples 94
the strategy choices of player 1 and to respond accordingly in a manner consistent
with Nash equilibrium.
Least-squares regret fails to capture the observed behavior simply because, as
discussed in Sections 1.2, 1.4, 2.2, and 2.5, it disregards fully strategic reasoning.
This disregard is an obvious point of criticism, and we discuss it in Section
7.4. Interesting questions remain, however, for example, why the behavior of
player 1 is determined more by own-payoff effects than by considerations of what
player 2 might do and how considerations of the behavior of other players can be
incorporated into least-squares regret. We propose one remedy in Chapter 8.
6.5 Chicken
Consider the finite two-person anticoordination game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in
strategic form known as Chicken shown in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6 Chicken game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
4 1
4 6
6 −3
1 −3
In this game, each player i in N has two pure strategies: the “cautious” strategy
xi and the “bold” strategy yi . Each player would most prefer to be bold himself
and the other to be cautious, but for each player to be bold would be catastrophic.
The best symmetric outcome occurs when each player is cautious; importantly,
this outcome is also efficient.
This game has three equilibria: (y1,x2), which gives the payoff allocation (6,1);
(x1, y2), which gives the payoff allocation (1,6); and
((2/3)x1 + (1/3)y1, (2/3)x2 + (1/3)y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (3,3).
Notice that the best symmetric outcome (x1,x2), which gives the payoff allo-
cation (4,4), is, in fact, also a remarkably good outcome. For each player, this
outcome is only slightly worse than his most preferred outcome, notably better
than the equilibrium in which he is cautious and the other bold, better than the
unique symmetric equilibrium, and considerably better than the catastrophic
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outcome in which each player is bold. And yet, this outcome, though both good
and efficient, is unachievable by players who choose only equilibrium strategies.
Now, consider least-squares regret. The unique least-squares regret profile in
pure strategies is precisely the best symmetric outcome (x1,x2). Thus, least-squares
regret with respect to pure strategies yields as the unique solution precisely the
good and efficient outcome that is unachievable by players who choose only
equilibrium strategies.
Least-squares regret with respect to randomized strategies yields a similar
solution. The unique least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies is
(0.8x1 + 0.2y1,0.8x2 + 0.2y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (3.56,3.56).
This solution is quite reasonable. In particular, it comes quite close to being
the best symmetric outcome and is better for each player than the qualitatively
similar symmetric equilibrium described above. Still, this solution is somewhat
unsatisfactory in that it is worse for each player than the best symmetric outcome
that is achieved by considering only pure strategies. But this is to be expected:
hedging via randomization comes at a price.
6.6 Coordination Games
Consider the finite two-person coordination game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in
strategic form shown in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7 A coordination game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
3 0
3 0
0 1
0 1
This game has three equilibria: (x1,x2), which gives the payoff allocation (3,3);
(y1, y2), which gives the payoff allocation (1,1); and
(0.25x1 + 0.75y1,0.25x2 + 0.75y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (0.75,0.75). Notably, in the unique equilibrium
in randomized strategies, each player i in N favors yi , making the outcome (y1, y2)
quite likely.
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But these are peculiar results. It seems that the sole reasonable outcome
is (x1,x2), which is clearly superior to the rest. Thus, one would expect the
outcome (x1,x2) to be the unique solution. And while it is possible to generate
it as the unique solution using standard solution concepts, doing so requires an
appeal to other principles such as the focal-point effect (Schelling, 1960) or payoff
dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).
Furthermore, the efficient outcome (x1,x2) is available and clearly better for
each player. Thus, one would expect each player i in N to favor xi .
Now, consider least-squares regret. The unique least-squares regret profile
in pure strategies is precisely the efficient outcome (x1,x2). Thus, least-squares
regret with respect to pure strategies yields as the unique solution precisely the
sole reasonable outcome (x1,x2), all without needing to appeal to other principles.
Least-squares regret with respect to randomized strategies yields a similar
solution. The unique least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies is
(0.9x1 + 0.1y1,0.9x2 + 0.1y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (2.44,2.44).
While this solution is not the efficient outcome (x1,x2), it is quite reasonable.
Each player i in N favors xi , as expected. Furthermore, since each player strongly
favors enacting the efficient outcome (x1,x2), making it very likely, the resulting
outcome is only marginally worse. Finally, choosing with positive probability
not to enact the efficient outcome can be seen as a sensible hedge to handle the
possibility that the other player chooses not to enact the efficient outcome; the
payoff reduction is simply the price of hedging via randomization.
Thus, least-squares regret is notable here for yielding solutions in line with
intuition, all without needing to appeal to other principles, and outperforming
Nash equilibrium.
Now, consider the finite two-person coordination game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2)
in strategic form shown in Table 6.8, which differs from the game shown in Table
6.7 only in that, for each player i in N , the payoff ui(x1,x2) is increased from 3 to
10.
This game has three equilibria: (x1,x2), which gives the payoff allocation
(10,10); (y1, y2), which gives the payoff allocation (1,1); and
((1/11)x1 + (10/11)y1, (1/11)x2 + (10/11)y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (10/11,10/11) or roughly (0.91,0.91). Notably, in the
unique equilibrium in randomized strategies, each player i in N strongly favors
yi , making the outcome (y1, y2) very likely.
Furthermore, in equilibrium, each player randomizes so as to render the other
player indifferent between his strategies, and so, the behavior of a player depends
Chapter 6. Further Examples 97
Table 6.8 A coordination game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
10 0
10 0
0 1
0 1
not on his own payoffs, but on the payoffs of the other player. Thus, for each
player i in N , increasing ui(x1,x2) from 3 to 10 reduces the probability of xi being
chosen.
But again, these are peculiar results. It seems that the sole reasonable outcome
is (x1,x2), which is clearly superior to the rest. In fact, it is even more outstanding
in this game than in the game shown in Table 6.7. Thus, again, one would expect
the outcome (x1,x2) to be the unique solution. But just as before, to generate it as
the unique solution using standard solution concepts requires an appeal to other
principles such as the focal-point effect (Schelling, 1960) or payoff dominance
(Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). And, perhaps disappointingly, this fact holds no
matter how outstanding the outcome (x1,x2) might be.
Furthermore, the efficient outcome (x1,x2) is available and clearly better for
each player. In fact, the extent of its superiority for each player is even greater in
this game than in the game shown in Table 6.7. Thus, again, one would expect
each player i in N to favor xi .
Finally, for each player i in N , the payoff ui(x1,x2) is greater in this game than
in the game shown in Table 6.7. Thus, one would expect, for each player i in N ,
the probability of xi being chosen to be greater in this game than in the game
shown in Table 6.7. More generally, one would expect a player to be sensitive to
his own payoffs in the natural way.
Now, consider least-squares regret. The unique least-squares regret profile
in pure strategies is precisely the efficient outcome (x1,x2). Thus, least-squares
regret with respect to pure strategies yields as the unique solution precisely the
sole reasonable outcome, all without needing to appeal to other principles.
Least-squares regret with respect to randomized strategies yields a similar
solution. The unique least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies is
((100/101)x1 + (1/101)y1, (100/101)x2 + (1/101)y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (100001/10201,100001/10201) or roughly (9.80,9.80).
While this solution is not the efficient outcome (x1,x2), it is quite reasonable.
Each player i in N favors xi , as expected. Furthermore, since each player very
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strongly favors enacting the efficient outcome (x1,x2), making it almost inevitable,
the resulting outcome is only marginally worse. Also, as noted earlier, choosing
with positive probability not to enact the efficient outcome can be seen as a
sensible hedge to handle the possibility that the other player chooses not to enact
the efficient outcome; the payoff reduction is simply the price of hedging via
randomization. Finally, for each player i in N , increasing ui(x1,x2) from 3 to 10
increases the probability of xi being chosen, as expected.
Thus, least-squares regret is notable here for yielding solutions in line with
intuition, all without needing to appeal to other principles, outperforming Nash
equilibrium, and capturing the experimentally robust own-payoff effects (Ochs,
1995; McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber, 2000; Goeree and Holt, 2001; Goeree, Holt,
and Palfrey, 2003).
Needless to say, least-squares regret cannot guarantee efficiency. Consider
the finite two-person coordination game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form
shown in Table 6.9.
Table 6.9 A coordination game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
3 0
3 2.5
2.5 1
0 1
The unique least-squares regret profile in pure strategies is the inefficient
outcome (y1, y2), which gives the payoff allocation (1,1), and the unique least-
squares regret profile in randomized strategies is
(0.2x1 + 0.8y1,0.2x2 + 0.8y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (1.16,1.16).
These solutions seem unsatisfactory. The efficient outcome (x1,x2) is available
and clearly better for each player. Thus, one would expect each player i in N to
favor xi .
Still, it seems reasonable for each player i in N to favor yi . If the other player
chooses x−i , then yi yields a payoff that is only marginally less than the best-
response payoff that is achieved by choosing xi , and if the other player chooses y−i ,
then yi yields the best-response payoff, which is notably greater than the payoff
from choosing xi . Thus, it seems reasonable, all things considered, to favor yi .
Indeed, this is the very idea behind least-squares regret. In a sense, the inefficient
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solutions yielded by least-squares regret are reasonable insofar as the logic just
described is.
These solutions are reasonable for yet another reason: the inefficient outcome
(y1, y2) is a risk-dominant equilibrium. Indeed, as Theorem 5.7.1 in Section 5.7
establishes, when it comes to the equilibria in pure strategies of a 2×2 game in
strategic form, least-squares regret is equivalent to risk dominance. Thus, the
convergence here of least-squares regret and risk dominance is precisely what one
would expect.
6.7 Battle of the Sexes
Consider the finite two-person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form
known as Battle of the Sexes shown in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10 Battle of the Sexes game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
3 0
1 0
0 1
0 3
This game has three equilibria: (x1,x2), which gives the payoff allocation (3,1);
(y1, y2), which gives the payoff allocation (1,3); and
(0.75x1 + 0.25y1,0.25x2 + 0.75y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (0.75,0.75). The first equilibrium is the most
preferred outcome of player 1, and the second equilibrium is the most preferred
outcome of player 2, and so, the players prefer different outcomes. In the third
equilibrium, the players act in a random and uncoordinated manner, but each
favors enacting his most preferred outcome. This third equilibrium is notably
inefficient.
Now, consider least-squares regret. The unique least-squares regret profile in
pure strategies is the conflict outcome (x1, y2), which gives the payoff allocation
(0,0), and the unique least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies is
(0.9x1 + 0.1y1,0.1x2 + 0.9y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (0.36,0.36).
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These solutions are admittedly unsatisfactory. But it is worth noting that such
outcomes may well obtain in play, especially in the absence of any coordination,
learning, or other mechanisms.
Least-squares regret can sometimes yield surprisingly gratifying solutions.
Consider the modified finite Battle of the Sexes game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in
strategic form shown in Table 6.11, which differs from the game shown in Table
6.10 only in that, for each player i in N , the payoff ui(y1,x2) is increased from 0 to
2.5.
Table 6.11 Modified Battle of the Sexes game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
3 0
1 0
2.5 1
2.5 3
This game has three equilibria: (x1,x2), which gives the payoff allocation (3,1);
(y1, y2), which gives the payoff allocation (1,3); and
((1/3)x1 + (2/3)y1, (2/3)x2 + (1/3)y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (2,2).
Notice that this third equilibrium is worse for each player than the nonequi-
librium compromise outcome (y1,x2), which gives the payoff allocation (2.5,2.5)
and is only slightly worse for each player than his most preferred outcome. In
fact, the compromise outcome (y1,x2) is a remarkably good outcome, and yet, it is
unachievable by players who choose only equilibrium strategies.
Least-squares regret yields a more satisfying solution. The unique least-squares
regret profile in pure strategies is precisely the compromise outcome (y1,x2). Thus,
least-squares regret with respect to pure strategies yields as the unique solution
the remarkably good outcome that is unachievable by players who choose only
equilibrium strategies.
Least-squares regret with respect to randomized strategies yields a similar
solution. The unique least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies is
(0.2x1 + 0.8y1,0.8x2 + 0.2y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (2.24,2.24).
This solution is quite reasonable. In particular, it comes close to being the
compromise outcome and is better for each player than the qualitatively similar
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third equilibrium described above. Still, this solution is somewhat unsatisfactory
in that it is worse for each player than the compromise outcome that is achieved
by considering only pure strategies. But this is to be expected: hedging via
randomization comes at a price.
6.8 The Two-Person Bargaining Problem
Consider the two-person bargaining problem (Nash, 1950b; Nash, 1953). In this
game, two players must divide some good between themselves, and each must
propose the proportion of the good that he himself will take. If the proportions
sum to no more than 1, each gets his demand; otherwise, each gets nothing. Thus,
in this game, the set of players is N = {1,2}, the pure-strategy sets are
C1 = C2 = {x ∈ R | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1},
and, for any player i in N , the utility function is
ui(c1, c2) = 0 if c1 + c2 > 1,
= fi(ci) if c1 + c2 ≤ 1,
where the function fi : Ci → R is increasing and twice differentiable. Without loss
of generality, for any player i in N , let the function fi be normalized so that
fi(0) = 0 and fi(1) = 1.
For any player i in N , let the function Fi : Ci → R be any antiderivative of fi .
For any allocation (c1, c2) in C1 ×C2, the allocation (c1, c2) is feasible if and only
if c1 + c2 ≤ 1.
It is easy to see that least-squares regret here yields reasonable solutions.
Consider any player i in N and any demand ci in Ci . If the other player chooses
some demand c−i in C−i that is less than 1 − ci , then the allocation is feasible,
but inefficient, and the payoff to player i from choosing ci is fi(ci) while the best-
response payoff is fi(1 − c−i) (since the best response is to choose 1 − c−i). If the
other player chooses some demand c−i in C−i that is greater than 1− ci , then the
allocation is not feasible, and the payoff to player i from choosing ci is 0 while the
best-response payoff is again fi(1− c−i). Thus, for any player i in N ,
ρi(ci) =
∫ 1−ci
0
(fi(1− c−i)− fi(ci))2dc−i +
∫ 1
1−ci
(fi(1− c−i)− 0)2dc−i
=
∫ 1−ci
0
(fi(ci))
2 − 2fi(ci)fi(1− c−i)dc−i +
∫ 1
0
(fi(1− c−i))2dc−i
= (fi(ci))
2(1− ci)− 2fi(ci)(Fi(1)−Fi(ci)) +
∫ 1
0
(fi(1− c−i))2dc−i ,
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and so,
d(ρi(ci))
dci
= (fi(ci))
2 − 2d(fi(ci))
dci
[(Fi(1)−Fi(ci))− fi(ci)(1− ci)]
and
d2(ρi(ci))
dc2i
=2fi(ci)
d(fi(ci))
dci
+ 2
(
d(fi(ci))
dci
)2
(1− ci)
− 2d
2(fi(ci))
dc2i
[(Fi(1)−Fi(ci))− fi(ci)(1− ci)].
In the standard formulation of the two-person bargaining problem, each player
is risk neutral. It is easy to see that if, for each player i in N , the function fi is
linear, then least-squares regret yields precisely the Nash bargaining solution.
Consider any player i in N . If the function fi is linear, then
d(ρi(ci))
dci
= c2i − 2[(1/2− c2i /2)− ci(1− ci)]
= 2ci − 1.
Setting the derivative equal to 0 and solving for ci yields the unique pure least-
squares regret strategy ci = 0.5. Thus, the final allocation is (0.5,0.5), which is
precisely the Nash bargaining solution.
What is notable about least-squares regret is that it generates precisely the
Nash bargaining solution without requiring the axioms described in Nash (1950b)
and Nash (1953). Furthermore, it is trivial to apply, intuitive, and parsimonious.
It is natural to wonder whether, by acting in accordance with least-squares
regret, the players will end up with a feasible allocation. The following theorem
establishes that if, for each player i in N , the function fi is concave, then the final
allocation is feasible.
Theorem 6.8.1. Consider any two-person bargaining problem as defined above. If, for
each player i in N , the function fi is concave, then, for any allocation (c1, c2) in C1×C2,
if
ρ1(c1) ≤ ρ1(d1), ∀d1 ∈ C1
and
ρ2(c2) ≤ ρ2(d2), ∀d2 ∈ C2,
then (c1, c2) is feasible.
Proof. Consider any player i in N . Since the function fi is nonnegative, increasing,
and concave,
d2(ρi(ci))
dc2i
=2fi(ci)
d(fi(ci))
dci
+ 2
(
d(fi(ci))
dci
)2
(1− ci)
− 2d
2(fi(ci))
dc2i
[(Fi(1)−Fi(ci))− fi(ci)(1− ci)] ≥ 0, ∀ci ∈ Ci .
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Thus, the regret function ρi is convex.
Consider the point ci = 0.5. Notice that every concave function must lie
somewhere between the following two extreme cases. In the first extreme case (in
which the function fi is linear),
fi(0.5) = 0.5,
d(fi(0.5))
dci
= 1, Fi(1) = 0.5, and Fi(0.5) = 1/8,
and so,
d(ρi(0.5))
dci
= 0.
In the second extreme case,
fi(0.5) = 1 and
d(fi(0.5))
dci
= 0,
and so,
d(ρi(0.5))
dci
= 1.
Thus, for any concave function fi ,
0 ≤ d(ρi(0.5))
dci
≤ 1.
The point to note here is that the first derivative of the regret function ρi at the
point ci = 0.5 is nonnegative. If
d(ρi(0.5))
dci
= 0,
which holds if and only if the function fi is linear, then the point ci = 0.5 is the
unique point that minimizes the regret function ρi . But if
0 <
d(ρi(0.5))
dci
≤ 1,
so that the first derivative of the regret function ρi at the point ci = 0.5 is strictly
positive, then any point that minimizes the regret function ρi must be strictly less
than 0.5 since ρi is convex.
And so, for any point ci in Ci , if
ρi(ci) ≤ ρi(di), ∀di ∈ Ci ,
then ci ≤ 0.5. Thus, for any allocation (c1, c2) in C1 ×C2, if
ρ1(c1) ≤ ρ1(d1), ∀d1 ∈ C1
and
ρ2(c2) ≤ ρ2(d2), ∀d2 ∈ C2,
then c1 + c2 ≤ 1, and so, (c1, c2) is feasible. 
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Intuitively, a risk-averse player is conservative with his demands and unwilling
to risk demanding an amount that might lead to an allocation that is not feasible.
Risk aversion on the part of each player thus guarantees that the players will never
end up outside of the set of feasible allocations.
It is instructive to compare least-squares regret with iterated regret minimiza-
tion (Halpern and Pass, 2012) with respect to the two-person bargaining problem.
The following theorem establishes that if, for each player i in N , the function
fi is concave, then the final payoff allocation generated by least-squares regret
is at least as great as that generated by iterated regret minimization. Thus, the
two-person bargaining problem is another example in which least-squares regret
outperforms iterated regret minimization.
Theorem 6.8.2. Consider any two-person bargaining problem as defined above. For
each player i in N , let the function fi be concave. Let (c¯1, c¯2) be any allocation in
C1 ×C2 such that
ρ1(c¯1) ≤ ρ1(d1), ∀d1 ∈ C1
and
ρ2(c¯2) ≤ ρ2(d2), ∀d2 ∈ C2.
Let (cˆ1, cˆ2) be any allocation in C1 ×C2 such that
cˆ1 ∈ RM∞1 (C1 ×C2)
and
cˆ2 ∈ RM∞2 (C1 ×C2).
Then
(u1(c¯1, c¯2),u2(c¯1, c¯2)) ≥ (u1(cˆ1, cˆ2),u2(cˆ1, cˆ2)).
Proof. Consider any player i in N . Since the function fi is nonnegative, increasing,
and concave,
d2(ρi(ci))
dc2i
=2fi(ci)
d(fi(ci))
dci
+ 2
(
d(fi(ci))
dci
)2
(1− ci)
− 2d
2(fi(ci))
dc2i
[(Fi(1)−Fi(ci))− fi(ci)(1− ci)] ≥ 0, ∀ci ∈ Ci .
Thus, the regret function ρi is convex.
Let cˆi be any point in Ci such that
cˆi ∈ RM∞i (C1 ×C2).
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Notice that cˆi = f
−1
i [{0.5}].
Now, consider the point ci = f
−1
i [{0.5}]. Notice that since the function fi is
concave,
d(fi(f
−1
i [{0.5}]))
dci
≥ 1
and
(Fi(1)−Fi(f −1i [{0.5}]))− fi(f −1i [{0.5}])(1− f −1i [{0.5}]) ≥ 1/8.
Thus, for any concave function fi ,
d(ρi(f
−1
i [{0.5}]))
dci
≤ 0.
If
d(ρi(f
−1
i [{0.5}]))
dci
= 0,
which holds if and only if the function fi is linear, then the point ci = f
−1
i [{0.5}] is
the unique point that minimizes the regret function ρi . But if
d(ρi(f
−1
i [{0.5}]))
dci
< 0,
then any point that minimizes the regret function ρi must be strictly greater than
f −1i [{0.5}] since ρi is convex.
And so, for any point ci in Ci , if
ρi(ci) ≤ ρi(di), ∀di ∈ Ci ,
then ci ≥ f −1i [{0.5}].
Let c¯i be any point in Ci such that
ρi(c¯i) ≤ ρi(di), ∀di ∈ Ci .
By Theorem 6.8.1 above, the allocation (c¯1, c¯2) is feasible, and so, the allocation
(cˆ1, cˆ2) is likewise feasible. Thus,
ui(c¯1, c¯2) = fi(c¯i) and ui(cˆ1, cˆ2) = fi(cˆi).
And so, since c¯i ≥ cˆi and the function fi is increasing,
ui(c¯1, c¯2) = fi(c¯i) ≥ fi(cˆi) = ui(cˆ1, cˆ2).
Thus,
(u1(c¯1, c¯2),u2(c¯1, c¯2)) ≥ (u1(cˆ1, cˆ2),u2(cˆ1, cˆ2)). 
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Intuitively, given risk aversion on the part of each player, choosing any pure
least-squares regret strategy yields a payoff that is at least as great as that generated
by choosing any pure strategy that survives iterated regret minimization. Iterated
regret minimization is, relative to least-squares regret, characterized by a greater
degree of conservatism and pessimism. This is unsurprising since, as discussed in
Section 3.2, iterated regret minimization (without iterative elimination) can be
seen as an extreme case of a natural generalization of least-squares regret.
7Weaknesses of Least-Squares Regret
In this chapter, we consider some of the weaknesses of least-squares regret. Section
7.1 discusses the failure of least-squares regret to satisfy the principle of Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Section 7.2 compares least-squares regret with
maximin with respect to two-person zero-sum games. Section 7.3 examines the
sensitivity of least-squares regret to framing. Section 7.4 considers some of the
problems that can arise from defining least-squares regret in a way that disregards
fully strategic reasoning.
7.1 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
The principle of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives appears throughout game
theory and economics and is defined formally as follows. Let X be any nonempty
set of alternatives. The principle of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
asserts that, for any set S ⊆ X of alternatives and any alternatives x and y in S, if
the alternative x is preferred to the alternative y with respect to the set S, then,
for any alternative z in X such that z < S, the alternative x is preferred to the
alternative y with respect to the set S ∪ {z}. Intuitively, the principle asserts that
the ordering over two alternatives depends only on those alternatives and not on
any others, which are deemed irrelevant to the comparison at hand.
As might be expected, least-squares regret fails to satisfy Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives. For an illustration of this point, consider the finite two-
person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form shown in Table 7.1.
Notice that, for player 1,
ρ1(x1) = 1 and ρ1(y1) = 4.
Thus, in this game, x1 is preferred to y1.
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Table 7.1 Payoffs of player 1 in a game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
1 4
2 2
Now, consider the finite two-person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic
form shown in Table 7.2, which differs from the game shown in Table 7.1 only in
the addition of the pure strategy z1 and the payoffs that it yields.
Table 7.2 Payoffs of player 1 in a game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
z1
x2 y2
1 4
2 2
4 1
Notice that, for player 1,
ρ1(x1) = 9, ρ1(y1) = 8, and ρ1(z1) = 9.
Thus, in this game, y1 is preferred to x1.
Adding z1—which, moreover, is ultimately not recommended since ρ1(z1) = 9—
changes the ordering over x1 and y1. Thus, Independence of Irrelevant Alterna-
tives is violated.
But Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is a notoriously controversial
principle. It states that the ordering over two alternatives should be independent
of the context in which they are presented. In practice, however, choice is often
context-sensitive, and such context effects are experimentally robust; see, for
example, Simonson and Tversky (1992) and Tversky and Simonson (1993). Thus,
it is not clear that the failure of least-squares regret to satisfy the principle of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives should be considered a real or significant
weakness. Indeed, it seems natural to suppose, as the foregoing example illustrates,
that the reasonableness of a strategy should depend on the alternatives that are
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available. Intuitively, it is important to consider the entire context when making a
decision, and should that context change, a re-evaluation would be advisable.
7.2 Maximin and Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
The standard solution concept for two-person zero-sum games is maximin (von
Neumann, 1928; Wald, 1939; Wald, 1945; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947;
Wald, 1950), which, when randomization is allowed, also coincides exactly with
Nash equilibrium. Least-squares regret represents a significant departure from
both of these solution concepts.
For an illustration of some of the differences, consider the finite two-person
zero-sum game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form shown in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3 A two-person zero-sum game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
4 0
−4 0
1 2
−1 −2
Consider first maximin with respect to pure strategies. For player 1, the
minimum payoff from choosing x1 is 0, and the minimum payoff from choosing
y1 is 1, and so, y1 is the unique pure maximin strategy. For player 2, the minimum
payoff from choosing x2 is −4, and the minimum payoff from choosing y2 is −2,
and so, y2 is the unique pure maximin strategy. Thus, the unique profile of pure
maximin strategies is (y1, y2), which gives the payoff allocation (2,−2).
Now, consider maximin with respect to randomized strategies. As Figure 7.1
shows, for player 1, the minimum expected payoff is maximized when
4σ1(x1) + (1− σ1(x1)) = 2(1− σ1(x1)),
that is, at the point σ1(x1) = 0.2, and so, the unique randomized maximin strategy
is 0.2x1 + 0.8y1. As Figure 7.2 shows, for player 2, the minimum expected payoff
is maximized when
−4σ2(x2) = −σ2(x2)− 2(1− σ2(x2)),
that is, at the point σ2(x2) = 0.4, and so, the unique randomized maximin strategy
is 0.4x2 + 0.6y2. Thus, the unique profile of randomized maximin strategies is
(0.2x1 + 0.8y1,0.4x2 + 0.6y2),
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Figure 7.1 Expected payoffs of player 1
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Figure 7.2 Expected payoffs of player 2
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σ2(x2)
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which gives the payoff allocation (1.6,−1.6). Notably, player 1 favors y1, and player
2 favors y2.
Now, consider least-squares regret. The unique least-squares regret profile in
pure strategies is (x1, y2), which gives the payoff allocation (0,0), and the unique
least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies is
((9/13)x1 + (4/13)y1, (1/17)x2 + (16/17)y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (168/221,−168/221) or roughly (0.76,−0.76). Notably,
player 1 favors x1, and player 2 favors y2.
Thus, when it comes to two-person zero-sum games, least-squares regret can
yield solutions that are different from those yielded by maximin and thus also
by Nash equilibrium. This discrepancy is unfortunate in light of the standard
arguments for the latter two solution concepts with respect to two-person zero-
sum games. From the perspective of maximin, by playing a maximin strategy, one
maximizes the minimum payoff and thus assures oneself of a certain minimum
payoff no matter what the other player might do. Furthermore, supposing that
the other player plays his maximin strategy, one cannot do better by deviating
since a maximin strategy is also an equilibrium strategy. Alternatively, from the
perspective of Nash equilibrium, by playing an equilibrium strategy, one also
maximizes the minimum payoff. These are rather compelling considerations.
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Least-squares regret, maximin, and Nash equilibrium represent different ways
to reason about a game. Least-squares regret involves partially strategic reasoning
and assessing personal payoffs in the form of regrets and choosing a strategy so
as to minimize the divergence from the best-response payoffs. Maximin involves
assessing personal payoffs, but not regrets, and choosing a strategy so as to maxi-
mize the minimum payoff. Nash equilibrium involves fully strategic reasoning
and choosing a strategy so as to maximize the expected payoff with respect to the
strategy of the other player.
Which way to reason is the most reasonable depends on a number of consid-
erations, for example, whether partially strategic or fully strategic reasoning is
more appropriate; whether regrets or payoffs are more significant; and whether it
is most important to minimize the divergence from the best-response payoffs, to
maximize the minimum payoff, or to maximize the expected payoff with respect
to the strategy of the other player.
7.3 Framing Effects
It has long been known that how a decision problem is presented can affect what
choice is made (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981;
Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth, 1998). Unsurprisingly, framing effects can arise
also in games, raising questions about how to take such effects into account; see,
for example, Eliaz and Rubinstein (2011); Dufwenberg, Gächter, and Hennig-
Schmidt (2011); Ellingsen, Johannesson, Mollerstrom, and Munkhammar (2012),
and Dreber, Ellingsen, Johannesson, and Rand (2013).
In this section, we show that least-squares regret is susceptible to certain
framing effects. Consider the finite two-person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in
strategic form shown in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4 A game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
0 1
0 1
10 0
0 1
Notice that, for player 1,
ρ1(x1) = 100 and ρ1(y1) = 1.
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Thus, the unique pure least-squares regret strategy for player 1 is y1.
Since u1(y1,x2) is so great and u1(x1,x2) is so low by comparison, the regret
that y1 could induce is significant. Thus, given how the game is presented, y1
appears to be extremely attractive from the perspective of least-squares regret and
has a dominating effect.
This effect is akin to the distortionary effect of an extreme value on the mean of
a set of numbers. Just as an extreme value can pull the mean of a set of numbers in
its direction, a strategy that could induce significant regret can pull least-squares
regret in its direction.
But this can be problematic, as the game above shows. Notice that x2 is strongly
dominated for player 2 by y2. Given this fact, y1 is, in reality, not as attractive
as least-squares regret would suggest: the significant payoff that it could yield—
and thus the significant regret that it could induce—turns on player 2 acting
imperfectly. Thus, y1 can be seen as a naïve strategy whose sensibility depends on
imperfect or irrational play. It can be likened to a naïve chess tactic that sets up
a rudimentary trap and would yield a significant gain should the opponent fall
prey to the trap. But if player 2 can be expected to play sensibly, choosing y2 and
not x2, then y1 is unattractive and should thus be seen as negligible.
Thus, how a game is framed can matter a great deal for least-squares regret.
This sensitivity to framing is to be expected given the basic idea behind least-
squares regret. As discussed in Sections 1.2, 1.3, 2.2, and 2.5, the regret of a
strategy with respect to a partial profile of strategies of the other players can be
seen as a measure of error. The greater is the degree to which a strategy falls short
of a best response, the graver a mistake it is to choose it. Accepting this idea means
accepting that the magnitude of regret is significant and that it is important to
be sensitive to it. Thus, least-squares regret should depend on the magnitudes
of the regrets in one way or another. But this means also that the distortionary
framing effects described above are inescapable and must be accepted as the price
of defining the reasonableness of a strategy in terms of regret.
Still, we readily admit that there is something unreasonable about assigning
undue significance to regret that could conceivably be considered negligible, say,
because the partial profile that would generate it can be discounted. We consider
this weakness in Section 7.4, and in Chapter 8, we introduce a refinement of
least-squares regret that addresses this weakness and others.
7.4 Fully Strategic Reasoning
As discussed in Sections 1.2, 1.4, 2.2, and 2.5, least-squares regret considers
partially strategic players and disregards fully strategic reasoning. In this section,
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we consider some of the problems that can arise from defining least-squares regret
in this way.
Consider the finite two-person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form
shown in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5 A game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
2 1
1 0
0 2
1 0
The unique least-squares regret profile in pure strategies is (x1,x2), which
gives the payoff allocation (2,1), and the unique least-squares regret profile in
randomized strategies is
(0.8x1 + 0.2y1,x2),
which gives the payoff allocation (1.6,1).
Now, consider the finite two-person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic
form shown in Table 7.6, which differs from the game shown in Table 7.5 only in
the payoffs of player 2.
Table 7.6 A game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
2 1
0 1
0 2
0 1
The unique least-squares regret profile in pure strategies is (x1, y2), which
gives the payoff allocation (1,1), and the unique least-squares regret profile in
randomized strategies is
(0.8x1 + 0.2y1, y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (1.2,1).
Notice that the pure and randomized least-squares regret strategies for player
1 in the one game are identical to the pure and randomized least-squares regret
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strategies for player 1 in the other game. Indeed, they must be identical since
the utility functions for player 1 in the two games are identical. Thus, as the
two games illustrate, the payoffs of player 2 are irrelevant to player 1 and can be
varied arbitrarily without affecting the behavior of player 1. In general, according
to least-squares regret, the behavior of a player is completely independent of the
payoffs of the other players.
But this independence is too strong and perhaps unrealistic. Just as the be-
havior of a player depends on his own payoffs, the payoffs of the other players
can be expected to influence how those players behave. And if a player can rea-
son about how the other players might behave and to respond accordingly, it is
reasonable to expect his behavior to vary depending on the payoffs of the other
players. But least-squares regret, which disregards fully strategic reasoning, is
unable to capture this variation and this intuition.
Furthermore, the most natural or reasonable way to solve a game may involve
recognizing fully strategic reasoning. For example, the game shown in Table 7.6
can be solved by recognizing that player 2 can be expected to play y2 for sure
(since x2 is strongly dominated for player 2 by y2) and that player 1, considering
this, can be expected to play y1 for sure. In general, fully strategic reasoning may
be indispensable for solving a game.
But since least-squares regret disregards fully strategic reasoning, it can fail
to capture the most natural or reasonable way to solve a game and may yield an
unreasonable solution. For example, the disregard of fully strategic reasoning
explains why least-squares regret fails to yield for the game shown in Table 7.6
the solution (y1, y2) just described.
Finally, least-squares regret can yield solutions that would be unreasonable or
unstable if they were to be anticipated by fully strategic players. For an illustration
of this point, recall that, in the game shown in Table 7.6, the unique least-squares
regret profile in pure strategies is (x1, y2). But if the players are fully strategic, then
this profile is unreasonable and unstable. In particular, it is not an equilibrium
since player 1, should he expect player 2 to choose y2, would prefer to deviate and
choose y1. Furthermore, it is unreasonable and unstable in the sense that player 1,
should he expect player 2 to choose y2, could reduce his regret to 0 by deviating
and choosing the best response y1. Thus, while least-squares regret may be adept
at characterizing the behavior of partially strategic players, it may be less adept at
characterizing the behavior of fully strategic players.
It is worth noting that these problems are not unique to least-squares regret.
Indeed, it is easy to see that all of these problems plague iterated regret minimiza-
tion also. Halpern and Pass (2012) consider a number of treatments, including
introducing lexicographic belief systems reminiscent of the lexicographic proba-
Chapter 7. Weaknesses of Least-Squares Regret 115
bility systems of Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel (1991) and Brandenburger,
Friedenberg, and Keisler (2008) and restricting analysis to proper subsets of the
set of partial profiles of strategies of the other players.
It may be important to refine least-squares regret to incorporate fully strategic
reasoning. One approach might involve, following Halpern and Pass (2012),
restricting analysis to proper subsets of the set of partial profiles, for example,
those resulting from the sets of undominated strategies. An alternative approach
might involve assigning weights to partial profiles; we consider this particular
refinement of least-squares regret in Chapter 8. The question of how best to
incorporate fully strategic reasoning remains to be determined.
8Mutual Weighted Least-Squares
Regret
As discussed in Sections 1.2, 1.4, 2.2, 2.5, and 7.4, least-squares regret considers
partially strategic players and is defined accordingly. While the assumption that
a player is partially strategic may be convenient and a realistic characterization
of typical reasoning and behavior, it may also be too restrictive, as information
about the behavior and beliefs of the other players is discarded. Furthermore,
as discussed in Section 2.5, least-squares regret assumes no mutuality condition,
with the result that in a least-squares regret profile, the strategies that the players
choose may differ from the ones that the players expect to be chosen.
In this chapter, we introduce a refinement of least-squares regret, which we
call mutual weighted least-squares regret, that addresses these concerns. The idea
is to modify the regret function in randomized strategies defined in Section 2.2
by assigning probability weights to the partial profiles of strategies of the other
players, where the distribution is just the probability distribution induced by the
randomized strategies of the other players, and then to introduce a mutuality
condition that requires that the randomized strategies that the players choose be
precisely the ones that the players expect to be chosen.
Thus, mutual weighted least-squares regret considers fully strategic players
capable of reasoning about one another. Section 8.1 formally defines mutual
weighted least-squares regret. Section 8.2 studies an illustrative example. Section
8.3 presents a general existence theorem. Section 8.4 examines the relationship
between mutual weighted least-squares regret and Nash equilibrium. Section
8.5 examines whether recursively updating the probability distributions by itera-
tively minimizing the respective weighted regret functions of the players yields
convergence to a fixed point.
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8.1 Formal Definition
Mutual weighted least-squares regret is defined formally as follows. Let Γ =
(N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form. For any player i in N , the
set
C−i =

j∈N−i
Cj
is the set of partial profiles that can ultimately obtain in play. But the partial
profiles in C−i need not be all on a par; some may be likelier than others depending
on how the other players choose their strategies. More precisely, the randomized
strategies of the other players induce a probability distribution over the set C−i .
For any player i in N , any partial profile σ−i = (σj)j∈N−i in

j∈N−i∆(Cj), and any
partial profile c−i in C−i , the probability that c−i obtains in play is just∏
j∈N−i
σj(cj)
since the players choose their pure strategies independently.
The induced probabilities can be used as weights in the following way. For any
player i in N , let ρi :

j∈N ∆(Cj)→ R be the weighted regret function in randomized
strategies for player i such that
ρi(σ−i ,σi) =
∑
c−i∈C−i
 ∏
j∈N−i
σj(cj)

 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i ,σi)

2
.
This weighted regret function differs from the regret function in randomized
strategies defined in Section 2.2 only in that each squared regret term is multiplied
by its corresponding weight. Intuitively, for any randomized-strategy profile
σ = (σj)j∈N in

j∈N ∆(Cj), the value ρi(σ−i ,σi) is the weighted regret from choosing
σi with respect to σ−i .
As with least-squares regret as defined in Section 2.2, we suppose that a player
chooses a strategy so as to minimize the divergence from the best-response payoffs.
But here, unlike with least-squares regret, the minimum is computed with respect
to a partial profile, which induces the weights to be used in the computation. For
any player i in N , any partial profile σ−i in

j∈N−i∆(Cj), and any randomized
strategy σi in ∆(Ci), the randomized strategy σi is a randomized weighted least-
squares regret strategy for player i with respect to σ−i if and only if
ρi(σ−i ,σi) ≤ ρi(σ−i ,τi), ∀τi ∈ ∆(Ci).
Intuitively, player i expects the other players to choose their strategies according
to σ−i , computes the probability distribution induced by σ−i over the set C−i , and
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then chooses a randomized strategy so as to minimize the weighted regret function
ρi with respect to σ−i . Notice that the randomized strategies that the players end
up choosing need not coincide with the ones that the players expect to be chosen.
Now, we introduce a mutuality condition. In particular, we suppose that a
player chooses a randomized weighted least-squares regret strategy and, more-
over, has no mistaken beliefs about the strategies of the other players. For any
randomized-strategy profile σ = (σj)j∈N in

j∈N ∆(Cj), the randomized-strategy
profile σ is a mutual weighted least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies of
Γ if and only if
ρi(σ−i ,σi) ≤ ρi(σ−i ,τi), ∀i ∈N, ∀τi ∈ ∆(Ci).
Intuitively, in a mutual weighted least-squares regret profile in randomized strate-
gies, the randomized strategies that minimize the respective weighted regret
functions of the players are precisely the ones that the players expect to be chosen.
Notably, a mutual weighted least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies
is stable in the sense that no player could reduce his weighted regret by deviating
given the randomized strategies of the other players.
8.2 An Example
For an illustration of mutual weighted least-squares regret, consider the finite
two-person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form shown in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1 A game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
2 3
1 0
3 1
0 1
For any randomized-strategy profile (σ1,σ2) in ∆(C1)×∆(C2), the randomized-
strategy profile (σ1,σ2) is a mutual weighted least-squares regret profile in ran-
domized strategies of the game shown in Table 8.1 if and only if σ1 is a randomized
weighted least-squares regret strategy for player 1 with respect to σ2 and σ2 is a
randomized weighted least-squares regret strategy for player 2 with respect to σ1.
Consider player 1. Notice that whatever player 1 chooses, he risks playing
imperfectly depending on what player 2 chooses. Thus, player 1 chooses a ran-
domized strategy so as to minimize the weighted regret function ρ1 with respect
to the randomized strategy of player 2.
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Consider any randomized strategy σ1 in ∆(C1) and any randomized strategy σ2
in ∆(C2). If player 2 ends up choosing x2, which obtains with probability σ2(x2),
then the payoff to player 1 is 2σ1(x1) + 3(1− σ1(x1)) while the best-response payoff
is 3, and so, the regret is 3− (2σ1(x1) + 3(1− σ1(x1))). If player 2 ends up choosing
y2, which obtains with probability σ2(y2) = 1− σ2(x2), then the payoff to player 1
is 3σ1(x1) + (1 − σ1(x1)) while the best-response payoff is 3, and so, the regret is
3− (3σ1(x1) + (1− σ1(x1))). The weighted regret function ρ1 : j∈N ∆(Cj)→ R is
ρ1(σ1,σ2)
= σ2(x2)
 max
τ1∈∆(C1)
u1(τ1,x2)−u1(σ1,x2)

2
+ σ2(y2)
 max
τ1∈∆(C1)
u1(τ1, y2)−u1(σ1, y2)

2
= σ2(x2)(3− (2σ1(x1) + 3(1− σ1(x1))))2 + (1− σ2(x2))(3− (3σ1(x1) + (1− σ1(x1))))2,
and so,
∂(ρ1(σ1,σ2))
∂σ1(x1)
= 8σ1(x1) + 8σ2(x2)− 6σ1(x1)σ2(x2)− 8.
Consider player 2. Notice that whatever player 2 chooses, he risks playing
imperfectly depending on what player 1 chooses. Thus, player 2 chooses a ran-
domized strategy so as to minimize the weighted regret function ρ2 with respect
to the randomized strategy of player 1.
Consider any randomized strategy σ2 in ∆(C2) and any randomized strategy σ1
in ∆(C1). If player 1 ends up choosing x1, which obtains with probability σ1(x1),
then the payoff to player 2 is σ2(x2) while the best-response payoff is 1, and so, the
regret is 1−σ2(x2). If player 1 ends up choosing y1, which obtains with probability
σ1(y1) = 1− σ1(x1), then the payoff to player 2 is 1− σ2(x2) while the best-response
payoff is 1, and so, the regret is 1 − (1 − σ2(x2)). The weighted regret function
ρ2 :

j∈N ∆(Cj)→ R is
ρ2(σ1,σ2)
= σ1(x1)
 max
τ2∈∆(C2)
u2(x1,τ2)−u2(x1,σ2)

2
+ σ1(y1)
 max
τ2∈∆(C2)
u2(y1,τ2)−u2(y1,σ2)

2
= σ1(x1)(1− σ2(x2))2 + (1− σ1(x1))(1− (1− σ2(x2)))2,
and so,
∂(ρ2(σ1,σ2))
∂σ2(x2)
= 2σ2(x2)− 2σ1(x1).
Setting each of the partial derivatives above equal to 0 and solving the resulting
system of equations yield
σ1(x1) = σ2(x2) = 2/3.
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Thus, the unique mutual weighted least-squares regret profile in randomized
strategies is
((2/3)x1 + (1/3)y1, (2/3)x2 + (1/3)y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (7/3,5/9).
8.3 Existence
In this section, we show that mutual weighted least-squares regret satisfies a
general existence theorem. The proof of the theorem relies on the following
fixed-point theorem due to Kakutani (1941).
Kakutani Fixed-Point Theorem (Kakutani (1941)). Let S be any nonempty, con-
vex, bounded, and closed subset of a finite-dimensional vector space. Let F : S→→ S
be any upper-hemicontinuous point-to-set correspondence such that, for every x in S,
the set F(x) is a nonempty convex subset of S. Then there exists some x¯ in S such that
x¯ ∈ F(x¯).
The following general existence theorem establishes that every finite game
in strategic form has at least one mutual weighted least-squares regret profile in
randomized strategies. Thus, for any finite game in strategic form, a solution is
guaranteed to exist.
Theorem 8.3.1. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form.
Then there exists some mutual weighted least-squares regret profile in randomized
strategies.
Proof. The set

j∈N ∆(Cj) of randomized-strategy profiles is a nonempty, convex,
bounded, and closed subset of a finite-dimensional vector space.
For any player i in N , let Ri :

j∈N−i∆(Cj) →→ ∆(Ci) be the point-to-set
correspondence such that
Ri(σ−i) = argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(σ−i ,τi).
Intuitively, for any partial profile σ−i in

j∈N−i∆(Cj), the set Ri(σ−i) is the set of
randomized weighted least-squares regret strategies for player i with respect to
σ−i .
Consider any player i in N . Let σ−i be any partial profile in

j∈N−i∆(Cj). Since
the set ∆(Ci) is a nonempty compact set and since the weighted regret function
ρi :

j∈N ∆(Cj)→ R is continuous, ρi has a minimum with respect to σ−i . Thus,
for any partial profile σ−i in

j∈N−i∆(Cj), the set Ri(σ−i) is nonempty.
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Now, let σ−i be any partial profile in

j∈N−i∆(Cj), and let σi and σˆi be any
randomized strategies in ∆(Ci). Let λ be any real number such that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, and
let λσi + (1−λ)σˆi be the randomized strategy in ∆(Ci) such that
(λσi + (1−λ)σˆi)(ci) = λσi(ci) + (1−λ)σˆi(ci), ∀ci ∈ Ci .
Then
ρi(σ−i ,λσi + (1−λ)σˆi) =∑
c−i∈C−i
 ∏
j∈N−i
σj(cj)

 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i ,λσi + (1−λ)σˆi)

2
.
But notice that
ui(c−i ,λσi + (1−λ)σˆi) = λui(c−i ,σi) + (1−λ)ui(c−i , σˆi).
And so,
ρi(σ−i ,λσi + (1−λ)σˆi) =∑
c−i∈C−i
 ∏
j∈N−i
σj(cj)

 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i , σˆi) +λ(ui(c−i , σˆi)−ui(c−i ,σi))

2
.
Now, consider the function fi : [0,1]→ R such that
fi(λ) = ρi(σ−i ,λσi + (1−λ)σˆi).
Notice that
d2(fi(λ))
dλ2
= 2
∑
c−i∈C−i
 ∏
j∈N−i
σj(cj)
 (ui(c−i , σˆi)−ui(c−i ,σi))2.
Clearly,
d2(fi(λ))
dλ2
≥ 0, ∀λ ∈ [0,1],
and so, the function fi is convex.
Now, notice that
fi(0) = ρi(σ−i ,0σi + (1− 0)σˆi) = ρi(σ−i , σˆi)
and
fi(1) = ρi(σ−i ,1σi + (1− 1)σˆi) = ρi(σ−i ,σi).
Observe that the line connecting the points (0,ρi(σ−i , σˆi)) and (1,ρi(σ−i ,σi)) in R2
is just the function gi : [0,1]→ R such that
gi(λ) = λρi(σ−i ,σi) + (1−λ)ρi(σ−i , σˆi).
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But since the function fi is convex,
fi(λ) = ρi(σ−i ,λσi +(1−λ)σˆi) ≤ gi(λ) = λρi(σ−i ,σi)+(1−λ)ρi(σ−i , σˆi), ∀λ ∈ [0,1].
Thus, for any partial profile σ−i in

j∈N−i∆(Cj), the weighted regret function ρi
is convex. And so, for any partial profile σ−i in

j∈N−i∆(Cj), the set Ri(σ−i) is
convex.
Let R :

j∈N ∆(Cj)→→

j∈N ∆(Cj) be the point-to-set correspondence such
that
R(σ) =

i∈N
Ri(σ−i).
To understand this point-to-set correspondence, consider any randomized-
strategy profiles σ and τ in

j∈N ∆(Cj). Then τ ∈ R(σ) if and only if
τi ∈ Ri(σ−i), ∀i ∈N.
For any randomized-strategy profile σ in

j∈N ∆(Cj), the setR(σ) is a nonempty
convex subset of

j∈N ∆(Cj) since it is the Cartesian product of nonempty convex
sets.
Now, let (σk)∞k=1 and (τ
k)∞k=1 be any convergent sequences, and suppose that
σk ∈

j∈N
∆(Cj), ∀k ∈ {1,2,3, . . .},
τk ∈ R(σk), ∀k ∈ {1,2,3, . . .},
σ¯ = lim
k→∞
σk , and
τ¯ = lim
k→∞
τk .
These conditions imply that
ρi(σ
k
−i ,τ
k
i ) ≤ ρi(σk−i ,ξi), ∀i ∈N, ∀ξi ∈ ∆(Ci), ∀k ∈ {1,2,3, . . .}.
By continuity of the weighted regret function ρi , this in turn implies that
ρi(σ¯−i , τ¯i) ≤ ρi(σ¯−i ,ξi), ∀i ∈N, ∀ξi ∈ ∆(Ci).
So,
τ¯i ∈ Ri(σ¯−i), ∀i ∈N,
and so, τ¯ ∈ R(σ¯). Thus, the correspondence R : j∈N ∆(Cj) →→j∈N ∆(Cj) is
upper-hemicontinuous.
Thus, by the Kakutani fixed-point theorem (Kakutani, 1941), there exists some
randomized-strategy profile σ in

j∈N ∆(Cj) such that σ ∈ R(σ). That is, σ is a
mutual weighted least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies. 
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8.4 Mutual Weighted Least-Squares Regret and
Nash Equilibrium
It is natural to ask whether there is any connection between mutual weighted
least-squares regret and Nash equilibrium. The following theorem answers this
question simply. While the theorem is straightforward to state and to prove,
we make it explicit in order to emphasize the effect of considering randomized
strategies.
Theorem 8.4.1. Let Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form.
Then, for any pure-strategy profile c in

j∈N Cj , the pure-strategy profile c is an
equilibrium of Γ if and only if c is a mutual weighted least-squares regret profile in
randomized strategies.
Proof. Let c be any pure-strategy profile in

j∈N Cj . Suppose that c is an equilib-
rium. Then
ui(c−i , ci) ≥ ui(c−i ,di), ∀i ∈N, ∀di ∈ Ci .
And so,
ui(c−i , ci) = max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi), ∀i ∈N.
Clearly,
ρi(c−i , ci) =
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i , ci)

2
= 0, ∀i ∈N.
Thus,
ρi(c−i , ci) ≤ ρi(c−i ,τi), ∀i ∈N, ∀τi ∈ ∆(Ci).
That is, c is a mutual weighted least-squares regret profile in randomized strate-
gies.
Now, let c be any pure-strategy profile in

j∈N Cj . Suppose that c is a mutual
weighted least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies. Then
ρi(c−i , ci) ≤ ρi(c−i ,τi), ∀i ∈N, ∀τi ∈ ∆(Ci).
Notice that
ρi(c−i ,ξi) =
 max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi)−ui(c−i ,ξi)

2
, ∀i ∈N, ∀ξi ∈ ∆(Ci).
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Since
ci ∈ argmin
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(c−i ,τi) and min
τi∈∆(Ci )
ρi(c−i ,τi) = 0, ∀i ∈N,
it follows that
ui(c−i , ci) = max
τi∈∆(Ci )
ui(c−i ,τi), ∀i ∈N.
Thus,
ui(c−i , ci) ≥ ui(c−i ,di), ∀i ∈N, ∀di ∈ Ci .
That is, c is an equilibrium. 
For an illustration of Theorem 8.4.1, consider the finite two-person game
Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form shown in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2 A game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
3 0
2 1
0 2
1 2
This game has two equilibria in pure strategies: (x1,x2), which gives the payoff
allocation (3,2), and (y1, y2), which gives the payoff allocation (2,2).
It is straightforward to verify that these two equilibria are also the only two
mutual weighted least-squares regret profiles in randomized strategies of this
game. The weighted regret function ρ1 :

j∈N ∆(Cj)→ R is
ρ1(σ1,σ2)
= σ2(x2)
 max
τ1∈∆(C1)
u1(τ1,x2)−u1(σ1,x2)

2
+ σ2(y2)
 max
τ1∈∆(C1)
u1(τ1, y2)−u1(σ1, y2)

2
= σ2(x2)(3− 3σ1(x1))2 + (1− σ2(x2))(2− 2(1− σ1(x1)))2,
and so,
∂(ρ1(σ1,σ2))
∂σ1(x1)
= 5σ1(x1)σ2(x2) + 4σ1(x1)− 9σ2(x2).
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The weighted regret function ρ2 :

j∈N ∆(Cj)→ R is
ρ2(σ1,σ2)
= σ1(x1)
 max
τ2∈∆(C2)
u2(x1,τ2)−u2(x1,σ2)

2
+ σ1(y1)
 max
τ2∈∆(C2)
u2(y1,τ2)−u2(y1,σ2)

2
= σ1(x1)(2− (2σ2(x2) + (1− σ2(x2))))2 + (1− σ1(x1))(2− (σ2(x2) + 2(1− σ2(x2))))2,
and so,
∂(ρ2(σ1,σ2))
∂σ2(x2)
= σ2(x2)− σ1(x1).
Setting each of the partial derivatives above equal to 0 and solving the resulting
system of equations yield
σ1(x1) = 1 and σ2(x2) = 1
and
σ1(x1) = 0 and σ2(x2) = 0,
which are precisely the equilibria (x1,x2) and (y1, y2), respectively.
When randomized strategies are considered, the set of mutual weighted least-
squares regret profiles in randomized strategies and the set of equilibria need
not coincide. Notice that the game shown in Table 8.2 has one equilibrium in
randomized strategies, namely,
(0.5x1 + 0.5y1,0.4x2 + 0.6y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (1.2,1.5). But, as just shown, the game has just
two mutual weighted least-squares regret profiles in randomized strategies, and
in each such profile, each player plays some pure strategy with probability 1.
For another illustration of the foregoing point, consider again the finite two-
person game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) in strategic form shown in Table 8.1 in
Section 8.2 and reproduced in Table 8.3.
The unique equilibrium of this game is
(0.5x1 + 0.5y1, (2/3)x2 + (1/3)y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (7/3,0.5), and, as noted in Section 8.2, the unique
mutual weighted least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies is
((2/3)x1 + (1/3)y1, (2/3)x2 + (1/3)y2),
which gives the payoff allocation (7/3,5/9).
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Table 8.3 A game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
2 3
1 0
3 1
0 1
Thus, the set of mutual weighted least-squares regret profiles in randomized
strategies and the set of equilibria are disjoint. Notably, while the payoff to
player 1 under mutual weighted least-squares regret is the same as that under
equilibrium, the payoff to player 2 under mutual weighted least-squares regret is
strictly greater than that under equilibrium.
That mutual weighted least-squares regret and Nash equilibrium should di-
verge when randomized strategies are considered is unsurprising. They represent
different ways to reason about a game. Mutual weighted least-squares regret in-
volves choosing a strategy so as to minimize the divergence from the best-response
payoffs. Nash equilibrium involves choosing a strategy so as to maximize the
expected payoff.
8.5 Recursion and Convergence
As discussed in Section 8.3, Theorem 8.3.1 establishes that every finite game in
strategic form has at least one mutual weighted least-squares regret profile in
randomized strategies. One natural question that arises is the following. Let
Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be any finite game in strategic form. Let (σk)∞k=1 be any
sequence defined recursively thus:
σ1 ∈

j∈N
∆(Cj) and
σk+1 ∈ R(σk), ∀k ∈ {1,2,3, . . .}.
The question is whether, for any sequence (σk)∞k=1 defined recursively as above,
there exists some randomized-strategy profile σ¯ in

j∈N ∆(Cj) such that
lim
k→∞
σk = σ¯ and σ¯ ∈ R(σ¯).
Intuitively, the question is whether recursively updating the probability distribu-
tions by iteratively minimizing the respective weighted regret functions of the
players yields convergence to a mutual weighted least-squares regret profile in
randomized strategies.
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As might be expected, the answer is no. For an illustration of this point,
consider again the Battles of the Sexes game Γ = ({1,2},C1,C2,u1,u2) shown in
Table 6.10 in Section 6.7 and reproduced in Table 8.4.
Table 8.4 Battle of the Sexes game in strategic form
@
@@
1
2
x1
y1
x2 y2
3 0
1 0
0 1
0 3
Consider the sequence (σk)∞k=1, recursively defined as above, such that
σ1 = (0.5x1 + 0.5y1,0.5x2 + 0.5y2).
It is straightforward to verify that
σk = (0.5x1 + 0.5y1,0.5x2 + 0.5y2) if k is odd,
= (0.9x1 + 0.1y1,0.1x2 + 0.9y2) if k is even.
That is, the sequence (σk)∞k=1 oscillates between
(0.5x1 + 0.5y1,0.5x2 + 0.5y2)
and
(0.9x1 + 0.1y1,0.1x2 + 0.9y2)
and so does not converge. Thus, even though, by Theorem 8.3.1 in Section
8.3, a mutual weighted least-squares regret profile in randomized strategies is
guaranteed to exist, it cannot be attained via the recursive process defined above
if
σ1 = (0.5x1 + 0.5y1,0.5x2 + 0.5y2),
as specified.
9Conclusion
As we have seen with games such as the Traveler’s Dilemma in Chapter 4 and those
in Chapter 6, the established solution concepts can sometimes yield solutions
that seem in some ways unsatisfactory. The need to develop solution concepts
that reflect more accurately and effectively how people actually reason about and
play games has long been recognized, and new solution concepts continue to be
developed.
The question of how people actually reason about and play games is partic-
ularly significant and not simply a matter of description or practice since it is
impossible to get far in game theory without attending to it. And this is because
the question of how one ought to act in a given situation depends significantly on
how others can be expected actually to act. Thus, the project of developing a good
normative theory is inseparable from that of developing a good descriptive theory.
We have endeavored to develop a new solution concept that seeks to provide
an intuitive characterization of reasonable or observed behavior in a wide range
of games, including some that have proved problematic for standard game theory.
The essence of this dissertation consists in showing that our proposed solution
concept of least-squares regret satisfies the relevant criteria, exhibits the desired
properties, and yields the expected or reasonable solutions. Of course, work
remains to be done, and Section 9.1 proposes some questions for further research.
9.1 Further Questions
While we have endeavored to develop and to defend least-squares regret, we
view this dissertation essentially as an exploration of a new approach to solving
noncooperative games. But a number of questions remain to be answered.
One important question to be answered more fully is whether people, in fact,
act in accordance with least-squares regret in particular or with some form or
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another of regret minimization in general.
One way to answer this question would be to develop further games and
experiments and to test specifically for reasoning based on regret. The results
relating to the Traveler’s Dilemma in Chapter 4 and to the various games in
Chapter 6 as well as the experimental results in psychology noted in Section 1.3
are promising and suggest that regret may figure importantly in reasoning about
a game. Furthermore, the results relating to the games proposed in Section 3.2,
games that could form the basis of further experiments, suggest that reasoning
about a game is characterized more by something like least-squares regret than by
some minimax regret approach such as iterated regret minimization.
Another way to determine whether people, in fact, act in accordance with
least-squares regret would be to axiomatize least-squares regret in the manner of
Stoye (2011) in the case of minimax regret or of von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947) in the case of expected utility maximization. An analysis of the axioms
underlying least-squares regret might then help us to determine how intuitive,
credible, and compelling least-squares regret might be as a characterization of
typical reasoning and behavior.
As discussed in Sections 1.2, 1.4, 2.2, 2.5, and 7.4, least-squares regret considers
partially strategic players. In Chapter 8, we introduced mutual weighted least-
squares regret, which, as noted, considers fully strategic players. It would be
worthwhile and very natural to explore the intermediate case of weighted least-
squares regret, which can be understood as least-squares regret with the admission
of nonuniform probability distributions or, equivalently, as mutual weighted
least-squares regret without the mutuality condition. Intuitively, the idea is
that a player might be significantly strategic and devise fairly reasonable beliefs
about the strategies of the other players without being fully strategic and having
perfect beliefs. The aim, then, would be to model the formation of the probability
distributions to be used as weights, perhaps by appealing to least-squares regret
or mutual weighted least-squares regret as benchmark models.
In the interest of tractability, we have restricted attention to finite games in
strategic form and, where tractable, to simple games with infinite strategy sets. It
would be worthwhile to extend least-squares regret to other classes of games.
Least-squares regret could be extended to Bayesian games. Perhaps the most
straightforward approach would be simply to consider, for any Bayesian game,
least-squares regret with respect to each type of each player, but there may be
alternative approaches that are more flexible or fruitful.
Least-squares regret could be extended also to games in extensive form. While
a game in extensive form can be reduced in the usual way to a game in strategic
form and thereby made amenable to least-squares regret, there is good reason to
Chapter 9. Conclusion 130
develop a version of least-squares regret that can be applied directly to games in
extensive form. To begin, the reduction of a game in extensive form to a game in
strategic form may involve the loss of significant information so that a full analysis
of the initial game in extensive form may differ in important ways from that of
the resulting game in strategic form. Furthermore, extending least-squares regret
to games in extensive form may involve considering important and interesting
intricacies and subtleties that do not arise in games in strategic form and can thus
lead to a better understanding of the nature of regret and regret minimization
more generally. Least-squares regret applied directly to a game in extensive form
may yield solutions and insights very different from those that emerge when it is
applied to the corresponding game in strategic form.
One further area to which least-squares regret can be extended is mechanism
design. Just as a number of important mechanisms have been developed on the
basis of Nash equilibrium, there remains the prospect of developing alternative
mechanisms on the basis of least-squares regret instead. Particularly attractive ar-
eas include auction theory and bargaining theory given their practical significance
and the usefulness of least-squares regret, as illustrated in Sections 6.1, 6.2, and
6.8, in reasoning about auctions and auction-like games and bargaining games,
situations in which considerations of regret appear to be especially forceful.
While this dissertation is essentially an exploration of an alternative approach
to solving games and while numerous questions remain, it is our hope that least-
squares regret can be developed further and become a valuable supplement to the
canon of solution concepts for noncooperative games.
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